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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 1984, the Soviet Union's Minister of Defense, Dmitri
Ustinov, stated publicly that the Soviet Union had increased the number of
ballistic missile launching nuclear submarines (SSBNs) patrolling the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States.' Action of this sort had
been threatened earlier by former Soviet leader Yuri V. Andropov and
1. Wash. Post, May 21, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
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Marshall Nikolai V. Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, in
response to the Reagan Administration's decision to proceed with sched-
uled deployments of Pershing II ballistic missiles and intermediate-range
ground launched cruise missiles in the European theatre. Ogarkov had
indicated that the Soviet Union would station additional Soviet SSBNs
sufficiently close to permit them to hit targets in the United States as
quickly as the new American missiles deployed in Western Europe could
hit targets in the Soviet Union.' Though there has been no official
indication of countermeasures the United States might take, there seems
little doubt that one possible response would involve an acceleration in the
activities of the United States' nuclear powered antisubmarine submarines
(SSNs) in those ocean areas adjoining the continental United States. This
response would not likely go unchallenged. Indeed, if the Soviets are to
assure their SSBNs sufficient protection from American SSNs and
accomplish the objective stated by Marshall Ogarkov they may deploy
antisubmarine warfare (ASW)s weapons at various seabed locations.
Since the most effective strategy of neutralization would involve engaging
American SSN forces as far forward as possible, the Soviets would likely
seek to deploy their ASW weapons on that portion of the seabed considered
the continental shelf of the United States.
The interplay between the United States' announcements regarding
the deployment of nuclear missiles and the reaction of the Soviet Union in
this instance indicates that the continental shelf will attract the interest of
Soviet military strategists. There are at least two other considerations
which may well assure that this interest will focus on full scale foreign state
military use of the continental shelf. The first of these arises from the
vulnerability of the United States' intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) force to destruction by the Soviet Union.
As early as 1976, recognized authorities warned of the United States'
ICBM force's' impending vulnerability5 Shortly thereafter various sug-
gestions for enhancing the survivability of that force were advanced.6
2. Allen & Polmar, The Silent Chase: Tracking Soviet Submarines, N.Y. Times, Jan.
1, 1984, 6 (Magazine), at 13, col. 1.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 31-45.
4. For the seminal work in this area, see Nitze, Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era
of Detente, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 207 (1976). See also Editorial Comment, Reflections on the
Quarter, 23 ORBIS 251, 253 (1979); Frye, Strategic Build-Down: A Context for
Restraint, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 293, 296, 298 (1983-84).
5. But see Lodal, Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View, 54 FOREIGN
AFF. 462 (1976).
6. See Gray, The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 771,
785-86 (1978). Proposals included multiple aim point (MAP) basing modes using buried
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These proposals, and others, have continued to receive priority considera-
tion from President Reagan.7 From all indications, however, full imple-
mentation of any proposal will stretch well into the balance of the 1980s.'
During the interim period of strategic realignment - a period when the
United States will be faced with the oft-talked about "window of
vulnerability" - Poseidon and the soon to be operational Trident missile
launching nuclear submarines will be relied upon heavily' 0 to deter
excessive Soviet adventurism and the effects of nuclear gamesmanship. 11
Given that a greater number of targets in the Soviet Union can be brought
within range the further seaward SSBNs of the United States are able to
advance, it would seem logical that any concerted effort by the Soviet
Union to minimize the devastation which the United States' submarine
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) force could inflict must engage the
Americans as far forward as possible. This will likely reinforce the interest
of Soviet military strategists in using the United States' continental shelf to
deploy military objects.
The second consideration arises from the possibility that the ex-
pressed interest of the United States in basing modern ballistic missiles on
conventional powered submarines which cruise the waters above the
Atlantic and Pacific shelves may eventually manifest itself in the form of
actual deployment.' 2 The United States may attempt to reconfigure the
trenches, dispersed and hardened horizontal or vertical shelters, and ICBMs located in
pools of water. In the summer of 1979, the Carter Administration was leaning towards the
buried trench option. See Kaiser, Complicated "Racetrack " Scheme Favored for Basing
New MX Missile, Wash. Post, July 26, 1979, at A3, col. 1.
7. Early in Reagan's first term, his administration expressed interest in a hardened
basing mode which concentrated, rather than dispersed, ICBMs. Known as "densepack,"
see Drew, A Political Journal, THE NEW YORKER, May 9, 1983, at 48, the basing mode
was not well received by Congress. In January 1983, President Reagan established the
Scowcroft Commission which reported in April of 1983 that the most appropriate basing
mode for new ICBMs, like the MX, should involve deployment in individual hardened silos.
See Frye, supra note 4, at 298.
8. See Gray, supra note 6, at 786-87.
9. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
96TH CONG., 1 ST SESS., FISCAL YEAR 1980 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS 45 (Joint
Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1980 ACIS].
10. Id. at 54.
II. As indicated in Section IV of this Article, the Soviet Union does not rely as heavily
as the United States on its SSBNs to deter nuclear conflict or geopolitical maneuvering. Its
nuclear force is based mainly on ICBMs, with SSBNs and long-range bombers comprising
only a small percentage of its nuclear arsenal.
12. It also may be that the controversy in spring 1984 surrounding the lawfulness of
mining operations undertaken by the United States Central Intelligence Agency in ports
along the Nicaraguan coast suggests a growing interest in using ocean areas over which the
coastal state has some type of jurisdiction for activities designed to exert political pressure
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basing pattern of its nuclear deterrent by shifting the more powerful and
technologically complex modern ballistic missiles - MXs - from land to
nearby ocean areas.13 It cannot be expected that the Soviets will remain
unresponsive while the United States moves to enhance the survivability of
its long-range nuclear arsenal. Deployment of new strategic missiles on
small, conventional powered submarines designed to navigate the waters
above the Atlantic and Pacific shelves, rather than in fixed, increasingly
vulnerable land-based silos, would surely evoke some sort of countermea-
sure. The most likely may involve increased military use by the Soviet
Union of the continental shelf subjacent to the waters in which the new
submarines will navigate.
Obviously, from the above discussion, whether international law
authorizes foreign state emplacement of military objects on another state's
continental shelf is much more than just a matter of simple academic
curiosity. International peace and world stability may well turn on the
nature of the existing and the future legal regime governing such uses of
ocean areas. There is a general consensus that the provisions contained in
the Geneva Conventions of 1958's and the recently completed 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea15 prohibit foreign state
emplacement of military objects in another state's internal and territorial
waters.16 With regard to both the navigable water column of the high seas
concerning onshore political problems. Though based on the principles of international law
relating to internal and territorial waters rather than to the continental shelf, there would
seem to be no reason why this development would not add its own momentum to that already
in existence concerning foreign state military use of another state's continental shelf. After
all, it may be that military use of the shelf can be undertaken with fewer chances of
detection than similar use of internal and territorial waters.
13. See Getler, Hill Study of MX Missile Bases Tilt Toward Submarine, Wash. Post,
Sept. 10, 1981, at AS, col. I; Greenberg, Missiles at Sea, Wash. Post, Aug. 7, 1979, at Al 9,
col. 2.
14. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Continental Shelf Convention];
Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,450
U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as 1958 High Seas Convention]; Convention on the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No.
5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969,559 U.N.T.S. 285.
15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.62/122, 21 int'l Leg. Materials 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Conven-
tion on Law of Sea].
16. See Brown, The Legal Regime of Inner Space: Military Aspects, 22 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 181, 184 (1969); Gehring, Legal Rules Affecting Military Uses of the
Seabed, 54 MIL. L. REV. 168, 181-84 (1971); Zedalis, Military Uses of Ocean Space and
the Developing International Law of the Sea: An Analysis in the Context of Peacetime
ASW, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575,596-605,630-37 (1979). The same prohibition does not
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and its bed, however, most authorities recognize a rule of qualified
freedom. 17
Regarding the continental shelf, the prevalent view is that it is subject
to the same proscriptive regime governing internal and territorial waters. 18
Over the years, however, voices have been raised in favor of authorizing
foreign state emplacement of military objects on another state's continen-
tal shelf.19 Recently the notion has developed that perhaps a proscriptive
regime cannot be assumed. Indeed, the suggestion has arisen that there
may very well be enough uncertainty to provide a foreign state with
latitude to contend that such military utilization is supported by the basic
principles of the international law of the sea. Because that suggestion
substantially departs from the previously held beliefs and has been
advanced by scholars of considerable stature within the international legal
extend to such use of internal and territorial waters by the coastal state itself.
17. See M. JANIS, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 85 (1976); M. McDOUGAL
& W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 754-63,769-73 (1962); Baxter, Legal
Aspects of Arms Control Measures Concerning the Missile Carrying Submarines and
Anti-Submarine Warfare, in THE FUTURE OF THE SEA-BASED DETERRENT 209, 221
(1973); Stoever, The "Race"for the Seabed: The Right to Emplace Military Installations
on the Deep Ocean Floor, 4 INT'L LAW. 560, 563-64 (1970); Zedalis, "Peaceful Purposes"
and Other Relevant Provisions of the Revised Composite Negotiating Text: A Compara-
tive Analysis of the Existing and the Proposed Military Regime for the High Seas, 7
SYRACUSE J. OF INT'L L. & COMM. 1 (1979). The basic limitations on the right are reflected
in the "reasonable regard" standard of Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, supra
note 14, and the Hague Convention Relating to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines, done Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541, 1 Bevans 669. The latter
prohibits the use of physical-contact mines, unless they either become harmless within one
hour after release or are anchored and become harmless if they break loose. The prohibition
probably does not affect contact mines that are innocuous until automatically activated.
However, even these may be subject to a requirement that they become harmless within one
hour after activation. On the "reasonable regard" standard, see M. McDOUGAL & W.
BURKE, supra, at 769-73.
18. See E. BROWN, ARMS CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE: LEGAL ASPECTS 32 (1971); W.
BURKE, TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEAN 78 (1969); M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE,
supra note 17, at 724; Gehring, supra note 16, at 188-94; Rao, Legal Regulation of
Maritime Military Uses, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 425,447-49 (1973). For the proposition that
military use of the shelf by the contiguous coastal state is permitted, see M. McDOUGAL &
W. BURKE, supra note 17, at 717.
19. See 23 U.N. GAOR C. 1 (1605th mtg.) at 3-5, U.N. Doc. A/C. I /PV. 1605 (1968)
(comment of Soviet Union representative). Chichele Professor of Public International Law
at Oxford University, the late D.P. O'Connell, reached the same conclusion. See 1 D.
O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 488 (1982); O'Connell, Resource
Exploitation, The Law of the Sea and Security Implications, in NEW STRATEGIC FACTORS
IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC 160, 167 (C. Bertram & J. Hoist eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
NEW STRATEGIC FACTORS]. See also Treves, Military Installations, Structures, and
Devices on the Seabed, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 808, 831-46 (1980). Professor Treves of the
University of Milan served as the coordinator of the French language group of the Drafting
Committee of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.
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community, it merits sedulous scrutiny."
The purpose of this Article is to examine each of the arguments
supporting the view that international law may authorize foreign state
emplacement of military objects on another state's continental shelf during
peacetime.21 To provide some perspective, the opening section briefly
surveys current ASW technology. As will be apparent from that discus-
sion, technology capable of permitting the emplacement of useful military
objects on the continental shelf currently exists and continues to be
improved with each passing year.
Following this survey, a section on legal principles analyzes the
relevant provisions of the current law reflected in the Geneva Conventions
of 1958. This section also analyzes the proposed 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Four tentative conclusions emerge from
this analysis. First, under current and future international law foreign
states may, in principle, lawfully emplace military objects on another
state's continental shelf. This results from the application of the doctrine of
freedom of the seas to the bed of the continental shelf. Second, in those
instances where foreign state emplacement and existing or ongoing coastal
state activity conflict, the prevailing use is to be determined by balancing
the values which each competing use attempts to advance. The 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf does not expressly enjoin the
use of this approach in the same manner as does the proposed 1982 United
Nations Convention. Nevertheless, its appropriateness under current law
seems demonstrated by its time-honored character and the consistency of
its results. Third, in most conceivable instances, application of the
balancing test prohibits even the very initiation of foreign state efforts to
conduct military maneuvers or emplace military objects, irrespective of the
20. Treves, supra note 19.
21. It should be noted that the question of lawfulness of foreign state military use
during peacetime may arise in one of the following three contexts: (1) threat directed at the
state whose shelf is being used; (2) threat directed at a third state rather than the state
whose shelf is being used; (3) threat directed at a third state, but use of the shelf is occurring
in accordance with consent of the contiguous coastal state. Principles discussed in this
Article govern the legal relations between the foreign state and the coastal state in the first
two situations just described. This Article does not deal with the legal relations between the
coastal state and the third state in the last situation described, nor between the foreign state
and the third state in the second and third situations. Matters of this sort are beyond the
scope of the present inquiry because they fall within the provisions of the U.N. Charter
governing the use of force and, perhaps, the Hague Convention of 1907 on Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, 18 Oct. 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. 545, 1 Bevans
723.
No attempt is made in this Article to address the question of whether international law
permits a coastal state to use its own shelf for military purposes. The coastal state's right,
however, is at least as extensive as any right held by foreign states.
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absence of an actual conflict with some coastal state use. Under the
proposed 1982 United Nations Convention, however, and then only when
foreign state military use involves some portion of the first 200-nautical
miles of another state's continental shelf, international law expressly
dictates the application of a balancing test. In all other instances its
application must be inferred. Fourth, in some situations the coastal state is
within its rights under current law to take unilateral efforts to remove
foreign state military objects emplaced on its continental shelf in violation
of international law. Under the dispute settlement provisions of the 1982
United Nations Convention, however, the lawfulness of such unilateral
efforts appears justified in only the most extreme cases.
The concluding section of this Article attempts to assess the strategic
military consequences and impact on world order of adopting either a
regime which permits or one which prohibits foreign state emplacement of
military objects on another state's continental shelf. This assessment seems
imperative given the inextricable relationship between law and political-
military reality in the international realm of arms control. In the final
analysis, the concluding section argues that the components of the current
superpower military equation commend a proscriptive legal regime. A
regime of this character minimizes the likelihood of confrontation, thus
ensuring a modicum of international stability.
II. DETECTION DEVICES AND NAVAL ORDNANCE
The modern Navy has four basic missions: sea control, projection of
power ashore, presence, and strategic deterrence. 2 The essence of sea
control is the ability both to assure one's forces effective and unimpeded use
of a specific portion of the oceans and to deny such use to the forces of an
adversary.2 3 Projection of power ashore does not involve the capability of
naval forces to exercise hegemony on the seas but rather the capability to
use the seas for mounting a strike against coastal or land-locked states.24
Unlike sea control and projection of power ashore, naval presence is the
mission perhaps most directly related to everyday foreign policy. It
involves the orchestrated, noncombat positioning of naval forces to
22. Turner, The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 339,
343 (1977); Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, 26 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 2 (1974). See
generally Komer, Maritime Strategy vs. Coalition Defense, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 1124 (1982);
Turner & Thibault, Preparingfor the Unexpected: The Needfor a New Military Strategy,
61 FOREIGN AFF. 122 (1982).
23. Turner, The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 339, at
345 (1977).
24. Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, 26 NAVAL WAR C. REV. at 5, 8 (1974).
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influence the resolution of particular political events occurring on shore.15
Arguably, the most important of the four missions is that of strategic
deterrence. This involves the employment of a Navy's nuclear war-making
capability to deter adversaries contemplating either limited or all-out
nuclear or conventional attack by threatening the kind of retaliation that
would be viewed as unacceptably devastating.26
Though the SSBN can, to some small extent, operate to support
efforts at sea control, it is principally designed to satisfy the mission of
strategic deterrence. This mission is effected through its ability to deliver
SLBMs against enemy targets. Theoretically speaking, however, an
adversary could completely frustrate or at least partially hamper the
accomplishment of strategic deterrence or sea control by initiating a
surprise or short-warning attack against ports where SSBNs are sta-
tioned.17 This could also be accomplished by deploying an ASW system
capable of detecting, identifying, locating, and destroying an opponent's
SSBNs as they move from home port to various target acquisition
destinations. The latter undertaking - involving the deployment of an
ASW system - is of immediate concern to us here28 and can be divided
into operational and system dimensions.
From an operational standpoint, ASW strategy is designed to provide
area and/or point defense. In short, area defense seeks to secure vast
expanses of ocean-space through the establishment of barriers to an
adversary's penetration into larger operational theatres.2 9 Generally, these
barriers are set up at straits or other natural geological ocean passage
zones. Point defense, on the other hand, picks up where area defense leaves
off. Specifically, it seeks to assure that the amount and magnitude of
attacks launched from SSBNs and other submarines which have eluded
25. See generally E. LUTTWAK, THE POLITICAL USES OF SEA POWER 1-38 (1974).
Luttwak labels naval presence "suasion." Id. at 3.
26. See M. JANIS, supra note 17, at 1.
27. See HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., EVALUATION OF
FISCAL YEAR 1979 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS: TOWARD MORE INFORMED
CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING 103 (Comm.
Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 ACIS].
28. This is primarily because the Geneva Conventions and the 1982 U.N. Convention
apply to law of the sea matters arising during peacetime. See C. COLOMBOS, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (5th rev. ed. 1962) (The 1958 Geneva Conventions are discussed
under the heading of "The International Law of the Sea in Time of Peace.") and Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
9) at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956) reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253,256,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1956/Add. 1 (1957) (1956 draft regulated law of sea "in time
of peace only"). A surprise or short-warning attack would involve matters governed by the
U.N. Charter.
29. See S. HIRDMAN, PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE OCEAN 11 (1972).
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the barrier control network will be kept to a minimum."
The systems used to staff the ASW networks providing area and point
defense fall into the category of detection devices or naval ordnance.
Technological advancements have led to the development of detection
devices which rely on a staggering variety of methods to detect, identify,
and locate enemy submarines. The most important methods include low-
light-level television, infra-red line scan, radar sensor, magnetic anomaly
detection, active and passive sonobuoy, dipping sonar, and acoustic
detection arrays.31 Some of these methods share certain general features.
Specifically, low-light-level television and radar sensor depend on visual
apprehension for detection purposes. Infra-red line scan and magnetic
anomaly detection rely on inaudible emissions from submarines or the
earth itself. Sonobuoys, sonar, and detection arrays, on the other hand,
30. Once an enemy submarine has escaped allied barrier-control systems, or managed
to transit to the deep ocean before the commencement of hostilities, ASW switches to "point
defense." Here allied ASW forces, exercising ASW sea assertion capabilities, attempt to
frustrate enemy sea denial forces by creating a cordon sanitaire around transiting allied
vessels.
31. See 1979 ACIS, supra note 27, at 106, 108; Antisubmarine Warfare, in [1974]
WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT 303, 308-13 (Stockholm Int'l Peace Research
Institute) (on low light level television, infra-red line scan, radar sensor, magnetic anomoly
detection, and sonobuoys) [hereinafter cited as Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974]; K.
Tsipis, TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE 24-25 & app. 1, table 1,
A(3) (1974) (on dipping sonar) [hereinafter cited as ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE]. The
principal acoustic detection arrays presently employed are the Sonar Surveillance System
(SOSUS), see generally Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5068 Before the Comm.
on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374-75 (1977); ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE,
supra, at 29-30; the Azores Fixed Acoustic Range (AFAR), see ANTISUBMARINE
WARFARE, supra at 30 and app. 1, table 1, A(5), and Sea Spider, see ANTISUBMARINE
WARFARE, supra at app. 1, table 1, A(5).
The entire SOSUS system consists of several individual systems, each designed to
monitor specific areas of ocean space. "Caesar," the original component of SOSUS, is
emplaced on the continental shelf along the eastern seaboard. See ANTISUBMARINE
WARFARE, supra at app. 1, table 1, A(5). A more advanced and refined version, "Colossus,"
is located on the Pacific shelf off the west coast. See Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra
at 317. "Barrier" and "Bronco," systems similar to those scanning the two seaboards, are
believed to be deployed beyond the coasts of the United States allies. See ANTISUBMARINE
WARFARE, supra, at app. 1, table 1, A(5).
AFAR consists of several sonars mounted on top of three or more 130-meter towers,
each spaced thirty-five kilometers apart and submerged off the southern-most islands of the
Azores group in water 300 to 600 meters in depth. Its principal task is to keep a check on
submarines entering and leaving the Mediterranean. Sea Spider is a much more ambitious
system. Basically, it is a passive acoustic submarine detection unit composed of a single
hydrophonic listening device three meters in diameter and anchored by three cables at a
depth of approximately 5,000 meters. The entire unit is reported to be powered by a nuclear
battery and stationed a few hundred miles north of Hawaii. In 1969 the Navy attempted
unsuccessfully to install such a system. Reports that it later succeeded have not been
confirmed.
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function on the basis of detectable sound emitted or reflected by
submarines.
Detection methods depending upon audible emissions, however,
cannot be distinguished among themselves on the basis of differing
functional characteristics. Nevertheless, these methods can be categorized
as either having passive or active capabilities. 2 If passive, they simply
listen for sound emitted as a result of the turbulence of a submarine's
motion while proceeding through the ocean.33 If active, they utilize
electromechanical generators, known as transducers, to propagate sound
waves and hydrophones to detect reflection of those waves. 4 Whether a
sonobuoy, sonar, or a detection array, a passive acoustic detection device
has greater operational range than an active system. 35 Active systems,
however, are capable of computing target location3 6 - a truly invaluable
attribute.
One or more of the devices using these detection methods may be
carried by satellite, land or aircraft carrier-based fixed wing airplane,
32. All submarines have two characteristics that make them detectable. First, they
generate and diffuse a spectrum of acoustic energy as a result of the cavitation and
turbulence of their movement through ocean space. Second, sound-wave emissions that
strike the interface of a submarine reflect and become susceptible to detection and analysis.
Acoustic energy emission and acoustic energy reflection provide operational foundations
for the two generic types of underwater acoustic submarine detection devices, the passive
device and the active device.
It should be noted that the nature of the ocean limits the selection of effective devices
for submarine detection. For instance, electromagnetic radiation cannot be used because it
is too readily attenuated by sea water. As a result, devices utilizing acoustic energy have
been employed almost exclusively. Nevertheless, the character of ocean space limits the
effectiveness of even these devices. Specifically, the velocity of acoustic sound waves is
directly related to ocean temperature, ocean salinity, water pressure (which is a function of
depth), and water turbulence. These factors necessarily mean that there are variations in
both sound wave velocity and consequential acoustic energy reflection from one ocean to
another, or even from one spot to another within the same ocean.
33. The passive device consists of hyper-sensitive hydrophones or listening instru-
ments that detect sound emissions generated by transiting vessels. These devices then relay
the detected emissions to an awaiting computer analysis unit, which processes out the
ambient ocean noise and attempts to identify the nature of the transiting object.
34. The transducers used by the active system are designed to convert electrical
energy into acoustic energy and to propagate the resulting sound waves through ocean
space. The hydrophones then listen to detect any reflection of the sound waves, processing
all information in a manner similar to that used by the passive system.
35. Passive devices can pick up sound generated as far as 100 miles away. See Brown,
Military Uses of the Ocean Floor, in PACEM IN MARIBUS 285, 288 (E. Borgesse ed. 1972).
Some authorities, however, set the range at 100 kilometers. See Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS:
1974, supra note 31, at 307. Active systems, on the other hand, are said to have a range of
about 50 miles. See Brown, supra at 287.
36. Processing units accomplish this by triangulation and measuring the time it takes
for sound pulses to return to the hydrophones.
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helicopter, surface ship, antisubmarine submarine, or may be deployed in
the waters of the oceans or fixed on the ocean's floor.37 Generally, basing
platforms using airspace or outer space will carry detection devices relying
on low-light-level television, infra-red line scan, radar sensors, or magnetic
37. Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 31, at 298 (on satellite based
devices). The Orion P-3C is the principal land-based aircraft used in ASW. It has a patrol
speed of approximately 200 knots and is capable of deploying eighty-seven active and
passive sonobuoys. Id. at 310. See also ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, supra note 31, at 22.
The active sonobuoys are said to have an effective detection range of about three kilometers;
the passive devices have a reported range of approximately ten kilometers. See Y.B. WORLD
ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 3 1, at 310. The principle carrier-based aircraft used in ASW
is the Viking S-3A. The Viking is a twin-engine jet with a sea-level loiter speed of 160 knots
and a maximum patrol range of 2,000 to 3,000 nautical miles.
In recent years the helicopter has proven an effective ASW platform. The operational
union of helicopters and long-range, fixed-wing aircraft has permitted large-area "sanitiza-
tion," compelled by the advent of submarine-based surface-to-surface cruise missiles with
effective ranges of from 20 to 400 kilometers. In an effort to detect transiting submarines,
the United States Navy has stationed both dipping sonar and sonobuoys aboard.land- and
carrier-based helicopters. The best known anti-submarine helicopter employing both
dipping sonar and sonobuoys is the Sea King SH-3 series. See ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE,
supra note 31, at 24 and app. 1, table 1, A(3). The Sea King is a land- or carrier-based
helicopter piloted by a four-man crew. It carries active acoustic dipping sonar with a range
of a few kilometers, as well as various active and passive sonobuoys. These include the AN/
SSQ-53 D.I.F.A.R. (passive sonobuoy), AN/SSQ-47/47B (active miniature sonobuoy
used for localization, code-named "Julie"), AN/SSQ-50 (a self-powered active localiza-
tion unit), and "Cass" (command-activated sonobuoy system). See id. at app. 1, table 1,
A(4). The sonobuoys are dropped on the surface, like those used by the Orion P-3C and the
Viking S-3A. They scan the area for audible sound emissions and transmit information to
the hovering helicopter, where it is processed and analyzed. Employing both sonobuoys and
dipping sonar, the Sea King can effectively "sanitize" a large expanse of ocean space in a
relatively short period of time.
The Surveillance Towed Array Sensor Systein (SURTASS) is a surface-ship based,
mobile, long-range, passive surveillance system designed to supplement the SOSUS
network. It consists of an acoustic hydrophone array towed astern civilian-manned small
vessels. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 9 7 TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FISCAL YEAR 1982 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS
355, 357 (Joint Comm. Print 1982).
On detection devices carried aboard United States SSBNs, see 1979 ACIS, supra note
27, at 109-10.
Having characteristics of both the free-floating sonobuoy and the fixed acoustic
detection array are the Moored Surveillance System (MSS) and its follow-on, the Rapidly
Deployable Surveillance System (RDSS). MSS consists of command-activated, long-life
sonobuoys which are dropped from the air and which automatically moor themselves to the
ocean floor to prevent displacement. Each sonobuoy is equipped with an elaborate
communication and detection system having a useful life of about ninety days. The
deployment scenario calls for each sonobuoy to be placed in a position that facilitates
submarine localization through triangulation techniques. The fact that the sonobuoys can
be moored in up to 3,000 fathoms of water creates the likelihood of a deep-ocean detection
capability. See ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, supra note 31, at 30 and app. 1, table 1, A(5).
See also Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 31, at 317-18. RDSS is quite similar.
See 1980 ACIS, supra note 9, at 107.
CONTINENTAL SHELF
anomaly detection. Those basing platforms using the waters or bed of the
oceans will carry active or passive sonobuoy, dipping sonar, or other
acoustic detection systems.
Complementing the various detection systems are four types of
weapons, each capable of disposing of enemy submarines. These weapons
include depth charges, antisubmarine rockets, antisubmarine torpedos,
and submersible antisubmarine mines. While the exact capabilities of
these weapons remain classified, reports suggest they may be awesome.
Many of the depth charges, rockets, and torpedos are, or can be, armed
with nuclear explosive devices. 8 Some have target acquisition ranges of
about 50,000 meters with diving abilities of up to 1,000 meters.39 Less
astounding capabilities are possessed by the depression and magnetic-
acoustic submersible mines 0 which have become widely used in recent
years. While they incorporate the latest technological innovations, they
have a basic range limitation of about 30 fathoms.
Two developments have occurred during the last fifteen years which
seem indicative of technology's impact on modern antisubmarine warfare.
As reported in the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's
annual publication, World Armaments and Disarmament,41 military
technologists can now deploy huge fixed acoustic detection devices capable
of insonifying all ocean space. The detection devices would consist of a
massive tower resting on the ocean floor at a depth of 5,000 meters with
each leg of the tower's tripod 10 kilometers apart. On top of this structure
would sit an acoustic detection array consisting of electromechanical
transducers and hydrophonic receivers."2 It has been suggested that only
one such device need be stationed in each of the world's oceans in order to
permit continual surveillance of all conventional and nuclear powered
submarines.
The second technological development involves a new, moored,
submersible, magnetic/acoustic mine.43 This new mine has integrated
38. See Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year
1981: Hearings on S.2294 Before the Subcomm. on Research and Development of the
Senate Armed Services Comm., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3102-06 (1980) (discussing the
SUBROC nuclear depth bomb and various torpedoes) [hereinafter cited as Department of
Defense Authorization].
39. Id.
40. Depression mines rest on or are secured to the sea floor. Unlike physical-contact
mines, which explode on impact, depression mines depend on fluctuations in the hydrostatic
pressure. Magnetic acoustic mines also rest on or are secured to the sea floor. They are
activated by changes in the surrounding magnetic or acoustic energy levels.
41. See Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 31.
42. Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 31, at 317.
43. This is the Captor, or Encapsulated Torpedo, mine. See 1979 ACIS, supra note
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various technological innovations which give it the ability to detect an
enemy submarine, release itself from its mooring device, and then propel
itself to its targeted destination. Indications are that this moored torpedo
may be deployed by airplane, surface ship, or submarine," and that it has a
sensor acquisition radius of about one kilometer. 5
Even though these two new developments will not change the basic
nature of antisubmarine warfare, they show continuous and rapid progress
in that field. At some point, inevitably the pace of such progress will place
all SSBNs in jeopardy. In light of these developments, claims by foreign
states to use another state's continental shelf for military purposes take on
added significance.
Information presently available to the general public suggests that
while the United States currently possesses the capability to employ each
of the detection methods and weapons systems discussed above,'6 the
Soviets apparently have yet to reach a comparable level of sophistication . 7
Nevertheless, given the increasing level of Soviet military technology,' 8 it
seems that the Soviets could acquire a matching ability after a reasonable
period of intense research and development.49 Indeed, if one accepts the
view that recent Soviet strategic military efforts reveal an intent to acquire
a war-winning capability, there would be every reason to suspect that in the
near future the Soviets might feel compelled to concentrate greater
attention on antisubmarine warfare.5
27, at 108.
44. See Department of Defense Authorization, supra note 38, at 3111.
45. See ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, supra note 31, at 33.
46. See supra notes 31-45 (United States possesses capabilities in all areas discussed).
47. See ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, supra note 31, at 66-68 and accompanying tables
of reference cited therein.
48. On Soviet efforts in the field of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, see Robinson,
Soviets Push for Beam Weapon, 106 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH. 11 (1977);
Thompson, "Directed Energy" Weapons and the Strategic Balance, 23 ORBIS 697
(1979). For commentary on the legal aspects of ASAT weapons, see Zedalis & Wade, Anti-
Satellite Weapons and the Outer Space Treaty of1967,8 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 454 (1978).
On Soviet ability to MIRV (to place multiple warheads on its ICBMs) as early as 1974, see
1979 ACIS, supra note 27, at 55. On Soviet efforts to improve the accuracy of its ICBMs,
see id. at 56.
49. The Soviets apparently seek major breakthroughs, rather than incremental
advances, in almost every area of military technology. For apprehensions thus generated in
the field of anti-submarine warfare, see 1979 ACIS, supra note 27, at 106.
50. This is a logical expectation since it would result in adding the United States'
SLBMs to its already jeopardized land-based ICBM force, leaving the Soviets with more
attention to concentrate on intercepting long-range bombers. For an analysis of Soviet air
defense against an attack by the United States' bomberforce, see Rummel, Will the Soviet
Union Soon Have a First-Strike Capability?, 20 ORBIS 579, 584-86 (1976).
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III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
As in many other areas of international law, the codified juridical
norms governing military uses of the oceans during peacetime are derived
either from conventions directed at specific activities or from conventions
containing general provisions designed to deal with the entire range of
conceivable activities. Those directed at the restriction of some specific
military use of the oceans include the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963
(LTB),5' Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 (SACT), 5' and the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM Treaty).53 Each of these treaties
contains provisions proscribing particular military uses of the oceans.
These proscribed uses range from nuclear weapons testing to the develop-
ment, testing, or deployment of sea-based ballistic missile defense sys-
tems. 54 In situations where one state's military use of another state's
continental shelf is not covered by treaties directed at specific activities, the
relevant international legal principles are those contained in the more
general provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Continental
Shelf 5 and the High Seas 56 and the proposed 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.5 7
51. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter cited as LTB]. See generally X, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 39 BRIT.
Y.B. I NT'L L. 449 (1963); Schwelb, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law,
58 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1964).
52. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof, done Feb. 11, 1971 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 [hereinafter cited as SACT].
See generally Krieger, The United Nations Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Ocean Floor, 3 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 107 (1971); Rao,
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty: A Study in the Contemporary Law of the Military Uses
of the Seas, 4 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 67 (1972).
53. Limitations on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, done May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T.
3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABMI.
54. The LTB prohibits nuclear test explosions in territorial waters or in the high seas.
LTB, supra note 5 1, at art. 1, 14 U.S.T. at 1316,480 U.N.T.S. at 45. The SACT prohibits
the installation of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the sea floor at any
point beyond twelve miles from the coastline of any state. SACT, supra note 52, at art. 1,23
U.S.T. at 704. The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of any
sea-based BMD system. ABM, supra note 53, at art. 5, 23 U.S.T. at 3441.
55. See supra note 14.
56. Id.
57. See 1982 Convention on Law of Sea, supra note 15.
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A. The Continental Shelf and Freedom of the Seas
Prior to the Gulf of Paria Treaty of 194258 and the Truman
Proclamation of 1945,59 the concept of the continental shelf as a legal
regime was not widely accepted. In the view of most commentators, the
national jurisdiction of a coastal state extended to the waters of its
territorial sea and the bed subjacent thereto. The waters beyond that
marginal belt of coastal state jurisdiction were held to be the high seas, and
the entire bed beneath those waters was said to be the bed of the high seas.60
Most of the discussion in the years intervening between the Truman
Proclamation of 1945 and the final adoption of the Continental Shelf
Convention of 1958 focused on the legal status of that portion of the bed of
the high seas which was ultimately encompassed by the developing shelf
concept. The principle positions articulated were that the area was res
nullius (owned by no one), and therefore subject to appropriation by
anyone, or res communis (common property), and therefore subject to
appropriation by no one." Nonetheless, since proponents on both sides of
the debate viewed the area, which later became the continental shelf, as a
portion of the bed of the high seas,62 the area was seen as subject to the
58. Treaty of 1942 relating to Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria, Feb. 26, 1942,
Great Britain- Northern Ireland-Venezuela, 205 L.N.T.S. 121.
59. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Comp.).
60. See 4 First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records 42,
para. 29 [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS I, Off. Rec.], U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40/SR.17
(1 958) (comment of Mr. Pedreira of Brazil indicating distinction between territorial sea
waters and high sea waters). See Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 377 (1950) (noting that some writers viewed seabed outside
territorial waters as open to use by all, and others viewed it as open to appropriation by
individual state; all writers viewed it as "seabed under the high seas").
61. For a discussion of the various views, see C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE SEA 81 (6th rev. ed. 1967); 1 P. FAUCHELLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL PUBLIC pt. !1, 17-19 (1925); 1 G. GIDEL, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA
MER 498-501 (1932); E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW (1758); 1 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 186-88 (1904); Hurst, Whose is the
Bed of the Sea?, 4 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 33 (1923-1924); Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over
Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376 (1950); Waldock, The Legal Basis of Claims
to the Continental Shelf, 36 TRANS. OF THE GROTIUS SOC'Y 115, 116-48 (1951).
62. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FORTY-FOURTH CON-
FERENCE (Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 1950) at 131. With regard to the sea now considered to be the
continental shelf, the Conference reported that:
[t] he doctrine that the seabed (as distinguished from its subsoil) outside territorial
waters is to be regarded as res communis, i.e., incapable of acquisition by any state,
does not differentiate between the status of that seabed and the status of the waters
above. It indicates no lawful basis for the exploitation of the resources of the
continental shelf in those cases in which it is technically necessary to pierce the bed
of the high seas and to erect installations thereon.
This doctrine has been attacked by those who hold - mostly for practical
1984] CONTINENTAL SHELF
fundamental doctrine of freedom of the seas.63 And since freedom of the
seas included the freedom of military use,6' it would appear that the
portion of the bed which eventually became the continental shelf of an
adjoining coastal state was, in principle, subject to military use by all
states.65
The doctrine of freedom of the seas was eventually codified with the
adoption of the High Seas Convention66 at the conclusion of the First
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in
Geneva, Switzerland in 1958. Article 2 of the High Seas Convention states
that the freedom comprises, "inter alia," navigation, fishing, overflight,
and the laying of submarine cables or pipelines.6 " The area to which the
freedom applies is the high seas, defined by Article 1 as "all parts of the
sea" beyond territorial seas of other states.68 No mention is made of a
freedom to undertake military uses not within one of the enumerated
freedoms; nor of the freedoms, whatever they include, being applicable to
the bed as well as the waters beyond the bed and waters of the territorial
seas of other states.
With respect to there being a freedom to engage in military uses not
reasons - that the bed of the high seas, like its subsoil and unlike its waters above,
is res nullius, over which control and jurisdiction may be acquired, as over "no
man's land", i.e., by effective occupation, provided adequate measures are taken to
safeguard the right of all nations with regard to freedom of navigation and fishing.
Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
63. See Summary Records of the 293d Meeting, [ 1955] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 54,
58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (1960). Mr. Scelle stated at the seventh session of
the International Law Commission that he was opposed to accepting a proposal on the high
seas advanced by Mr. Zourek "since it was incomplete and open to misinterpretation in that
it failed to stipulate that the seabed and superjacent air were subject to the same regime as
the high seas." Id. (emphasis added). Scelle observed, at the 320th meeting, that, in
addition to navigation, fishing, overflight, and the laying of cables and pipelines, "there were
other freedoms covered by [freedom of the seas] such as the right to scientific research, and
to the exploitation of the resources of the seabed." See also id. at 222 (emphasis added).
64. For support for the notion that freedom of the sea includes military use, see
McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for
Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648,678 (1955). See also U.S. Delegation Paper, Legality of Using
the High Seas in Connection with Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Pacific Ocean, U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 1958, US/CLS/POS/48(2)-(3), Annex II, Feb. 20,
1958, reprinted in 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 546, 548 (1965); L.
HENKIN, CHANGING LAW FOR THE CHANGING SEAS 84-86 (1968). See also Washburn,
The Legality of Pacific Blockade (pts. 1-3), 21 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 227, 442 (1921).
65. It should be noted that, even then, Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
prohibited military uses involving force against the shelf state.
66. See 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 14, at art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82-83.
67. Id., 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82.
68. Id., 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82-83.
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covered by navigation, overflight, and the laying of cables or pipelines,
attention need only be drawn to the reference to "inter alia."69 From all
indications, this open-ended reference was deliberately included to signify
that the enumeration of freedoms was not exhaustive.7 0 Most significant,
however, is that the Second Committee at UNCLOS I refused to endorse
two separate proposals prohibiting military uses not within any of the
enumerated freedoms. 71 The Three Power proposal 72 would have prohib-
ited military maneuvers and weapons practice on the high seas near foreign
coasts, and the Four Power proposal73 would have prohibited nuclear
weapons tests anywhere on the high seas.The rejection of these proposals
intimates that the term "inter alia" encompasses a wide range of military
undertakings.
With respect to the freedoms of the seas - including the freedom of
military use - applying to the seabed as well as to the waters beyond the
territorial seas of other states, several pieces of evidence come readily to
mind. First, the very definition of the term "high seas" is declared by
Article 1 of the High Seas Convention to include "all parts of the sea" not
69. See supra note 66.
70. See Summary Records of the 320th Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 220,
222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (1960). See also Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 10 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 3, art. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in [1955] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 19,21-22, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add.1 (1960); Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/3159/(1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253,278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/
Add.l (1957).
71. See 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 54; U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40/
SR.21 (1958) (rejecting the Three Power proposal 43 to 13, with 9 abstentions). The
second, or Four Power proposal, was countered with a United Kingdom proposal, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.13/C.2/L.64, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, Annex 132,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), later withdrawn, 4 UNCLOS I Off. Rec., supra note 60,
at 47, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40/SR.18 (1958). An Indian compromise, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 13/C.2/L.71 / Rev. I, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I Off. Rec., supra note 60, Annex 134,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.1 3/40 (1958), which prevented the Four Power proposal from being
rejected and resulted in the matter being referred to the United Nations General Assembly.
The specific proposals involved were the Three Power Proposal which prohibited military
maneuvers and weapons practice on the high seas near the coasts of foreign states, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.I 3/C.2/L.32, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, Annex
124, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40 (1958), and the Four Power Proposal which prohibits
nuclear weapons tests on the high seas, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.2/L.30, reprinted in 4
UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, Annex 124 (1958).
72. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. I 3/C.2/L.32, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra
note 60, Annex 124, U.N. Doe. No. A/Conf.13/40 (1958).
73. U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 1 3/C.2/L.30, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra
note 60, Annex 124, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40 (1958).
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within the territorial sea of other states .7  That this broad reference
includes more than just the water surface and navigable water column, is
supported by the fact that one of the three freedoms mentioned in Article 2
is that of overflight.7 5 Second, Article 26(1) of the Convention expressly
applies one of the freedoms, that of laying cables and pipelines, to the bed of
the sea. 76 Third, commentaries of 1955 and 1956 by the International Law
Commission (ILC) on earlier drafts of Article 2 of the High Seas
Convention expressly note that one of the unenumerated freedoms within
the reference "inter alia" is exploration and exploitation of the "subsoil. 77
Finally, the Second Committee at UNCLOS I specifically rejected, by a
vote of 27 to 2, with 25 abstentions, a Brazilian proposal which would have
applied the freedoms to the waters alone.7
B. Convention on the Continental Shelf: The Current Law
Apart from the High Seas Convention, UNCLOS I also produced a
Continental Shelf Convention reflecting the international community's
acceptance of a special relationship between a coastal state and the seabed
extending off its coast to the point where the water depth is 200 meters or,
74. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 14, at art. 1, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82.
75. See 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 14, at art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82-83.
76. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 14, at art. 26, para. 1, 13 U.S.T. at 2319,
450 U.N.T.S. at 96 ("All States shall be entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on
the bed of the high seas.").
77. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in [1955] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 19,21-22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add. 1 (1960) (stating that
"[the Commission] is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or
exploit the subsoil of the high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research therein.")
See also id., 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 26, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/Add.1 (1957).
78. Mr. Pedreira, the delegate from Brazil, desired to have the term "high seas"
changed to read "waters of the high seas." He then proposed to define "waters of the high
seas" to mean "those waters lying between the outer limits of the territorial sea," referring
to the territorial seas of all states. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.66 and L.67, reprinted in 4
UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, Annex 133, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40 (1958)
(emphasis added). Mr. Pedreira had been particularly interested in delimiting not only the
horizontal zones of ocean space but also the vertical zones. He felt that his proposal would
accomplish this delimitation and would confine the applicability of the principles to the
water surface and column only, leaving the seabed unaffected. See 4 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec.,
supra note 60, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40/SR.10 (1958) (remarks of Mr. Pedreira).
Committee i rejected the proposal designed to emphasize the distinction, id. at 52, 53,
forcing Pedreira to withdraw the other. See id. at 54, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40/SR.22
(1958). The rejection of the one proposal and the withdrawal of the other may well indicate
that what appears to be expansive language in Articles 1 and 2 should be so construed.
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even beyond that, to where the water admits of exploitation.79 The Shelf
Convention changed the characterization of that specific portion of the
seabed from what had previously been viewed as the bed of the high seas to
the legal continental shelf of the coastal state. The precise language of
Article 2(1) of the Shelf Convention which produced the change states:
"[t] he coastal State exercises sovereign rights over the continental shelf for
the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." 8 Two
questions quite naturally arise. First, did the right of foreign state military
use survive the Shelf Convention? Second, if it did, what happens when the
exercise of that right conflicts with activities of the coastal state?
1. The Right of Foreign State Military Use
(a) Reaffirmation: 1953-1958
1953: Evidence drawn from the travaux preparatoires (preparatory
documents) suggests that the right of foreign state military use survived
the Shelf Convention. The earliest indications from the ILC that it
apparently did not view the recognition of coastal state "sovereign rights"
in the continental shelf as destroying the traditional right of foreign state
military use are found in the records of its fifth session in 1953.81 The
language of Article 2 of the Shelf Convention considered at that session
was from the ILC's 1951 draft, which provided the coastal state with
"control and jurisdiction" to explore the shelf and exploit its natural
resources.82 Ultimately, that specific language was rephrased in 1953
79. See 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14, at art. 1, 15 U.S.T. at 473,
499 U.N.T.S. at 312.
80. Id.
81. See Summary Records, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 83-102, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/ 1953 (1959); Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 12-19, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in
[1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 212-20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/Add.1 (1959).
82. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 6
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 17,18, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951),reprintedin [195112 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 123, 141 (1957) ("The continental shelf is subject to the exercise by the
coastal State of control and jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources." (emphasis added)). In comment 7 to article 2, the ILC stated:
Article 2 avoids any reference to "sovereignty" of the coastal State over the
submarine areas of the continental shelf. As control and jurisdiction by the coastal
State would be exclusively for exploration and exploitation purposes, they cannot
be placed on the same footing as the general powers exercised by a State over its
territory and territorial waters.




following the reconsideration and rejection83 of an earlier adopted proposal
advanced by the British representative, Mr. Lauterpacht, designed to
"subject [the continental shelf] to the sovereignty of the coastal state."8 4
The final language provided the coastal state with "sovereign rights [over
the continental shelf] for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural
resources." This language is virtually identical to that found in Article 2 of
the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. 5
Before consideration of the adopted Lauterpacht proposal actually
occurred, an interesting and revealing exchange took place between the
Chinese representative, Mr. Hsu, and Chairman Amado. The immediate
impetus for the exchange was a proposal by the Russian representative,
Mr. Kozhevnikov, to add a second sentence to Lauterpacht's language
clearly limiting the exercise of sovereignty to exploration and exploitation
of the shelf's natural resources.8" Kozhevnikov's proposal, as well as several
similar proposals, 87 reflected a desire to clarify Lauterpacht's language by
83. See infra note 93.
84. See Summary Records of the 197th meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 79,
84, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1953 (1959). Lauterpacht's proposal was motivated by an
interest in assuring coastal state jurisdiction to deal with crimes on or beneath the shelf, and
he explained it as being subject to freedom of the seas. Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/
2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 266, 267, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 (1959); Summary Records of the 198th Meeting, [1953] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 85, 86, para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
85. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No.9) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [ 19531 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 200, 212, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.I (1959).
86. See Summary Records of the 200th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 97,
U.N. Doc. A/CN .4/SER.A/ 1953 (1959) ("The sovereign rights over the continental shelf
are exercised by the coastal State for the purpose of exploring and exploiting the natural
resources of this continental shelf."). Kozhevnikov had submitted a similar proposal shortly
after Lauterpacht's had been adopted. Id. at 89 (198th mtg.). However, it was defeated at
the next meeting. Id. at 92 (199th mtg.).
87. Between the time Lauterpacht submitted his proposal and the ILC acted
favorably on it, Mr. Francois, the representative of the Netherlands, moved a substantive
amendment providing that "[o] n the sea-bed, however, the coastal State has only the rights
of control and jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural (or
mineral) resources." Id. at 85 (198th mtg.). Shortly thereafter Lauterpacht proposed the
following limiting language: "On the sea-bed the exclusive rights of the coastal States are
limited to the exercise of rights of control and jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting the mineral resources of the sea-bed and its subsoil." Id. at 89 (198th mtg.).
Indeed, even as the ILC began its consideration of the 1951 draft of Article 2, the Indian
representative Mr. Pal advanced a proposal to change "control and jurisdiction" to
"sovereign rights of control and jurisdiction," but only in the context of a limitation on the
purposes for which sovereign rights could be exercised. Pal's proposal read: "The coastal
State has the sovereign rights of control and jurisdiction over the continental shelf in respect
only of its mineral resources and of the exploration and exploitation of the same." Id. at 87.
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circumscribing the purposes for which a coastal state could exercise
authority over the shelf. Hsu inquired, in recognition of this limiting
feature, whether the Kozhevnikov proposal permitted a coastal state to
take measures of security, "objecting, for instance, to another state's
sending a submarine into [the] area and concealing it there?"88 The
inquiry generated no immediate response. 89 Hsu then suggested that, since
the Lauterpacht proposal referred to "sovereignty," it would only be
"reasonable to expect claims for security to be made by the coastal state,"
notwithstanding the existence of additional language attached to the grant
with a view to limiting the purposes for which sovereignty could be
exercised. 90
Hsu's characterization of the significance of providing that the coastal
state has "sovereignty" over the shelf caught the immediate attention of
Chairman Amado. He reacted by rather cryptically reminding Hsu and
the other delegates that it had been Great Britain which had proposed
"sovereignty" and that doubtless she was one of the premier champions of
freedom of the seas. 91 Amado's observation was not objected to by
Lauterpacht or any other delegate present.
This exchange obviously captured the essence of what a coastal state
could not do under Lauterpacht's language of sovereignty. By virtue of
this, it also suggested what a foreign state was entitled to do. Since foreign
state military use had traditionally been permissible and the proposal to
grant a coastal state "sovereignty" had been advanced by a champion of
freedom of the seas in the interest of assuring coastal state criminal
jurisdiction, that proposal seemed in no way intended to change the law
concerning foreign state military use.92 The subsequent reconsideration by
See also the proposal of Mr. Spiropolous, infra note 89, made at the 200th meeting.
88. See Summary Records of the 200th Meeting, [ 1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 98,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
89. It was followed, however, by a proposal of the Spanish representative Mr. Alfaro
to further assure the limiting quality of Kozhevnikov's proposal by inserting the word "sole"
before the word "purpose." Id. The Greek representative Mr. Spiropolous then proposed
that Lauterpacht's earlier adopted proposal of "sovereignty" be merged with a limitation so
that there would be only one sentence reading: "The coastal state exercises over the
continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural
resources." Id.
90. Id. at 99.
91. Id.
92. One possible problem with reading the Hsu/Amado exchange as suggesting the
continuation of the right of foreign state military use is Hsu's reference to submarines. That
submarines navigate in the water above the shelf might lead some to contend that the
exchange can only prove helpful in establishing that coastal state rights in the shelf do not
affect the status of superjacent waters. This is an accurate statement of an international
legal principle, but that this is the proposition for which the Hsu/Amado exchange stands,
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the ILC of the Lauterpacht proposal and its ultimate rejection of that
proposal in favor of one advanced by the Greek representative, Mr.
Spiropolous,9 3 containing the very language finally reflected in the 1953
draft of Article 2 in no way weakens this basic conclusion.9' Indeed, if the
seems incorrect for one simple reason: It is abundantly clear that the context in which the
exchange occurred focused on the shelf and not the waters above it.
93. Spiropolous' language was initially advanced after Hsu's inquiry concerning the
Kozhevnikov proposal, and was withdrawn after Amado's reaction. Summary Records of
the 200th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953
(1959). At roughly the same time, the Alfaro and the Kozhevnikov proposals were rejected.
Summary Records of the 200th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 100, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959). Lauterpacht's and Francois' proposals had been with-
drawn before the Hsu/Amado exchange. Summary Records of the 199th Meeting, [ 1953]
1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 91, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959). The Pal proposal,
however, was still alive. After Spiropolous withdrew his language, Pal's proposal was
amended to read: "The exclusive rights of the coastal State are limited to the rights of user,
control and jurisdiction for the purposes of exploration and exploitation of the natural
(mineral) resources of the sea-bed and its subsoil." Summary Records of the 200th
Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 101, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
Subsequently, that language was adopted by a vote of 7 to 5, with 1 abstention, id. at 101,
and then Article 2 as a whole - containing Lauterpacht's language as its first sentence and
Pal's as its second - was adopted 8 to 4, with 1 abstention. Id. at 101-02.
At the 210th Meeting, the Swedish representative Mr. Sandstrom moved that Article
2 as adopted at the 200th meeting be reconsidered. Id. 169, para. 73. The motion passed, 9 to
4, with I abstention. Id. Sandstrom then proposed that the first sentence be deleted since he
had been absent from the 198th meeting when that sentence, advanced by Lauterpacht, was
adopted. Id. Actually, though Lauterpacht's language had been adopted 6 to 5, with 1
abstention, id. at 88, 7 of the 13 delegates spoke against it. See id. at 79 & 85 (197th &
198th mtgs.). Following Sandstrom's proposal to delete the first sentence of Article 2,
Spiropolous resubmitted his own earlier withdrawn language. Id. at 169 (210th mtg.). At a
later meeting, Sandstrom explained that his fear of the language used in the first sentence
stemmed from that "sovereignty over a territory was bound to result in sovereignty over
what lay above that territory." See id. at 199 (215th mtg.). Thus, he proposed that the
language, however limited by Lauterpacht, be replaced with "exclusive rights of control
and jurisdiction." Id. Mr. Alfaro, seeking to assure the delegates that Lauterpacht's
proposal, although couched in terms of "sovereignty," was really only designed to guarantee
coastal states the right to handle activities related to exploration and exploitation stated,
"[it was ... abundantly clear that the Commission was not recognizing the coastal State's
sovereignty over the continental shelf, but its exclusive. . . right of control and jurisdiction
for the purposes of exploring and exploiting." Id. at 201. Many were unsatisfied with the
language of draft Article 2. It was finally amended when Spiropolous' language was
adopted by a vote of 10 to 3, with I abstention. Id. at 202.
94. Recall that Lauterpacht's motive for proposing "sovereignty" stemmed from his
fear that without it the coastal state might lack jurisdiction over crimes on or beneath the
shelf. See supra note 84. Recognizing this, the ILC said in its 1953 Report on draft Article 2
that, even though "sovereign rights" appears in the final version of Article 2, "the text...
leaves no [d]oubt that the rights conferred upon the coastal State cover all rights necessary
for and connected with the exploration and the exploitation of the. . . shelf." Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at
14, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [ 1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 214 U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.I (1959).
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right of foreign state military use remained in the face of a grant of
"sovereignty" to coastal states, it definitely survived the change to
"sovereign rights" for specific and limited purposes) 5
1956: The eighth session of the ILC in 1956 considered two matters
bearing upon the continuation of the freedom of foreign state military use
of the continental shelf. The first matter involved the question of the
lawfulness of conducting nuclear weapons tests on the high seas. The
second involved the question of whether a foreign state should be permitted
to conduct weapons tests of any sort on the water surface or in the water
column of the high seas surmounting the continental shelf of another state
absent that state's prior approval.
Both of these matters were initially addressed in a paper prepared
95. Nothing here is intended to suggest that a coastal state is never entitled to take
measures of security on its shelf. Certainly, though the grant of "sovereignty" or "sovereign
rights" may have not been designed to confer the power to lawfully take such measures at
any point in time, the inherent right of self-defense, provided for in Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter; still exists and can be exercised in appropriate instances. Further, in the 1953
records of the I LC, a comment of the representative from The Netherlands, Mr. Francois,
evidences additional support for the view that foreign state military use survived sovereign
rights. As pointed out, Lauterpacht's proposal to vest the coastal states with "sovereignty"
over the shelf generated a flurry of limiting amendments, including one from Francois
himself. See supra note 87. However, unlike the Kozhevnikov language, it did not elicit
observations concerning foreign state military use, even though its thrust was virtually the
same. The Egyptian delegate Mr. el Khouri, however, was prompted to ask why the
limitation was necessary. Francois indicated that once "sovereignty" was referred to it
became "very important indeed to ensure the application of the doctrine of the freedom of
the seas." See Summary Records of the 198th Meeting, [ 1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 88,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959). His limitation accomplished this by making it
clear that "sovereignty" pertained to exploration on the shelf and exploitation of its natural
resources and not to "fish and wrecks." Though Francois' proposal was later withdrawn, see
supra note 93, draft Article 2 reported by the ILC in 1953 basically reflected its
fundamental limitation.
Admittedly, the observation by Francois does not explicitly support the continuation of
foreign state military use. It does, however, recognize the friction which the creation of
coastal state rights in the continental shelf causes traditional freedom of the seas. Francois,
as most other representatives of the ILC, recognized the need for a continental shelf
doctrine, a doctrine stating governing principles de legeferenda. Yet, at the same time he
and others recognized that the doctrine should only create coastal state rights for a very
limited set of purposes, preserving as much as possible the traditional freedoms existing de
lege lata. The two specific traditional freedoms referred to by Francois were the right of all
states to fish and to exploit wrecks. His failure to make reference to other freedoms long
acknowledged to exist should not be read as indicating that only fishing and the exploitation
of wrecks were to be preserved. Quite to the contrary, Francois' observation that his
proposal was motivated by an interest in assuring that "sovereignty" did not encroach on the
doctrine of freedom of the seas suggests that, with one exception, all traditional freedoms-
including the freedom of foreign state military use - remained intact. The only exception,
of course, concerned the coastal state's right to explore the shelf and exploit its natural
resources. No other state could pursue that activity.
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prior to the session by the Special Rapporteur who apparently felt
compelled to respond to the debate taking place among international legal
scholars on the general question of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons
tests.96 First, the Special Rapporteur suggested that nuclear weapons tests
were a permissible use of the seas subject to the proviso that they not
''unreasonably" prevent other states from enjoying their freedoms of the
seas.97 This suggestion evoked animated discussion at formal session, with
some delegates contending that the proper standard was not whether such
tests "unreasonably" interfered with but whether they "adversely af-
fected" the freedoms of other states.98 Ultimately, the ILC provided in its
commentary to the 1956 draft articles that "[s]tates are bound to refrain
from any acts which might adversely affect the use of the high seas by
nationals of other states."9 9 Yet the ILC also noted that it was making no
"express pronouncement" on the lawfulness of nuclear weapons tests in the
context of either freedom of the seas or ocean pollution. 100 This apparent
equivocation led some to conclude that the Commission had settled upon a
compromise which recognized the right to use the seas for nuclear weapons
tests, but only if the tests did not unreasonably interfere with the freedoms
of other states.10 1 Given the fact that the standard of reasonableness has
invariably been applied in international law to resolve competing permissi-
ble claims, one would seem unjustified in viewing the Commission's action
on this matter as designed to impair the freedom of military use.
96. Regime of the High Seas and of the Territorial Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/97
(1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 10 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
Regime of the High Seas]. See also Editorial Comment, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the
International Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 356 (1955); Margolis, The Hydrogen
Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955); McDougal & Schlei,
supra note 64.
97. Regime of the High Seas, supra note 96, at 1, 10.
98. See Summary Records of the 335th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 8,
I I -12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1956 (1956) (remarks of Mr. Pal); id. at 12 (remarks
of Mr. Zourek of Czechoslovakia); id. at 13 (remarks of Mr. Amado of Brazil).
99. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 24, Art. 27, commentary 2, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted
in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1
(1957).
100. For action on nuclear weapons tests and freedom of the seas, see Summary
Records of the 340th Meeting, [ 1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 32-34, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1956 (1956). On ocean pollution, see id. at 59-63 (346th mtg.); Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at
33-34, commentary 4, art. 48, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 253,285-86, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1956/Add. 1 (1957) (providing that,
in the context of ocean pollution, the question of nuclear weapons tests is a many-sided
problem subject to "difficulties besetting any attempt to impose a general prohibition").
101. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 17, at 761.
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The ILC's consideration of the Special Rapporteur's second recom-
mendation - that a proposal be adopted requiring a foreign state to obtain
advance approval from a coastal state before conducting weapons tests of
any sort in the waters above that state's continental shelf - is most
relevant to our present inquiry concerning the freedom of foreign state
military use of another's shelf. The proposal accurately reflected the
tension between an activity deemed permissible freedom of the seas and the
sovereign rights of a coastal state to explore the shelf and exploit its natural
resources. Scientific detonation of a nuclear weapon in the water column of
the high seas immediately above the continental shelf of a state could have
a direct and substantial effect on that state's sovereign rights by contami-
nating its shelf with radiation. Thus, it was essential to design a proposal to
accommodate the interests of the states involved.
Once the Commission declined to explicitly proscribe nuclear weap-
ois tests, the Special Rapporteur suggested that the delegates consider
disregarding his proposal requiring advance consent. 10 Subsequently that
suggestion was followed. 103 The clear inference to be drawn is that the ILC
did not wish to enlarge the shelf state's rights to include authorizing them
to require advance consent from foreign states interested in using the
waters of the high seas superjacent to the shelf for activities falling within
the doctrine of freedom of the seas. 0 4 The sovereign rights of coastal states
pertain to exploration and exploitation of the shelf and do not affect the
waters above. Recognition of the use of nuclear weapons tests on the high
seas could well encroach on the coastal states' sovereign rights much more
extensively than other more limited forms of military use of the bed of the
shelf. Thus, it appears the rejection of the Special Rapporteur's proposal
affirms the traditional freedom of foreign state military use of another's
continental shelf.
1958: Discussions at UNCLOS I in 1958 indicate that the concept of
"sovereign rights," which the ILC had again approved in 1956, did not, in
principle, eliminate the traditional freedom of foreign state military use.10 5
102. Summary Records of the 359th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 142,
147, 148, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 (1956).
103. Id. at 148.
104. This is not to imply, however, that the ILC felt that any detonation above the
shelf was lawful. The use entailed in such detonation must still be in accord with the
standard of reasonableness.
105. Summary Records of the 359th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 142,
146, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 (1956). Mr. Hsu, of China, proposed that
"exclusive rights" be substituted for "sovereign rights." This proposal was rejected 9 to 3,
with 3 abstentions. Id. at 147. In retaining "sovereign rights" the ILC stated that it "was
unwilling to accept the sovereignty of the coastal State over the seabed and subsoil of the
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The Fourth Committee considered recommendations for alternatives to
the term "sovereign rights."106 One such alternative was reflected in the
proposals of both Argentina10 7 and Mexico 08 to grant coastal states
"sovereignty" over the shelf. But, given the reluctance of the Committee's
predecessor - the ILC - to adopt such a characterization, it seemed a
foregone conclusion that "sovereignty" would meet with a poor recep-
tion.109 This conclusion was made even more likely by a revealing
observation by the Cuban delegate, Mr. Garcia Amador. Speaking in
opposition to the Mexican and Argentine proposals, he noted that if either
proposal were adopted it would be "technically a legal impossibility" for a
foreign submarine to "come to rest" on another state's continental shelf.'10
The persuasive impact of this evaluation does not readily lend itself to
precise assessment. Undoubtedly, however, it stiffened the resolve of those
who eschewed coastal state "sovereignty," thus leading to the withdrawal
of the Argentine proposal" 1 and the decisive rejection of the Mexican
proposal. 112
continental shelf." Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
I 1 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 42, commentary 2, art. 68, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 297, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1956/
Add. I (1957) (emphasis added).
106. The United States proposed that "sovereign rights," found in Article 68 of the
ILCs 1956 draft, be changed to "exclusive rights." U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/L.31,
reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at Annex 135. Sweden proposed
"control and jurisdiction," A/Conf.13/C.4/L.9 reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec.,
supra note 60, at Annex 129; The Netherlands proposed "exclusive rights," A/Conf. 13/
C.4/ L. 19/Rev. 1, reprinted in id. Annex 131; and West Germany proposed "rights defined
in article 7 1," A/Conf. I 3/C.4/L.43, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60,
at Annex 138. The Swedish proposal was withdrawn. 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note
60, at 67 (23d mtg.). The West German proposal was rejected 52 to 7, with 6 abstentions.
id. at 69 (24th mtg.). The Netherlands proposal was rejected 40 to 4, with 22 abstentions.
Id. The United States proposal was adopted by the Fourth Committee 21 to 20, with 27
abstentions. Id. On a proposal of Mr. Jhirad of India, in Plenary session, "sovereign rights"
was - with the approval of the United States - reinstated 57 to 14, with 6 abstentions. 2
UNC LOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 13, 14, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/SR.8. Mexico and
Argentina proposed "sovereignty." See A/Conf.13/C.4/L.4 & L.6, reprinted in 6
UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at Annex 126 and 127.
107. See A/Conf. I 3/C.4/L.4, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at
Annex 126.
108. See A/Conf. 1 3/C.4/L.6, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at
Annex 127.
109. See infra notes Ill & 112.
110. See 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 52-53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/
C.4/SR.20 (1958).
IlI. 6 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/SR.21
(1958).
112. The Mexican proposal was rejected 37 to 24, with 6 abstentions. Id. at 69, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. I 3/C.4/SR.24 (1958). The Argentine proposal was withdrawn. See id. at 55,
1984]
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
Interestingly enough, if one contrasts the statement of the Cuban
delegate, Mr. Garcia Amador, with the inquiry advanced by the Chinese
delegate, Mr. Hsu, during the fifth session of the ILC in 1953, there is little
doubt that whatever inference can reasonably be drawn relates to the bed
of the continental shelf. Mr. Hsu had earlier referred to a foreign state
concealing a submarine in the "area" of the continental shelf. Since he did
not distinguish concealment in the water column of the high seas from
concealment on the actual bed of the shelf, one could argue, though
unpersuasively, that the exchange between Hsu and Chairman Gilberto
Amado only suggests that coastal state "sovereign rights" do not affect the
status of the superjacent waters of the high seas. On the other hand, by
explicitly referring to a foreign submarine coming "to rest" on the bed of
the shelf, Garcia Amador left no doubt that in his estimation his remarks of
disapproval related to foreign state military use of the continental shelf.
This simple fact alone, however, fails to demonstrate that the grant of
"sovereign rights" did not destroy the traditional foreign state freedom.
Surely in Garcia Amador's estimation the rejection of "sovereignty" went
a considerable distance in that direction. But even when one recognizes
that his opposition to "sovereignty" stemmed from the undesirable
consequences it would have on a foreign state's right to use the shelf for a
military purpose and that, further, this opposition was coupled with
apparent support for the notion of "sovereign rights," ' " the most that can
be concluded with certainty is that Garcia Amador was satisfied that the
traditional freedom of foreign state military use is not incompatible with
the rights of a shelf state.
Be that as it may, the Fourth Committee's action on another quite
distinct proposal indicates rather ineluctably that the grant of "sovereign
rights" did not destroy the freedom of foreign state military use. That
proposal was submitted by the Indian delegate, Mr. Jhirad, during the 29th
meeting of the Committee. 1 4 In essence it was designed to add a paragraph
to the language of Article 71 of the 1956 ILC draft then being consid-
ered.11 5 The proposed paragraph prohibited the continental shelf of any
state from being used by a foreign state or the coastal state itself "for the
purpose of building military bases or installations." ' Jhirad's proposal
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.21 (1958).
113. For Garcia-Amador's views on "sovereign rights," see id. at 52-53, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.13/C.4/SR.20. See also id. at 25 (1 1th mtg.), 69 (24th mtg.) (absention on United
States proposal of "exclusive rights").
114. See id. at 85, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.29 (1958).
115. Article 71 of the 1956 1LC draft ultimately became Article 5 of the 1958 Shelf
Convention. Article 68 of the 1956 draft became Article 2 of the Convention.
116. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/L.57, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec.,
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was a refined version of a proposal submitted and later withdrawn by
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian proposal contained language effectively prohibit-
ing only the coastal state from using the shelf for such purposes.' 1
7
In addressing the Indian proposal, some delegates considered it
closely associated with the matter of disarmament and therefore, perhaps,
beyond the bailiwick of the Conference. 8 Mr. Munch, of the Federal
Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), shared this view" 9 but had also advanced,
in criticizing the earlier Bulgarian proposal, an equally applicable addi-
tional reason for opposing the language of the Indian amendment.
Specifically, he noted that "except for the express purpose of...
exploration and exploitation of its natural resources, the continental shelf,
including its subsoil, was subject to the regime of the high seas." Therefore,
"[any State could build installations on it, provided that they did not
interference [sic] with the exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources."' 120 Mr. Jhirad, of India, and Mr. Belinsky, of Bulgaria, did not
concur with Munch's assessment. Though both acknowledged that the
doctrine of freedom of the seas had applicability, they concluded that the
construction of military installations on the continental shelf would violate
international law.
1 21
supra note 60, at Annex 141, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/42 (1958).
117. The Bulgarian proposal advanced as an addition to Article 68 of the ILC's 1956
draft by Mr. Belinsky, 6 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. I 3/C.4/SR.29 (1958), stated: "The coastal State shall not use the continental shelf
for the purpose of building military bases or installations." U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/
L.41 /Rev. 1, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at Annex 137, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/42 (1958). The proposal was withdrawn at the 29th meeting in favor of Jhirad's
proposal. 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 1 3/C.4/SR.29
(1958).
118. See 6 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 85 U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/
SR.29 (1958) (comments of Ms. Guttridge of the United Kingdom); id. at 86 (comments of
Mr. Mouton of the Netherlands); id. at 88, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. I 3/C.4/SR.30 (comments
of Mr. Rodriguez of Brazil); id. (comments of Mr. Whiteman of the United States); id.
(comments of Mr. Van Der Essen of Belgium). Not all delegates agreed. See id. at 88
(comments of Mr. Nae of Romania); id. (comments of Mr. Ranukusumo of Indonesia); id.
at 89 (comments of Mr. Jhirad of India); and id. (comments of Mr. Kanakaratne of
Ceylon).
119. Id. at 85, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.29 (1958).
120. Id. at 83, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.28 (1958) (emphasis added).
121. Belinsky defended the Bulgarian proposal by stating that "[e]xcept for purposes
of exploration and exploitation of natural resources, the continental shelf was subject to the
regime of the high seas." Id. at 83-84, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.29 (1958). He
concluded that "[h]ence, the presence of any military installations on the continental shelf
would be a violation of international law." Id. Jhirad defended the Indian proposal by
asserting that the building of military bases or installations would violate freedom of the
seas and Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, and interfere with the rights of exploration and
exploitation. Id. at 85.
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The Indian proposal was decisively rejected.122 It seems probable that
while some voted against the proposal out of a conviction that military use
of the continental shelf was not violative of international law, others
opposed it on the ground that it was outside the Committee's jurisdictional
competence.
Two possible explanations exist for the rejection of the Indian
proposal. Therefore, the negative vote does not necessarily imply that
foreign states may, in principle, use another state's continental shelf for
military purposes. After all, those who viewed the matter as beyond the
Committee's jurisdictional competence may simply have intended their
vote to indicate that fact and that fact alone. On the other hand, one would
not seem to be reading too much into the vote if one concluded that the
rejection of the Indian proposal suggests that nothing in the Shelf
Convention - including the concept of "sovereign rights" - supports the
idea that the traditional freedom of foreign state military use was intended
to be destroyed.1 23 Indeed, that it was not destroyed by the Convention
seems the most obvious conclusion in view of the subsequent assessment of
the international legal community that an additional convention would be
needed if the objective of prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons
anywhere on the seabed beyond 12 miles from the shore-line of any state
was to be accomplished.' 2 ' Had the Fourth Committee destroyed the
traditional freedom of military use of the continental shelf, there would
have been no need for a Seabed Arms Control Treaty in 1971125 which
prohibited anything more than the emplacement of nuclear weapons on
that portion of the seabed located beyond the continental shelf.
122. Id. at 91, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.30 (1958). The vote was 31-18, with 6
abstentions. Id.
123. It is recognized that the effect of asserting, essentially, that the rejection of the
Indian proposal affirms the traditional freedom may not be different from asserting that
nothing in the Convention destroys that freedom. The distinction, however, seems essential
in view of the existence of two possible explanations for the negative votes.
124. This is reflected by the adoption of SACT. SACT, supra note 52, at arts. 1,2, 23
U.S.T. at 704.
125. Id. For a contrary view, see the declaration of India in conjunction with its
accession to SACT, 955 U.N.T.S. 190 (1974) (indicating that apart from the Treaty,
international law prohibits foreign state use of another state's continental shelf). For the
view that the Treaty cannot be read as meaning that any state has a right to use another
state's continental shelf for military purposes not prohibited by the Treaty, see the
declaration of Canada, id. at 189. The statement above is not inconsistent with the
Canadian declaration since it simply provides that the 1958 Geneva Convention confirms
the traditional freedom of use, and the Seabed Treaty would not have been required had
that freedom not existed.
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(b) Matter of Foreign State Scientific Research
Article 5(8) of the Shelf Convention provides that a foreign state
interested in conducting "any research concerning the continental shelf"
must first obtain advance approval of the coastal state. 26 The breadth of
the term "any" would surely include nonmilitary and military scientific
research regarding the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf.
Accepting this premise, the range of military activities covered by Article
5(8) would run the gamut from exploitation of mineral resources under the
guise of military scientific research to, perhaps, scientific research
designed to ascertain the effects on the continental shelf of certain military
undertakings. However, the very fact that Article 5(8) requires advance
approval of foreign state research might generate reluctance to accept the
assessment of Article 2(1) described above.1 27 A common sense approach
would suggest that the Shelf Convention deems foreign state military use
of another state's continental shelf as unlawful if simple, peaceful research
cannot even be conducted without having been approved in advance by the
coastal state.1 8 Discussions surrounding the adoption of Article 5(8),
however, suggest that this approach may not be accurate.
The ILC's 1956 commentary to Article 2's predecessor - Article 68
- contains the first significant reference to the matter of foreign state
research. In that commentary a distinction was drawn between "scientific
research" and research "relating to the exploration or exploitation of the
seabed or subsoil," with only the latter being subject to advance approval of
the coastal state.1 29 The Shelf Convention of 1958, quite obviously, does
not continue that distinction.1 30 Rather, it contains a prescription for
advance approval for a broad spectrum of research activities.
The language of advance approval contained in Article 5(8) found its
way into the Convention when a proposal by the French delegate, Mr.
126. 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14, at art. 5, para. 8, 15 U.S.T. at
474, 499 U.N.T.S. at 316.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 81-125.
128. See Gehring, supra note 16, at 193-94.
129. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 42, commentary 10, art. 68, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1 956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253,298, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1956/
Add. I (1957). The commentary was prepared in response to the suggestion of the Special
Rapporteur Mr. Francois, who had indicated that research "bearing on the exploration or
exploitation of the seabed or subsoil" should be made subject to advance consent. Regime of
the High Seas, supra note 96, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/97, reprinted in [ 1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N Ii, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.l (1957).
130. See 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14.
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Patey,1'3 was adopted by the Fourth Committee3 2 at UNCLOS I in,
essentially, verbatim form.1"' The basic concept of advance approval,
however, was not new. The Indonesians put forward the concept earlier in
the Conference, but in the form of an addition to the ILC's 1956 draft of
Article 71(1), predecessor to Article 5(1).1" In opening that earlier
proposal for consideration, the Indonesian delegate, Mr. Ranukusumo,
stated quite unequivocally that it was "in no sense intended to cover
nuclear tests or similar activities."'3 5 Given the fact that Indonesia had
supported the Three Power Proposal to prohibit military maneuvers near
another state's coast,3'3 it would seem Ranukusumo's comment was.
intended to suggest nothing more than that "nuclear tests and similar
activities" were not subject to advance coastal state approval and could be
conducted if viewed as in accord with international law. Surely, Indone-
sia's position on military maneuvers made it extremely unlikely that
Ranukusumo meant to suggest any official view on this latter point.
The Indonesian proposal to add language to the ILC's Article 71 (1)
was ultimately rejected.' Nevertheless, Ranukusumo's comment is
relevant to understanding the significance of the French proposal for
several reasons. First, both the French and the Indonesian proposals shared
the same basic objective: increase coastal state authority over the shelf by
requiring foreign states to obtain consent before undertaking any form of
research. Second, in submitting the French proposal, Mr. Patey approv-
ingly referred to the proposal submitted earlier by his colleague from
Indonesia. 138 Finally, after having had the benefit of Ranukusumo's
observation about what the Indonesian language was not intended to
131. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.4/L.56, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra
note 60, at Annex 141, U.N. Do. A/Conf.13/42 (1958).
132. It was adopted 30 to 17, with 6 abstentions. 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note
60, at 90-91, U.N. Do. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.30 (1958).
133. The language of the French proposal was identical to that of Article 5(8) as
adopted, except that the final reference to "research" in the proposal read "researches."
134. The Indonesian proposal also required consent in all instances. U.N. Do. A/
Conf.13/C.4/L.53, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at Annex 140,
U.N. Do. A/Conf.13/42 (1958).
135. See 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 83, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. I 3/C.4/
SR.29 (1958).
136. Indonesian support of the Three Power proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/
L.32, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at Annex 124, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 13/40 (1958), to prohibit foreign state military maneuvers and weapons practice near
another state's coast is evident in its favorable vote on that proposal. 4 UNCLOS I, Off.
Rec., supra note 60, at 54, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.21 (1958).
137. The vote was 23 to 10 with 22 abstentions. 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note
60, at 90, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/C.4/SR.31 (1958).
138. See id. at 84, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.13/C.4/SR.29 (1958).
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affect, Mr. Patey did not attempt to disassociate the language he was
advancing from Ranukusumo's observation, but rather explained it was
only intended to insure that exploration and exploitation were not "carried
out on the pretext that they constituted scientific research." ' Had Patey
desired to signify that his proposal required a foreign state to obtain
advance approval before conducting "nuclear tests or similar activities" he
would certainly have said so.
Two conclusions seem to proceed from all of this. One is that, while the
drafters of Article 5(8) desired to subject all research regarding the seabed
and subsoil of the continental shelf to advance coastal state consent, they
did not intend that nuclear tests and similar activities on the continental
shelf be subject to advance approval by the coastal state. The other
conclusion, which is clearly much more important for our purposes here, is
that it seems as though there was a recognition by those concerned with this
matter that, notwithstanding the establishment of a requirement that
peaceful, innocent research be subject to advance approval by the coastal
state, any foreign state military use permitted by international law could be
undertaken on a coastal state's shelf without fear of restriction. Article
5(8) by its very terms deals only with research "concerning" the continen-
tal shelf. This language suggests the scope of activities which the drafters
intended the provision to address expressly and by implication. The focus is
clearly on activities directed at the seabed and subsoil of the continental
shelf. Since it is not possible to view nuclear tests or military uses directed
at the military forces of the coastal state as undertakings "concerning" the
continental shelf, it would seem incorrect to view such efforts as inconsis-
tent with the requirement of advance approval of foreign state research.
Had the requirement of advance approval been seen as the last and most
persuasive bit of evidence suggesting that foreign states could not use
another state's shelf for military purposes, Article 5(8) would not have
been so drafted. Furthermore, Mr. Ranukusumo would not have indicated
that "nuclear tests and similar activities" could be undertaken without
being subject to advance approval if they were in accord with international
law.
2. Limitations on Foreign State Military Use
Even though the evidence supports the notion that the freedom of
foreign state military use has not, in principle, been destroyed by the grant
of "sovereign rights," the practical question arises whether the state may




state. Two positions have been expressed on this matter. At one extreme is
the view that certain kinds of military uses may lawfully continue to be
undertaken, even though interference occurs, because such uses prevail
over the "sovereign rights" of the coastal state.140 This view may be
supported by the language of the Shelf Convention itself."" As the
argument goes, some military uses either involve or can be assimilated to
navigation or the laying of cables or pipelines.14 To the extent that this is
so, Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Shelf Convention would seem to indicate that
these military uses prevail over the "sovereign rights" of the coastal
state. 3 At the other extreme is the view that all foreign state military uses
cross the legal threshold and become unlawful the moment they begin to
interfere with the "sovereign rights" of the coastal state." Persuasive
authority for the latter position is apparently found in the earlier
referenced comment by Mr. Munch, of the F.R.G., that the continental
shelf of another state is subject to all of the freedoms of the seas -
including the freedom of military use - provided there is no interference
with the "sovereign rights" of that state." 5 Each of these two positions will
be examined to determine which, if either, accurately reflects current
international law.
(a) Certain Kinds of Military Uses Prevail
In pertinent part, Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Shelf Convention
provide,"4 respectively, as follows:
Subject to its right ,o take reasonable measures for the exploration of the
continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources, the coastal
state may not impede the laying or maintenance of submarine cables or
pipelines on the continental shelf.
The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its
natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with
navigation, fishing or the conservation of living resources of the sea.
The basic contention advanced is that the foreign state freedoms




144. See Rao, Legal Regulation of Maritime Military Uses, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
425, 449 (1973); Brown, Legal Regime of Inner Space, 22 CURRENT LEGAL PROBs. 181,
186 (1969).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
146. See 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14.
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referred to by these provisions are freedoms long recognized by customary
international law; that the grant of "sovereign rights" to the coastal state is
a limited exception to these freedoms and, therefore, must be viewed
restrictively; and that the language in the 1969 North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases1 7 observing that these freedoms are mentioned in Articles 4
and 5(1) "to insure that they were not prejudiced by the exercise of the
continental shelf rights as provided for in the Convention"' 14 confirms the
restrictive reading and leads to the conclusion that the freedoms prevail
over the coastal state's rights. 49 Taking this analysis one step further, it is
maintained that military uses which can be assimilated to the freedoms of
''navigation" or the laying of "cables" or "pipelines" should therefore
prevail as well. There appear, however, to be two fundamental deficiencies
with this argument. First, the records of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the 1969 North Sea Cases, and those reported at UNCLOS I, do
not support efforts to assimilate to "navigation," "cables," or "pipelines"
military uses which are not within those terms as they are commonly
understood. And secondly, the same records also suggest that even
activities irrefutably within those terms do not prevail in every case of
conflict with the "sovereign rights" of the coastal state.
(i) Assimilation to Navigation, Cables, or Pipelines
As described earlier, 150 Article 2 of the High Seas Convention
provides the affirmative treaty source for the existence of the freedoms
applicable to the bed as well as the waters beyond the bed and waters of
territorial seas of other states.'" Article 2(1) of the Continental Shelf
Convention declares, however, that the coastal state alone is vested with
"sovereign rights" to explore and exploit the resources found in that
portion of the bed constituting its continental shelf. This may well be a
derogation from the doctrine of freedom of the seas if Article 2 of the High
Seas Convention is read as affirming the right of all states to undertake
activities of exploration and exploitation anywhere on the bed beyond the
territorial seabed of other states. 56 Nevertheless, given the limited nature
147. North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands) 1969 I.C.J. 12.
148. Id. at 39-40.
149. Reply to Zedalis, Military Installations, Structures and Devices on the
Continental Shelf: A Response, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 926, 933 (1981).
150. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. See I T. KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING 106-07, 164-
72, 349-84 (1980) (intimating that had the Shelf Convention not been adopted, the entire
bed beyond the territorial seabed would have been res nulluis and subject to exploitation by
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of the grant of "sovereign rights," Article 2(1) of the Shelf Convention in
no way diminishes the other freedoms, possessed by all to use another
state's continental shelf for catching nonsedentary species of fish, laying
submarine cables or pipelines, or engaging in any other undertaking -
including that of a military nature - protected by its reference to "inter
alia."153
The representatives of the international legal community recognized
that the grant of "sovereign rights" to the coastal state to explore the shelf
and exploit its natural resources might conflict with the right of other states
to pursue other freedoms affirmed by Article 2 of the High Seas
Convention.1 54 This recognition led to the formulation of Articles 4 and
5 (1) of the Shelf Convention.1 55 These articles set forth specific standards
for resolving conflicting claims. The Articles are not designed to provide an
enumeration of the freedoms which foreign states may exercise on another
state's continental shelf, for that appears in Article 2 of the High Seas
Convention. 56
Two conclusions flow from the relationship between Article 2 of the
High Seas Convention and Articles 2(1), 4 and 5(1) of the Continental
Shelf Convention. The most obvious, although there is no language
referring to military uses in Articles 4 and 5(1), is that one should not
conclude that foreign states are not entitled to conduct military uses on
another state's continental shelf."' 7 Again, the freedom derives from
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention, not Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Shelf
Convention. 5" Less obvious, but more important for present purposes, is
that the terms "navigation," "cables," and "pipelines" in Articles 4 and
5(1) mean only navigation, cables, and pipelines. Military activities or
objects not within those terms as commonly understood may not be
assimilated thereto.
With special reference to the latter point, since Article 2 of the High
any state).
153. As explained earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 69-78, the freedoms of
the seas apply to the entire bed beyond the territorial seabed of other states. By granting the
coastal state "sovereign rights" over natural resources, e.g., minerals and sedentary species
of fish, only the freedoms of fishing for nonsedentary species, laying submarine cables or
pipelines, and engaging in activities within the reference to "inter alia" remain to be
exercised by foreign states on another's continental shelf.
154. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 17, at 691-92.
155. 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14, at arts. 4, 5, para. 1, 15
U.S.T. at 473, 499 U.N.T.S. at 314.
156. 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 14, Art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312,450 U.N.T.S.
82.
157. See supra note 155.
158. See supra note 156.
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Seas Convention contains the affirmative treaty statement of the existence
of freedoms exerciseable on the bed beyond the territorial seabed of other
states, it would seem that any effort to ascertain the meaning of the
undefined terms "navigation," "cables," and "pipelines" should begin with
the travauxs relevant to that provision. The earliest efforts to develop a list
of freedoms corresponding with those set forth in Article 2 began at the
seventh session of the ILC in 1955.1 59 Nothing in the records of that
session, l60 or the subsequent session in 1956,1'1 however, is particularly
helpful in determining whether military uses may be assimilated to any of
the three terms. Delegates to the Commission who used the terms during
the 1955 and 1956 sessions did so only in the sense in which they are
commonly understood." 2 But this does not indicate whether they thought
military uses not clearly within "navigation," "cables," or "pipelines"
could be undertaken because the uses might be assimilated thereto. The
records of the Second Committee of UNCLOS I in i 958, though, are a bit
more illuminating. In fact the Committee's reaction to two earlier
proposals which were designed to prohibit certain military uses of the high
seas16 3 reveals a great deal about this interpretative question.
The specific proposals were advanced by the Soviet-bloc and dealt
with prohibitions to be considered by the Committee in the context of
Article 2's predecessor, Article 27 of the ILC's 1956 draft convention. The
first, known as the Three Power Proposal, prohibited military maneuvers
and weapons practice. The second, known as the Four Power Proposal,
declared nuclear test detonations on the high seas to be a violation of
international law.' The Committee refused to endorse either of the
proposals.1 1 5 Since weapons practice and nuclear test detonations are
outside even the most expansive understanding of "navigation," "cables,"
or "pipelines," the Committee's refusal suggests that the delegates must
have viewed the activities against which the proposals were directed as
159. Summary Records of the 293d Meeting, [1955] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 57-59,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (1960); Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly, 10 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 3, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/2934
(1955), reprinted in [1955] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 19, 21, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1955/Add.! (1960).
160. Summary Records of the 283d, 284th, 293d and 300th Meetings, [ 1955] 1 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 4-7, 8-9, 57-59, 105, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (1960).
161. Summary Records of the 339th and 340th Meetings, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 29-35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 (1956).
162. See supra notes 160-61.
163. See supra notes 72 & 73 (the Three and Four Power Proposals).
164. Id.
165. See supra note 71.
1984]
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
within Article 27's reference to "inter alia."1 6 The accuracy of this
impression is strengthened by the view of Mr. Hlaing, of Burma, a
supporter of the Four Power Proposal. He suggested that "inter alia"
might well serve to justify continued use of the high seas for test
detonations if no specific prohibition were to be adopted by the Commit-
tee. 167 Beyond even this terribly important impression, it would seem that if
the delegates viewed Article 27's reference to "inter alia" as the basis for
the right to undertake military uses, they probably felt the accompanying
terms "navigation," "cables," and "pipelines" were to be given their most
commonly understood meaning. This same conclusion should obtain
whether these terms appear in Article 2's predecessor, Article 27, or in
Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Continental Shelf Convention. 6 8
Admittedly this conclusion is purely inferential. The drafters of
Article 2 of the High Seas Convention and Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Shelf
Convention indeed may have felt that military undertakings not within the
terms "navigation," "cables," or "pipelines" as commonly understood
could, nevertheless, be assimilated thereto. Accepting this reading, one is
still not impelled to conclude that Articles 4 and 5(1) provide that military
undertakings which have been assimilated to one of the three terms prevail
over conflicting activities pursued by the coastal state.
As we have seen,169 the argument that some foreign state military uses
do prevail is based on the ICJ's statement in the North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases that Articles 4 and 5 (1) were mentioned in the Convention "to
insure that they were not prejudiced by the exercise of the continental shelf
166. Indeed not one delegate argued that the activities fell within the terms
"navigation," "cables," or "pipelines." See 4 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 43-
49, 52-55, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/40/SR.17-18, 20-21 (1958).
167. See 4 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/C.2/
SR.9 (1958).
168. The history of the development of Articles 4 and 5(1) suggest nothing to the
contrary. For instance, all references to "cables" and "pipelines" found in the records of the
I LC from 1951-1956 suggest the terms were viewed as having only their common meaning.
On the 1951 third session, see Summary Records of the 114th Meeting, [ 1951] 1 Y.B. INT'L
COMM'N 278, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951 (1951) (comment of Mr. Yepes); id. at
280 (comment of Mr. Alfaro); id. (115th mtg.) (comment of Mr. Hudson); id. at 281
(comments of Messers. el-Khoury and Cordova). On the 1953 fifth session, see Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9)
at 13, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 213,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 (1959). On the 1956 eighth session, see
Summary Records of the 360th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 149, 150, U.N.
Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 (1956) (comments of Mr. Francois and Mr. Pal). At the
meetings of the Fourth Committee of UNCLOS 1, the absence of contrary statements
continued. See 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/
SR.27 (1958) (comment of Mr. Moreno).
169. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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rights as provided for in the Convention." '1 0 It should be borne in mind that
the principal issue before the ICJ in that case was whether the equidistance
method of dividing a continental shelf shared by several states had, by
virtue of its inclusion in Article 6 of the Shelf Convention, become
crystallized as a rule of customary law which was obligatory on the F.R.G.,
notwithstanding the fact that it was not a state party to the Convention
itself.17 ' There was no dispute about coastal state exploration and
exploitation which conflicted with navigation, fishing, or the laying of
submarine cables or pipelines. Nevertheless, the Court did note that while
the rule enunciated in Article 6 had not yet been received into the corpus of
customary international law, Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Convention
contained rules which had.7 2
What is the significance of the Court's statement given this back-
ground? Most obviously, the statement is pure dictum. The opinion of the
ICJ itself specifically noted as much just four paragraphs earlier in
providing that "it should be clearly understood that in the pronouncements
the Court makes on [the issues at hand] it has in view solely the limitation
provisions (Article 6) of the Convention, not other parts of it, nor the
Convention as such." Dictum can be instructive, but since it is not meant to
resolve a controversy which has been joined by fully aired opposing points
of view it may well be expressed in terms which have been selected with
something less than the circumspection accorded judicial pronouncements
of law. Thus, one should hesitate before ascribing to those terms conse-
quences of appreciable significance.
Even if one accepts that the Court labored over each word used in the
opinion and concludes that the dictum appearing has precedential value,
the statement focused on in this specific instance may not have the meaning
which some have suggested. Again, the statement reads that Articles 4 and
5(1) were mentioned "to insure that they were not prejudiced by the
exercise of the continental shelf rights as provided for in the Convention."
Observe that the period does not follow the words "continental shelf
rights." Rather, it follows the words "continental shelf rights as provided
for in the Convention." As those rights are provided for in the Convention,
the coastal state is prohibited from impeding the laying of submarine
cables or pipelines, "subject to its right to take reasonable measures" for
exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, the coastal state is also
prohibited from causing "unjustifiable interference" with navigation or
170. Id.
171. See North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of Germany v.




fishing. Thus, what the Court really may have been suggesting is that
coastal state measures considered "unreasonable" or which cause "unjus-
tifiable interference" prejudice the rights referred to in Articles 4 and 5(1)
and must give way to those rights. But measures which can be considered
"reasonable" or which do not cause "unjustifiable interference" cannot
possibly be viewed as prejudicing the rights of the foreign state.
To be sure, however, the language used by the ICJ suggests that one
should be cautious in characterizing even this reading as apodictic. The
reference to "as provided for in the Convention" may be designed to
indicate something quite antithetical to the idea that coastal state
measures of exploration and exploitation which are considered "reasona-
ble" or which do not cause "unjustifiable interference" will not be viewed
as prejudicing the rights of foreign states. Specifically, the reference may
suggest that even coastal state measures of that sort may not be permitted
to prejudice (i.e., interfere with) the rights of navigation, fishing, or the
laying of submarine cables or pipelines. The precise meaning intended by
the Court is difficult to ascertain. But if one assumes that ICJ pronounce-
ments of law derive from accurate interpretation of the underlying
principles, clarity can be brought to the Court's pronouncement by
analyzing the travauxs pertaining to Articles 4 and 5(1). This analysis
suggests that the Court's statement means that "reasonable" measures not
causing "unjustifiable interference" do not prejudice a foreign state's
rights of navigation, fishing, and laying of submarine cables or pipelines.
(ii) Resolving Conflicts Under Articles 4 and 5(1) of the Shelf
Convention: 1950-1.958
1950: Beginning with the second session of the ILC in 1950,
international jurists sought to articulate a standard for accommodating
exploration and exploitation by the coastal state with those freedoms left
unaffected by the grant of "sovereign rights." The two freedoms which
drew special attention were navigation and fishing. Separate proposals
were advanced during the second session, 173 but the one submitted by Mr.
173. Mr. Hudson of the United States proposed that exploration and exploitation be
considered lawful as long as such activities "do not affect" navigation or fishing. Summary
Records of the 67th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L COMM'N 218-19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/ 1950 (1957). He later changed the language to "must not substantially affect." Id.
at 219. Mr. Sandstrom of Sweden proposed the language "seriously affect." Id. at 218. Mr.
Brierly of the United Kingdom proposed "must reduce to a minimum" the obstacles to
navigation and fishing. Id. at 224. Mr. Hsu of China proposed that the resource related
activities must "avoid affecting" the high seas freedoms. Id. Mr. Kerno from the U.N.
Legal Department proposed no "excessive impediment." Id. Prior to the second session, Mr.
Francois of the Netherlands had proposed no "appreciable repercussions." Report on the
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Hudson, of the United States, was found most acceptable. In essence, it
provided that exploration and exploitation were lawful so long as they did
not "substantially affect" navigation or fishing.1 7' The language ultimately
reported by the Commission at the conclusion of the 1950 session provided
that coastal state activities could interfere with navigation and fishing only
to the extent that the interference was "strictly necessary" to exploration
and exploitation.' The difference however, was simply one of form. Both
sets of language envisioned a hierarchy. Specifically, in every instance in
which coastal state activities either "substantially affect[ed]" navigation
or fishing or created interference not "strictly necessary" to exploration
and exploitation, the freedom of navigation or fishing would prevail.
1951: At its third session in 1951, the ILC again dealt with the matter
of accommodation of resource-related activities of the coastal state with
navigation and fishing by others. Additionally, it tried its hand at
formulating a second standard to accommodate "sovereign rights" and the
laying of submarine cables. The end products were Articles 5 and 6(1),
respective predecessors to Articles 4 and 5(1) of the 1958 Convention.
The language appearing in Article 6(1) of the 1951 draft resulted
from a proposal submitted by Mr. Hudson176 which was altered to provide
that exploration and exploitation were lawful as long as they did not
produce "substantial interference" with navigation or fishing."77 Article 5,
also resulting from a proposal of Mr. Hudson,7 8 provided that the
Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/17 (1950), reprinted in [ 1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 102, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950/Add.1 (1957).
174. Summary Records of the 670th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 219,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950 (1957).
175. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/1316, reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 364, 365, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1950/Add.l (1957).
176. Hudson's proposal originally prohibited "substantial interference with naviga-
tion along established traffic routes." See Summary Records of the 115th Meeting [ 1951 ] 1
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 282, para. 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951 (1957). In his
estimation, the construction of installations on the water surface and the resource of
regulations requiring foreign ships to sail around them would not amount to "substantial
interference," id. at para. 34. As a result, Francois urged, id. at para. 35, that reference to
"established traffic routes" be deleted. The effect would make it clear that the "substantial
interference" test had general application. Hudson agreed to this suggestion. Id. para. at 36.
Interestingly enough, Francois also suggested that the "substantial interference" test could
be violated by coastal state activities which "hampered" navigation. Id. at para. 35.
177. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 6 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/1858, art. 6, para. 1, reprinted in [ 19511 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 123, Annex 141, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add.I
(1957).
178. Summary Records of 114th Meeting, [1951]1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 277, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1951 (1957) (proposing that coastal state rights may not affect the
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establishment or maintenance of cables could not be prohibited, "[s] ubject
to the right of [the] coastal state to take reasonable measures for the
exploration of the shelf and the exploitation of its natural resources." '179
Juxtaposing the "substantial interference" standard with that of "reasona-
ble measures" makes it quite obvious that two distinct approaches were set
forth by the ILC. Article 6(1) continued the hierarchical approach
developed in 1950.180 If the extent of the interference was substantial,
navigation and fishing would prevail. The commentary to Article 6(1)
confirmed this by characterizing navigation and fishing as the "primary
interest."1 81 Article 5, on the other hand, clearly established a different
approach.1 82 Assessment of the extent of interference would not alone
suggest whether the laying of cables should prevail over coastal state
resource-related activities. The determinative matter was whether the
interference could be considered "reasonable." 183
There is more support for reading Article 5 of the 1951 draft as
articulating a balancing test than just a comparison with the terms of
Article 6(1). During the Commission's consideration of the Hudson
proposal, which contained the "reasonable measures" test, the representa-
tive from Mexico, Mr. Cordova, asked how a conflict between the rights of
the coastal state and the laying of the cables or pipelines would be
status of the right to lay cables or pipelines "subject to the right of the coastal State to take
reasonable measures in connection with the exploitation of the natural resources"). Note
that this language was proposed as an amendment to Article 3 of a 1951 draft proposal of
Mr. Francois. Article 3 of that draft, however, was renumbered Article 5, id. at 277.
179. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 6 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 19, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [ 19511 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 123, Annex 141, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A 1951/Add.1
(1957).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
18 1. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 6 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/1858, comment 1, art. 6, para. 1, reprinted in
[1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 123, Annex 141, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1951/Add.I (1957).
182. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 6 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 19, art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 123, Annex 141, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A 1951/Add.1
(1957).
183. Theoretically, it would seem that there might be instances where it would be a
"reasonable measure" to exclude foreign cables. In this context, comment I to Article 5,
supra note 179, seems to provide a rather inconsistent observation. Specifically, it states
that a coastal state "may not exclude the laying of submarine cables by non-nationals." Id.
Construed in line with the "reasonable measures" test, the seeming prohibition may simply




resolved. 84 Francois, of The Netherlands, who himself had advocated a
"reasonable measures" approach in his 1950 report on the Regime of the
High Seas,'85 suggested that it would be resolved by recognizing the
"priority" rights of the coastal state.18 6 The French representative, Mr.
Scelle, objected. In his estimation, recognizing coastal state priority would
destroy freedom of the seas.181 Clearly, this observation had merit, thus
leading Francois, with Mr. Brierly, the Chairman, to state that Scelle's
attitude was "in direct contradiction" with the principle that recognition of
the coastal state's rights would leave the status of the shelf and superjacent
waters unaffected. 88 Considering both of Francois' remarks, it seems
apparent his reference to "priority" suggested nothing more than that the
rights of the coastal state may, in some instances, prevail over the right to
lay cables or pipelines. When those instances would occur would depend
upon a balancing approach. Had he viewed the rights of the coastal state as
having the "priority," his remarks with Brierly would have noted the
accuracy of Scelle's observation.
The discussion surrounding the Commission's actions with respect to
the term "pipelines" provides additional support for this view of Article 5.
The original proposal applied the "reasonable measures" standard to
conflicts between activities of the coastal state and the laying of cables or
pipelines by foreign states.189 When the Commission concluded that the
reference to "pipelines" should be deleted because the technology for
laying them on the shelf had not yet sufficiently developed, 190 the American
representative, Mr. Hudson, urged the removal of the "reasonable mea-
sures" standard. In his view, that test applied to pipelines and not to
cables.191 Francois joined the representative from Panama, Mr. Alfaro, in
insisting upon retention of the test. Both of these representatives urged
retention of the test because in some instances "cables might hamper the
exploitation of the continental shelf."' 92 Ultimately, the "reasonable
measures" language was retained. Had Hudson's urging been heeded,
184. Summary Records of the 114th Meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 277,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A./1951 (1957).
185. See supra note 173.
186. Summary Records of the 114th Meeting, [19511 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 277,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A./1951 (1957).
187. Id. at 278, 279.
188. Id. at 279.
189. See supra note 178.
190. Summary Records of the 11 5th Meeting, [1951] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 281,





however, the right to lay cables would surely have prevailed over conflicting
resource-related activity. As it finally developed, the retention of the
"reasonable measures" test provided a standard to deal with instances
where cables hampered exploitation of the shelf. Specifically, exploitation
could prevail in those instances where measures effecting it were viewed as
"reasonable." The reasonableness of the measures could only be deter-
mined by balancing the competing interests involved. 193
1953: The fifth session of the ILC in 1953 produced a dramatic
reversal in the approach taken to accommodate coastal state rights with the
freedoms of navigation and fishing. The 1951 standard of "substantial
interference" was abandoned in favor of a standard which characterized
coastal state activities as unlawful only when they resulted in "unjustifi-
able interference" with navigation and fishing.19' No similar reversal
occurred with respect to the standard for accommodating coastal state
rights with the freedom to lay cables. The "reasonable measures" test
appeared once more, again with no mention made of its applicability to
"pipelines. ' 195
A review of the records of the fifth session suggests the representatives
fully appreciated that the 1953 draft of Articles 5 and 6(1) provided for a
balancing rather than a rigid hierarchical approach to resolving conflicting
claims. Several proposals were advanced concerning Article 6(1), includ-
ing "unreasonable interference" by Lauterpacht, of the United King-
dom,1 96 and Pal, of India,1 97 and "unjustified" interference by Francois, of
The Netherlands.198 Pal's proposal was ultimately adopted after he
193. One point of confusion may arise after looking at commentary I to Article 5. It
indicates that the coastal state "may not exclude the laying of submarine cables." Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9)
at 19, U.N. Doc. A/1858, commentary 1, art. 5, reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 123, Annex 141, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 1951 /Add.I (1957). Taken
literally, this would mean there is a limit to the balancing test, i.e., if a conflict occurs the
coastal state may not exclude foreign cables. Actually, if one is to give meaning to the
balancing test it must envision exclusion even in some extreme cases. Thus, the language of
the comment should be read as dealing only with arbitrary exclusions. See infra text
accompanying notes 209-10.
194. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 13, art. 6, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [ 19531
2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 213, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 (1959).
195. Id. at art. 5.
196. Summary Records of the 200th Meeting, [ 1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 102,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
197. Id. at 109 (201st mtg.).
198. Id. at 104 (201 st mtg.). The language "substantial interference" was supported
by Cordova of Mexico, id. at 102 (200th mtg.) (later, however, he stated that he
'welcomed" Lauterpacht's proposal, id. at 103), Kozhevnikov of the Soviet Union, id. at
103, Zourek of Czechoslovakia, id., and Amado of Brazil, id. at 104 (201st mtg.).
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changed "unreasonable" to "unjustifiable."199 This change did not occur
however, before Lauterpacht had insisted that "exploration of the seabed
on a large scale. . . in some cases might justify substantial interference"
with navigation and fishing200 and Francois had stated that "sometimes"
those two freedoms might have to yield to coastal state rights since "[i]t
would be impossible always to give [navigation and fishing] prece-
dence."201 The commentary accompanying Article 6(1) supports this view.
In essence, it virtually repeats Lauterpacht's words and notes that this
position is acceptable because of the "relative importance of the needs and
interests involved. 20 2
Very little discussion occurred before Article 5 was unanimously
adopted.20 3 The Special Rapporteur, Mr. Francois, however, did call to the
attention of his colleagues that, following the 1951 session, the Danish
government had transmitted a letter to him suggesting that some indica-
tion should appear in Article 5 on whether the rights of the coastal state or
the freedom of other states to lay cables would prevail in cases of conflict.2 0,
Francois stated that in his estimation no modification to Article 5 was
necessary.20 5 Given the views he expressed during the 1951 session, his
position on the Danish comment was quite predictable. Article 5 estab-
lished a balancing approach and one could not determine in advance how
the balance would tip. 20 6 Mr. Yepes, of Colombia, expressed his support for
Spiropolous of Greece supported the language "reasonable interference." Id. at 103 (200th
mtg.). Yepes of Columbia supported "unnecessary" interference. Id. at 104 (201st mtg.).
Scelle of France supported "sensiblement." Id. at 109 (20 1st mtg.). Sandstrom of Sweden
waivered between "unreasonable," id. at 103 (200th mtg.) and "substantial" interference,
id. at 104 (201st mtg.).
199. The change from "unreasonable" to "unjustifiable" was adopted 11 to 0, with 2
abstentions. Id. at 110. Article 6, containing Pal's language, was then adopted unani-
mously, id. at 113 (202d mtg.), subject to later resolution of the question whether Article
6(1) should refer to "mineral" or "natural" resources. This was finally resolved in favor of
"natural" resources at the 205th meeting. Id. at 135.
200. Id. at 102 (200th mtg.).
201. Id.
202. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 13, para. 77 of commentary, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted
in [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 215, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1
(1959).
203. Summary Records of the 200th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 102,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
204. Id. at 102 (200th mtg.). Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) Annex II, 45-46, U.N. Doc. A/2456
(1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 245-46, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/ 1953 (1959).
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
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Francois' position. 0 Mr. Sandstrom, of Sweden, did not fully agree, but,
in apparent recognition of the balancing standard articulated in Article 5,
would go no further than to say that if the coastal state wished to exploit an
area where cables were already laid, it must bear the cost of relocation. 8
The commentary relevant to Article 5 of the 1953 draft 0 9 supports
Francois' conclusion that a balancing approach was intended. It states that
the standard in Article 5 was "designed to prevent either arbitrary
prohibition or discrimination against foreign nationals. '2 10
1956: The ILC's 1956 provisions which correspond to Articles 5 and
6(1) of the 1953 draft appeared in draft Articles 70 and 71(1). The latter
provision continued the "unjustifiable interference ' 211 standard regarding
navigation and fishing, while the former reaffirmed the "reasonable
measures" approach on submarine cables.2 12 During the meetings of the
eighth session there were no discussions about the nature of the standard
reflected in the "unjustifiable interference" language of Article 7 1(1).213
The commentary to that provision, however, characterized navigation and
fishing as two of the "main manifestations of the freedom of the seas."2 4
The Commission's additional statement that "[i]nterference, even if
substantial, with navigation and fishing might, in some cases, be justi-
207. See Summary Records of the 201st Meeting, [19531 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
102, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
208. Id.
209. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 15, para. 76 of commentary, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953),
reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 215, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953
(1959).
210. Id. This reference to Article 5 being directed at "arbitrary" prohibitions appears
in the commentary while the language of the article itself suggests flatly that the coastal
state "may not prevent the establishment or maintenance of submarine cables." Report of
the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9)
at 15, U.N. Doc. A/2456, art. 5, para. 76 of commentary, reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 200, 215, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959). Reading the language of
the article as even preventing non-arbitrary prohibitions, however, would fail to give full
meaning to the balancing test and the commentary's reference to the fact that the "may not
prevent" language was focused on "arbitrary" prohibitions.
211. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 11, art. 71(1), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 264, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1 (1957).
212. Id. at art. 70.
213. Summary Records of the 360th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 149,
150-51, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 (1956).
214. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 45, commentary 1, art. 71, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 299, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1
(1957).
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fled, ' 215 signifies that the commentary did nothing more than recognize
frequency of use.
As with Article 71 (1), there was little explanatory discussion concern-
ing Article 70. What was reported, though, indicates that the Commission
agreed to take language found in the commentary to Article 34(2) of the
1955 draft dealing with the high seas2 16 and reproduce it in the commen-
tary to Article 70 of the 1956 draft convention.2" 7 The end result was to
describe the "reasonable measures" test of Article 70 as providing that
"[t]he coastal state is required to permit the laying of cables" but that it
may establish conditions concerning routes which the cables must fol-
low. 218 As a point of comparison, the commentary to the 1953 draft of
Article 5 described "reasonable measures" as prohibiting "arbitrary
prohibition or discrimination." ' 9 The differences in wording might give
one the impression that the 1956 commentary rejects a true balancing
approach. Since it required the coastal state to permit the laying of cables,
in a hypothetical situation involving active exploitation of the entire shelf,
the right to lay cables would apparently prevail.
Two reasons exist for suggesting that this view should not be accepted.
First, given the improbability that active exploitation would occur every-
where on a coastal state's entire continental shelf at the same time, the
Commission was likely thinking only of situations involving exploitation of
less than the entire shelf when it adopted the commentary to Article 70.
With this as an operative assumption, the language of the commentary
could be construed literally while giving the "reasonable measures"
215. Id.
216. Article 34(2) of the 1955 draft states: "Subject to its right to take reasonable
measures for the exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural
resources, the coastal State may not impede the laying or maintenance of submarine
cables." Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 10 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 13, art. 34(2), U.N. Doc. A/2934, reprinted in [19551 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 19, 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955/Add.1 (1960). The second
sentence of paragraph 3 of the commentary following Article 34(2) states: "Paragraph 2 [of
Article 34] was added to make it quite clear that the coastal State is obliged to permit the
laying of cables and pipelines on the floor of its continental shelf but that it can impose
conditions as to the track to be followed .... ." Id. (commentary).
217. Summary Records of the 360th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 149,
150, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956 (1956).
218. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, I I U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 45, 46, commentary I, art. 70, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 298-99, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1956/Add.l (1957) (emphasis added).
219. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B.
I NT'L L. COMM'N 200, 215, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959) (emphasis added).
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approach enunciated in the Article itself full meaning as a true balancing
approach. Specifically, if less than the entire shelf were being exploited, the
coastal state would be required to permit the laying of cables in unexploited
areas along routes which it would establish. If the entire shelf were under
active exploitation, that obligation would not obtain. The reasonableness of
not giving the obligation full effect would depend upon an assessment of the
various competing interests involved. Second, the records of the 1955
session containing the debates on Article 34(2)220 implicitly suggest that
the delegates did not view the provision as requiring the coastal state to
permit the laying of cables in an instance where the entire shelf was actively
under exploitation.
During the debate at the 1955 session, Mr. Spiropoulos referred
approvingly221 and Mr. Scelle referred disapprovingly 222 to the fact that
Article 34(2) contemplated cables being subject to "diversions" imposed
by the coastal state. Since a diversion would be possible only when some
portion of the shelf remained to which it could be applied, these references
evoke the question of whether the obligation to permit the laying of cables
obtains whenever the entire shelf is actively under exploitation. Through-
out the discussion, Scelle expressed his consternation with what he
perceived as the subordination of the freedom to lay cables to the right of
the coastal state to exploit the shelf.223 The other delegates failed to express
this concern, thus suggesting that under the "reasonable measure [s]" test,
the scale does not invariably tip in one direction.224
1958: On the language of Articles 4 and 5(1) of the 1958 Shelf
Convention quoted at the beginning of this section, it is apparent the
delegates to UNCLOS I chose to preserve the "unjustifiable interference"
and "reasonable measures" tests reported by the ILC in 1956. Some
criticized the "unjustifiable interference" standard as too vague;22 5 and
others favored alternative language designed to restore the hierarchical
approach the ILC had advocated in 1951 and 1953.226 In the end,
"unjustifiable interference" was retained by a vote in the Fourth Commit-
tee of 35-0, with 13 abstentions 227 and in Plenary of 50-0, with 14
220. See Summary Records of the 285th and 286th Meetings, [1955] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 14, 18-19, 19-22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 (1960).
221. Id. at 18.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 184-89.
225. See 6 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 9,28, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 1 3/C.4/
SR.7 & SR.12 (1958).
226. Id. at 7 (6th mtg.), 84 (29th mtg.).
227. Id. at 91 (30th mtg.).
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abstentions.228 In explanation of the favorable vote in Committee, Ms.
Whiteman, of the United States, said the language referred to "a balance
between . ..navigation and exploitation"22 9 and Mr. Jhirad, of India,
suggested it called for "a comparative assessment of [the] different
interests . . involved."230
On "reasonable measures" a similar result obtained; the vote in
Committee was 48-0, with 8 abstentions 3' and in Plenary was 45-0, with 2
abstentions.2 3 2 Though no reference was made by any of the delegates to
the confusing language appearing in the commentary to the 1956 draft of
Article 70,233 Ms. Whiteman did say that "[s]ince it was impossible to
foresee all the situations that might arise . . . no more definite criterion
than that of reasonableness could be established. '3 4 This statement
sounds strikingly like the response of Francois to the comment of the
Danish government on the 1951 draft of Article 5. Furthermore, given the
reference to the impossibility of foreseeing "all the situations that might
arise," Ms. Whiteman's statement suggests that "reasonable measures"
has meaning, in fact, even when the situation involves coastal state action
in contravention of the requirement to permit the laying of cables and
pipelines in order to insure that its efforts of active exploitation of the entire
shelf are implemented.
(b) Interfering Foreign State Military Use Unlawful: Hierarchical or
Balancing Approach?
It is clear from what has been said that Articles 4 and 5(1) do not
establish a hierarchical approach to resolving conflicts between foreign
state military use of the continental shelf and coastal state resource-related
activity. Further, it would seem that the approach which the provisions
establish does not apply to foreign state military undertakings not strictly
within "navigation," "cables," and "pipelines" as those terms are com-
monly understood. As we have seen,23 5 the evidence strongly suggests that
228. 2 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/SR.9
(1958).
229. See 6 UNCLOS 1, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 88, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.13/C.4/
SR.30 (1958).
230. Id. at 12 (8th mtg.).
231. Id. at 80 (27th mtg.).
232. 2 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 15, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.13/SR.9
(1958).
233. 6 UNCLOS i, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at 78-80, U.N. Do. A/Conf.13/C.4/
SR.27 (1958).
234. Id. at 79.
235. See supra notes 150-73 and accompanying text.
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military uses not within those terms may not be assimilated thereto. The
question which quite naturally arises, then, is what standard does apply?
In attempting to provide an answer to this question, it must be
recognized that the discussion so far has focused only on the matter of
foreign state military use conflicting with coastal state resource-related
activity. The reality, however, is that there are two quite distinct coastal
state activities with which the foreign state military use might conflict: (1)
those involving military use of the continental shelf undertaken by the
coastal state itself;23 6 and (2) those involving coastal state efforts to explore
and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf.
The first, which involves foreign state military use of the continental
shelf conflicting with similar activity undertaken by the coastal state itself,
falls within the terms of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the High Seas
Convention.2 37 Specifically, since the uses undertaken by the concerned
states find support in the freedom of the high seas, conflicts between these
uses must be resolved by the balancing test reflected in the obligation to
exercise the freedom with "reasonable regard" for the interests of other
states in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas.
The second, which involves a conflict with coastal state resource-
related activity, is much more troubling. Given that the coastal state
activity is grounded in the grant of "sovereign rights" contained in the
Shelf Convention, the conflict is not between two high seas freedoms and,
therefore, is not one subject to the "reasonable regard" standard of Article
2 of the High Seas Convention. The two remaining possibilities for
resolving a conflict of this nature include a hierarchical approach,
providing that resource-related activities of the coastal state prevail if
foreign state military uses create any interference therewith, and a
balancing approach, based on an assessment of the nature and value of the
competing uses involved.
The hierarchical approach favoring the coastal state has definite
support in the travaux and the language of the 1958 Shelf Convention. The
records of the meetings of the Fourth Committee at UNCLOS I clearly
indicate that Mr. Munch, of the F.R.G., expressed his preference for the
hierarchical approach during the deliberations on the Bulgarian and
236. On the right of a coastal state to use its own shelf for military purposes, see supra
note 21.
237. Article 2 states, in relevant part, that "[tihese freedoms, and others which are
recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States
with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas." 1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 14, at art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 450
U.N.T.S. at 84. See infra note 239 & 360.
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Indian proposals to prohibit the building of military bases or installa-
tions.238 As will be recalled, he observed that foreign states could use
another state's continental shelf for military purposes as long as the use did
not interfere with the "sovereign rights" of the coastal state to explore the
shelf and exploit its natural resources. 3 9 Munch's observation was neither
objected to nor contradicted by any representative. Other representatives
who spoke on the proposals did not advance any suggestion which usefully
could be applied to the resolution of conflicts between military and
resource-related undertakings.
The most compelling piece of evidence supporting the simple interfer-
ence standard, however, is the very absence from Articles 4 and 5(1) of the
Shelf Convention of any reference, direct or indirect, by name or through
the use of some general term such as "inter alia," to military use not strictly
within the terms "navigation," "cables," or "pipelines. 2 40 The logical
inference is that the balancing test set forth in those provisions was not
applicable to resolve conflicts between military uses of such a nature and
resource-related undertakings of the coastal state. It seems the language of
Articles 4 and 5(1) would have made some reference to military uses of
those sorts if the drafters had intended this provision to apply to those
conflicts.
As attractive as the hierarchical approach favoring the coastal state
appears, there would seem to be two reasons for rejecting it and preferring
a balancing approach which resolves conflicts between foreign state
military use and coastal state resource-related activity on the basis of an
assessment of the nature and value of the competing uses involved. First,
the hierarchical approach has rarely been used in the international law
process. With only a few known exceptions, the balancing test reflected in
the reasonableness standard is the approach which has typically been used
to resolve conflicts between competing permissible uses. 41 Second, appli-
cation of the interference approach would result in foreign state uses that
are not within "navigation," "cables," or "pipelines" automatically giving
way to the resource-related rights of the coastal state in instances of
conflict. The balancing test, on the other hand, which acknowledges the
238. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
239. See Brown, The Legal Regime of Inner Space, 22 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 181,
186 (1969); Zedalis, supra note 16, at 647; Zedalis, Military Installations, Structures, and
Devices on the Continental Shelf: A Response, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 926, 929 (1981).
240. 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14, at arts. 4, 5, para. 1, 15
U.S.T. at 472, 499 U.N.T.S. at 314.
241. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 17, at 37-38, 56-58, 579, 758-63;
Fisheries Case, [ 1951 ] I.C.J. 116-43; Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 407-09 (1950).
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changing nature of international conditions, would avoid the capricious-
ness of such a result.
The time-honored status of the balancing approach, however, is not
alone sufficient to dictate its continued use. It should be noted, however,
that the result produced by application of hierarchical approach would be
especially disturbing. One may be content to see resource-related rights of
the coastal state preferred over foreign state military uses. But if this
preference results from the application of a simple interference test, one
may have to accept coastal state resource-related activity being preferred
over a military use even when the importance of the latter is supported by
the most compelling reasons of security. Similarly, the coastal state's
resource-related activity may have to be preferred over a foreign state
nonmilitary use which not only avoids infringing the coastal state's
"sovereign rights" but also generates, in comparison to the resource-
related activity of the coastal state, extremely valuable benefits which
inure indirectly to many members of the world community. These results
would seem undesirable and not in keeping with other provisions of the
Shelf Convention. Article 5(6),"2" for example, provides that in some
instances the value of a foreign state use may outweigh that undertaken by
a coastal state. In an effort to avoid problems of this sort, reliance on the
customarily recognized balancing test would seem desirable.
The foreign state military uses of the continental shelf which might
conflict with coastal state military or resource-related activities include the
conduct of ongoing military maneuvers, the emplacement of weapons, and
the deployment of seabed-based detection devices. In assessing the
lawfulness of these military uses in relation to coastal state military or
resource-related activity, the balancing test would require consideration of
the following:
* Whether the foreign state military use is in fact designed to obtain a
military advantage or simply designed to restore military parity;
* If the coastal state activity with which the foreign state military use
conflicts is itself of a military nature, whether it is in fact designed to obtain
a military advantage or to restore military parity;
* Whether the foreign state military use manifests itself in an active or in a
passive manner;
* The extent to which the foreign state military use relies on objects affixed
to the shelf or results in long-term utilization of the shelf;
242. 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14, at art. 5, para. 6,15 U.S.T. at
474, 499 U.N.T.S. at 316 ("Neither the installations or devices [for coastal state
exploration], nor the safety zones around them, may be established where interference may
be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.").
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* In cases where the coastal state activity with which the foreign state use
conflicts involves exploration for and exploitation of the shelf's natural
resources, whether that resource-related activity produces benefits exclu-
sively for the coastal state or other states as well;
* The relative needs of the states involved for the benefits produced by the
conflicting uses;
* The extent to which the foreign state military use jeopardizes coastal
state security;
* The extent to which the foreign state military use meets legitimate
security needs of the foreign state;
* Possibilities for accommodation of the conflicting uses and the various
costs associated with such accommodation;
* Likelihood that the foreign state military use would be equally effective if
conducted from a location beyond the continental shelf of the coastal state;
* The extent to which the foreign state military use involved promotes
international stability or serves to cause international instability.
Examined in light of the foregoing factors, it would seem that foreign
state military use could conceivably prevail over coastal state military or
resource-related activity whenever the use is in fact designed to restore
military parity, arises from unquestionable security needs, and serves to
buttress international stability.2 43 When a foreign state engages in maneu-
vers or uses weapons or detection devices to obtain a military advantage244
and the maneuvers, weapons, or devices interfere with coastal state
resource-related activity, the foreign state not only impedes or prevents the
distribution of wealth to the coastal state, and perhaps to others, but it also
jeopardizes coastal state security, thereby increasing the chances of
international instability. The general desire to avoid the risks associated
with international instability seems to be sufficiently compelling to warrant
characterizing military undertakings of a foreign state designed to produce
a military advantage as unlawful, even though the resource-related
activity with which such undertakings interfere may inure to the benefit of
the coastal state alone. Instability increases the chances that a disadvan-
taged state will take precipitous action in dealing with those which threaten
it and often confronts an advantaged state with the temptation to capitalize
on its new-found favorable position.
In the case of a conflict with military activity conducted by the coastal
state itself, the determination of unlawfulness is admittedly more difficult
to reach but is, nevertheless, inescapable. Basically, the coastal state
243. See infra notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
244. While one may generally view detection devices as lacking offensive capacity,
when they are integrated with a larger military network they can acquire offensive capacity.
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military activity with which the foreign state use interferes may either be
designed to produce an advantage or to restore parity. If designed to restore
parity, it should always prevail over a foreign state use designed to produce
military advantage.24 5 If the coastal state military activity is designed to
obtain a military advantage, the answer is less certain. It would be a
mistake, however, to conclude that any result of an application of the
balancing test which permits the offensive military use of one of the two
states to prevail over that of the other state would necessarily jeopardize
the other state's security and thereby imperil international stability. Upon
close scrutiny, the military use of one state may indeed sufficiently buttress
international stability to warrant its prevailing over the competing use of
the other.
Coastal state security is of the utmost importance. It is clear,
therefore, that use of the balancing test need not await an actual conflict
between foreign state military use and coastal state military or resource-
related activity to work its juridical determination. Since a threat to coastal
state security sufficient to imperil the stability of the international
community may flow from foreign state use designed to produce a military
advantage (even in a situation where the coastal state is not conducting
activity with which such use may conflict) the balancing test would seem to
apply at the stage when the foreign state first reflects on possible military
use.2 " It has been observed by eminent authority that a balancing test
which calls for consideration of the coastal state's interest in security
prohibits the very initiation of most foreign state military uses of another
state's continental shelf.2 47
The prudence of this position lies in two distinct, yet somewhat
related, rationales. First, to maintain otherwise and thus permit a coastal
state to be subjected to a foreign state military use designed to produce a
military advantage could threaten the very balance of power which the
245. The reason for this is quite simple. The coastal state activity enhances
international stability by protecting the coastal state against threats to its security, while
the foreign state use disrupts stability by placing the coastal state in military jeopardy.
246. As is the case with all principles of international law, the balancing test will
initially be applied by the state interested in a particular use. Since its judgment is open to
reconsideration by other members of the international community, an inaccurate assess-
ment of how the scales tip is open to scrutiny, condemnation, and retaliatory reaction.
247. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 17, at 719 & 724. McDougal and
Burke, however, do not note that the balancing test they apply derives only from customary
principles of law and not from the express provisions of either the Shelf Convention or the
High Seas Convention. Both Conventions contained balancing tests, but they do not apply
to conflicts involving foreign state military uses and coastal state resource-related activities
or security interests. See supra text accompanying notes 235-51.
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international legal order is designed to support. 48 Military maneuvers
involving use of the continental shelf by foreign state equipment and
personnel, and the affixation to the shelf of destructive foreign state
weaponry, could be directed at the seagoing military forces of the coastal
state. Normally, one would not consider sensitive detection devices
emplaced on the continental shelf as falling in the same category. But, if
the devices are integrated with a larger military network able to utilize the
information produced for the purpose of assisting in the neutralization of
detected coastal state naval vessels, there would be no reason for not
considering the threat posed by them to be of an equivalent character. In
giving full effect to the balancing test, it must be found that the very
initiation of any of these military uses by a foreign state in order to obtain
an advantage against the coastal state violates international law.
Second, a coastal state should not be expected to tolerate a foreign
state military use which threatens to place it at a disadvantage. The coastal
state will undoubtedly take responsive action that might precipitate a
serious international dispute. In this context, one must recall the problems
associated with the enforcement of any principle of international law. To a
large extent these suggest that the most time honored and respected
principles are those which simply mirror the practices or actions in which
states would otherwise normally engage. If international law is to be taken
seriously, this fact should be kept firmly in mind. Rather than arguing that
the customarily-used balancing test enjoined by international law does not
deal with the question of foreign state military use until it is undertaken
and actually conflicts with a coastal state activity, it would seem best to
argue that it governs such use from its very initiation to its interference
with military or resource-related activity of the coastal state. This brings
law and practice into harmony. 49
One might question the view that international law of the sea prohibits
the very initiation of foreign state military maneuvers, the emplacement of
weapons, and the deployment of detection devices when a state undertakes
these activities in order to obtain a military advantage, given that the
negotiating history of the Shelf Convention itself indicates in no uncertain
terms that it is lawful for foreign state submarines to come to rest on
another state's continental shelf.2 50 How, one might ask, can uses which
248. See generally Vagts & Vagts, The Balance of Power in International Law: A
History of an Idea, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 555 (1979).
249. Accord M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 17, at 724 (concluding
initiation of foreign state military use is prohibited, authors mention importance of fact that
coastal state will not tolerate such activity.).
250. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
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jeopardize coastal state security only indirectly and distant in time be
prohibited while a use which jeopardizes security directly and immediately
be permitted?
It is completely consistent to argue that the balancing test prohibits
military maneuvers, the emplacement of weapons, and the deployment of
detection devices when these are designed to give the foreign state a
military advantage and yet defend the lawfulness of foreign state subma-
rines coming to rest on another state's continental shelf. The ballistic
missile launching submarine has long been recognized as the most
stabilizing component of the nuclear triad. This is both because the
inaccuracy of the SLBMs it carries prevents their use for preemptive
strikes and because the relative invulnerability of the submarine itself does
not make it an easy target for those tempted to launch a preemptive
strike.2 "5 Therefore, advocating the position that the balancing test
prohibits maneuvers, weapons, and detection devices designed to threaten
the SSBN serves to buttress international stability and coastal state
security by assuring that the SSBN will be allowed to continue performing
its role in deterring nuclear conflict. To argue, on the other hand, that the
lawfulness of foreign state SSBNs coming to rest suggests the lawfulness of
military uses which threaten SSBNs serves only to promote international
instability. There can be no doubt that the balancing test is specifically
intended to avoid this result.
(c) Remedial Action
If a foreign state applying the balancing test 52 faces a result
suggesting the unlawfulness of a contemplated use, and, nevertheless,
initiates the use or persists in the use, the coastal state might wish to take
remedial action. In those situations where the foreign state use amounts to
the kind of violation of the U.N. Charter warranting the invocation of
Article 51,253 the coastal state may resort to unilateral force directed at
termination of ongoing activity or removal of objects (i.e., weapons or
detection devices) emplaced as a result of earlier activity. If no such
violation of the Charter exists, military objects left unprotected by forces of
the foreign state would seem lawfully subject to removal efforts by the
coastal state because such efforts would not necessitate resort to force
251. See Scoville, Missile Submarines and National Security, SCIENTIFIC AM., June
1972, at 16-17.
252. See supra notes 241-51 and accompanying text.
253. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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violative of Article 2(4).254 Further, it would seem to matter little whether
a representation of violation has been advanced by the coastal state and
rejected by the foreign state. The obligatory peaceful settlement proce-
dures established by Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter5 would not be
triggered in either case. The simple explanation is that, even in cases where
the coastal state has made a representation which the foreign state has
rejected, the "dispute" which exists156 is not one likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security.257 This is because the
objects which precipitated the dispute can quickly be made inoperative and
removed without foreign state resistance. 58
254. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
255. Id. arts. 33-38. The touchstone of the obligation spelled out in Chapter VI
appears in Article 2(3) of the Charter. Id. art. 2, para. 3. Elaborating on this, Chapter VI
contains two general categories of settlement efforts: those between the parties themselves,
id. art. 33, and those taken by the Security Council, id. arts. 34, 35, 37. The former is
obligatory whenever a dispute is "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security." Id. art. 33, para. 1. The latter is also obligatory - but on the part of the
parties to refer the dispute to the Security Council and the Security Council to take it -
where settlement efforts under Article 33 prove elusive. Id. art. 37, para. 1. Articles 34 and
35, however, establish a discretionary power of consideration. They entitle the Security
Council on its own initiative, or as a result of action by any state, to commence an inquiry
into "any dispute" or "any situation which might lead to international friction." Id. arts. 34,
35. The objective, of course, would be to determine if the dispute or situation is "likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." Irrespective of the category
of settlement efforts used, the Security Council is empowered by Articles 33(2), 36, and
37(2) to "call upon the parties to settle their dispute" by means listed in Article 33(1), id. at
33, para. 2, or issue recommended "procedures or methods of adjustment," id. art. 36, para.
1, or "terms of settlement," id. art. 37, para. 2, only when international peace and security is
likely to be endangered, id. art. 37, para. 2.
256. The "dispute" may concern an interpretation of admittedly applicable legal
principles or whether the factual situation is as claimed. See generally Liang, The
Settlement of Disputes in the Security Council: The Yalta Voting Formula, 24 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 330 (1947).
257. Concededly, the Security Council may, if it becomes aware of the "dispute,"
initiate an inquiry under Articles 34 or 35(1). U.N. CHARTER arts. 34, 35, para. 1. As
observed, supra note 255, this would simply be the first step in the Security Council
attempting to determine whether it is seized of jurisdiction to exercise its powers under
Articles 33(2), 36, or 37(2). Since the facts as stated above do not involve a dispute of the
nature which would trigger those powers, see L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 268 (1969) [hereinafter cited as THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS], the matter will end at that step.
258. What makes this conclusion especially compelling is the fact that it seems to
comport with reality, a goal to which any interpretation of an international legal principle
should aspire. One might argue that the very emplacement of military objects on another
state's continental shelf is "likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security," U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1, and that an awareness of the emplacement on the
part of the coastal state creates a "dispute" the moment the coastal state develops an
interest in removal to which the foreign state is not likely to consent. But this does not lead to
a very palatable, or very probable, conclusion. Once the dispute is joined, Article 33 of the
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In those instances when the coastal state lacks the wherewithal to
embark on a removal effort, is likely to encounter resistance necessitating
the use of force against contingents of the foreign state to effect the
removal, is confronted with an assertion by the foreign state maintaining
the lawfulness of the military object's emplacement, as well as when the
foreign state military undertaking consists of current, ongoing maneuvers
involving the presence of foreign state forces and equipment, reference to
the peaceful settlement mechanisms of Chapter VI is appropriate. 5 9
Coastal state inability to undertake a removal effort would most likely lead
to a representation of a violation being transmitted to the foreign state. A
rejection relating to military objects designed to produce a military
advantage for the foreign state, though not warranting invocation of
Article 5 1, gives rise to a dispute "likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security." 60 As recounted earlier,"' the threat to
Charter obligates the states involved to peacefully resolve the matter. Id. art. 33. If such
efforts prove fruitless, then Article 37 requires referral to the Security Council. Id. art. 37.
The Security Council, however, is only empowered to issue non-binding recommendations
which the foreign state may ignore. Id. art. 37, para. 2. It is possible that the Security
Council may then determine that the situation constitutes a "threat to the peace" under
Article 39 of Chapter VII and decide upon action under Article 41 or military measures
under Article 42. See id. arts. 39, 41,42. The possibility, of course, would never materialize
if the emplacing state happened also to be a permanent member of the Council. See infra
note 417. Thus, the most the coastal state could expect would be Security Council action
designed to effectuate removal. During the interim, however, the military objects would
remain in place and would be capable of accomplishing their operational objectives. Since
the chances are rather remote that military decisionmakers would find this acceptable, legal
proscriptions leading to this type of conclusion would be honored more in the breach than in
the observance.
Admittedly, the suggestion that mechanisms set forth in Chapters VI and VII of the
Charter must be exhausted before any unilateral effort is undertaken has advantages. This
suggestion would subject the coastal state's assessment of foreign state inability to meet the
rigors of the balancing test to independent scrutiny. Few determinations under interna-
tional law, though, are so made. Additionally, foreign states are not totally without power to
compel such an assessment. The foreign state is entitled to have that assessment considered
at any time it suspects that the coastal state is interested in removal. See infra text
accompanying notes 259-69. In conclusion, it may indeed be argued that all of this will
simply encourage the foreign state to station forces in the vicinity of military objects which
they have emplaced. This result would lead the coastal state to undertake covert removal
efforts. Though seemingly logical, it is highly unlikely that a foreign state would be willing
to risk disclosure of the fact of emplacement in order to trigger the dispute resolution
mechanisms of the Charter, since disclosure could result in neutralizing countermeasures.
Similarly, covert removal is the most likely route the coastal state is to pursue, and
principles designed to compel discussion thus would be flouted. The result could well be a
diminished respect for other legal principles.
259. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
260. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
261. See supra notes 244-45 and accompanying text.
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the coastal state increases the chances that the foreign state will be faced
with the temptation to capitalize on its new-found favorable position, while
the disadvantaged coastal state will be placed in a position of perhaps
acting precipitously in future dealings with those that threaten it. The
foreign state may question this and refuse to submit to the procedures of
Article 33(1)262 but if the coastal state presents the relevant facts to the
Security Council under Article 35(1), it can enlist the Council's assistance
in giving effect to the obligation to peacefully settle the dispute.'"
A rejection of a coastal state representation concerning foreign state
military objects which fails to survive the rigors of the balancing test
because of a conflict with coastal state military or resource-related activity
would, on the other hand, be much more troublesome. Though the objects
may pose some demonstrable threat to the coastal state, if it is not
significant enough to create a military advantage likely to jeopardize the
security of the states involved, one might be inclined to view the dispute as
not of a nature to trigger the foreign state's obligation to submit to peaceful
settlement on its own, under Article 33(1), or upon Security Council
urging, under Article 33(2). It is impossible to know whether the foreign
state's obligation will be activated, because the coastal state might resort to
other measures within its power in retaliation for the emplacement. The
same observation applies if the foreign state's military objects have the
potential for presenting an ominous threat to the coastal state upon
integration with a comprehensive military system at some indeterminate
future time. 64 The answer in such situations may, in large measure,
depend upon the Security Council's receptiveness to viewing the dispute as
"likely to endanger" international peace and security, thus prompting it to
call upon the parties to meet their peaceful settlement obligation.
6 5
262. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
263. If the Security Council determines that the dispute is "likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security, it is obligated to'call upon the parties' "to
observe their duty under Article 33(1). See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra
note 257, at 263.
264. The reasons for reading Chapter VI as not requiring the coastal state to seek
removal through dispute settlement procedures when direct efforts would not encounter
foreign state resistance, see supra note 258 and accompanying text, do not apply in this
situation or mean that there is no dispute "likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security," U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1. The earlier situation
involved the issue of whether the coastal state was obligated to seek removal through
Chapter VI. The instant situation involves the issue of whether the foreign state must
submit to settlement procedures under Chapter VI.
265. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, supra note 257, at 268 (in practice,




Coastal state removal efforts which might encounter foreign state
resistance, and efforts to terminate current ongoing maneuvers involving
foreign state forces, fall squarely within the language of Article 33.26 A
situation involving an assertion by the foreign state that emplacement
efforts undertaken earlier satisfied the balancing test will undoubtedly be
received with skepticism. Yet, just as a coastal state lacking the ability to
remove military objects may bring the matter before the Security Council
under Article 3 5 (1), so too may the foreign state proceed. 2 7 If it can satisfy
the Security Council that its assertion is indeed correct, then under Article
33(2) the foreign state can obtain the Council's help in giving effect to the
coastal state's obligation to resolve the matter. Since few foreign state
military uses will be able to satisfy the balancing test, it is difficult to
envision the Council acting under Article 33(2) very often.",
C. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Law of the
Future
On April 30, 1982, the new United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea was adopted and declared open for signature beginning the 10th of
December.27 0 To date it has been signed by 130 nations, including the
Soviet Union.271 While the United States approves of most of the
Convention's provisions, its objection to those on deep seabed mining has
led it to withhold formal ratification 272 This means that, with the exception
of those provisions of the Convention reflecting principles received into the
corpus of customary international law, 27 8 resort must be had to the
standards prescribed by the 1958 regime in order to determine whether
military use of another state's continental shelf by the United States, or
foreign state use of the United States' continental shelf, is consonant with
266. U.N. CHARTER art. 33, para. 1.
267. U.N. CHARTER art. 35, para. 1.
268. Id. at 33, para. 2. This would seem to follow from two facts. First, the balancing
test is passed only when the emplacement of military objects is to restore military parity,
when it arises from legitimate security needs, and when it serves to buttress international
stability. Secondly, removal would therefore undermine that stability, endangering the
maintenance of international peace and security.
269. For a discussion of military uses and the balancing test, see supra notes 235-51.
270. See Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60
FOREIGN AFF. 1006, 1021 (1982).
271. As of September 1983, the Bahamas, Fiji, Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico, Zambia,
and the U.N. Council for Nambia had ratified the Convention through internal constitu-
tional processes. The Convention requires sixty ratifications before it will take effect.
272. Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A. J. 156 (1983).
273. The principles of the exclusive economic zone are often so viewed. See
Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 4, 74.
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international law. Yet, two facts lead to the conclusion that the 1982
Convention should be addressed. First, states other than the United States
and the Soviet Union have the technological sophistication to use another
state's shelf for military purposes and, second, the United States may
sufficiently change its attitude and sign and ratify the Convention. In view
of these facts, it would seem terribly remiss to confine discussion to the
1958 Geneva regime.
The provisions of the 1982 Convention which affect foreign state
military use of another state's continental shelf are found in three separate
portions of the Convention: Part V, "Exclusive Economic Zone" (EEZ);
Part VI, "Continental Shelf;" and Part VII, "High Seas." Traditionally,
that part of the seabed forming the natural prolongation of a coastal state's
territorial landmass has been subject to the legal regime of the continental
shelf.174 Under Part VI of the 1982 Convention that principle still
applies.2 75 Yet, that portion of the shelf within 200 nautical miles of the
coastal state's shore-line is regulated by the additional regime of the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) .1 7 The opening provision of Part V states
that the economic zone is "subject to the specific legal regime established in
this Part. ' 277 The rights foreign states are entitled to exercise are therefore
limited to those provided in Part V.2 78 A coastal state may, in addition to
exercising the rights set forth in Part V, exercise those rights provided in
274. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
275. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 76, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1285. Paragraph 1 of Part VI states:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of
the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not
extend up to that distance.
Id.
276. Id. at art. 57, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280. Article 57 states: "The exclusive
economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Id. Some might contend that the regime of the
EEZ applies only to the waters above the shelf. In view of the repeated references in Part V
of the Convention to rights of both coastal and foreign states to use the bed and subsoil,
however, it is clear that it applies to the bed as well as to the waters.
277. Id. at art. 55, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280.
278. For an explanation of the EEZ as developed in the informal composite
negotiating text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP.10, reprinted in 8 Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records 1 [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS III,
Off. Rec.], and 16 Int'l Legal Materials 1108 (1977), see Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. INT'L L.
57, 67-75 (1978). The provisions of the 1982 Convention do not differ in any considerable
degree on this matter. See also Treves, supra note 19, at 831-32.
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Part VI, since reference is made to the fact that the rights of coastal states
include those set forth in other provisions of the Convention.27 9
A slightly different regime has been applied to that portion of the shelf
extending beyond the 200 mile limit of the EEZ. Part VI on the continental
shelf and Part VII on the high seas spell out the rights various states are
entitled to exercise.280 The rights of the coastal state basically replicate -
with a few changes - those set forth in the 1958 Geneva Convention of the
Continental Shelf 2 81 Foreign states, however, are treated differently. Part
VI diverges from the approach taken in the Shelf Convention by going
beyond a mere statement of coastal state rights and also referring to rights
foreign states are entitled to exercise. 82 This may be the result of an
overabundance of caution. Since the opening provision of Part VII on the
high seas makes those same rights plus others applicable to areas beyond
the EEZ, the articulation is unnecessary283 and could very well lead to
279. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 56, para. 1, 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1280 (in the exclusive zone the coastal state has several enumerated
rights and "other rights and duties provided for in this Convention").
280. See id. at arts. 76-120, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1285-91.
281. Id. at art. 77, para. 1, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1285. Article 77(1) provides
that "[t] he coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." Id. Article 80 makes Article 60, on the
EEZ, applicable to the shelf. Id. at 1286, art. 80. Article 60 grants the coastal state the
exclusive right to "construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and
use" of artificial islands and many installations and structures. Id. at art. 60, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1280-81. Article 81 grants the coastal state the exclusive right concerning
drilling for "all purposes." Id. at art. 81, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1286.
282. See id. at art. 79, para. 1, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1285. Article 79(1) provides
that "[a]ll States are entitled to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf,
in accordance with the provisions of this article." Id. (emphasis added). Article 78(2) also
mentions "navigation and other rights and freedoms ... as provided for in this
Convention." Id. at art. 78, para. 2, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1285. They are mentioned,
however, in the context of a limitation on the rights of the coastal state. This suggests that
78(2) should not be read as containing a grant of rights. Further support for this view exists
in the fact that Article 79(1) contains a clear grant of authority to lay cables and pipelines,
and then follows the grant with another paragraph designed to limit coastal state activities
which might impede exercise of the right. Id. art. 79, para. 1, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at
1285. Nothing here indicates that foreign states have not been granted the right of
"navigation" and "other rights." These arise from Articles 86 and 87 of Part VII, id. at arts.
86,87, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1286-87, however, and not from Article 78(2) of Part VI.
283. Id. at 1286-87, art. 87, para. 1. Article 87(1) states:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-
locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;




Bearing the distinction between the economic zone and the continen-
tal shelf in mind, it would appear that whether the Convention envisions
foreign state military use turns on the language which creates foreign state
rights in the EEZ and the shelf, as well as that used to place limitations on
the exercise of rights thus created. Let us now proceed to examine the
provisions relating to these matters.
1. The Right of Foreign State Military Use
(a) The EEZ
The right, in principle, of foreign state military use under the 1958
Geneva Conventions is derived from the applicability of Article 2 of the
High Seas Convention to the continental shelf adjacent to any coastal
under international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
By the terms of Article 86, id. at art. 86, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1286, these rights are
made applicable to "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone,
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State. . . ." As under Article 2 of the
1958 High Seas Convention, supra note 14, at art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314,450 U.N.T.S. at 82-
84, one could argue that "all parts of the sea" includes that portion of the bed of the high seas
designated as the continental shelf of the coastal state.
284. The two most apparent interpretive problems concern whether any state may
exercise rights on the shelf beyond those granted in Part VI, and whether any such rights
may be exercised by the coastal state. The former problem arises as a consequence of the
language of Article 79(1) which purports to grant to all states the right to lay submarine
cables and pipelines. See supra note 282. This could give rise to the contention that the
rights referred to'in Article 87 of Part VII do not apply to the shelf. The rights applicable to
the shelf would be those set forth in Part VI. The reference in Article 78(2) to "navigation"
and "other rights and freedoms ... as provided for in this Convention," 1982 Convention
on the Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 78, para. 2, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1285,
would not affect the cogency of this contention since that language is not designed to grant
rights. See supra note 282. The latter problem, arises from the fact that the above-
mentioned language of 78(2) characterizes those "navigation" and "other rights" as rights
exercisable by "other States." 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art.
78, para. 2, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1285. This may lead some to suggest that while
foreign states may navigate above the shelf, lay cables and pipelines, and engage in other
activities on the shelf that are authorized by Article 87, the coastal state may only
undertake resource activities and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines. It would
seem that both problems are best dealt with by recognizing that it is Part VII on the high
seas which grants coastal and foreign states all non-resource rights. When this is done, the
failure of Part VI to grant rights other than those pertaining to resources and the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines is seen as meaningless. Similarly, the reference to "other
States" in Article 79 is not read as suggesting that "other rights" are exercisable only by
foreign states. For a discussion of the negotiating history relating to Article 78(2)'s
adoption, see infra note 360.
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state.2 8 5 Under the 1982 Convention that portion of the shelf within 200
nautical miles of the shore-line of a coastal state is subject to the specific
legal regime of Part V dealing with the EEZ.286 Part V provides that within
that zone the coastal state possesses, among other things, sovereign rights
over the waters, seabed, and subsoil for all economic and resource-related
purposes28 7 and jurisdiction relating to marine scientific research.28 8
Additionally, the coastal state possesses the exclusive right to authorize,
construct and regulate artificial islands and various other types of
objects, 8 the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling for all
purposes, 29 and the traditional rights of navigation, overflight, and the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines. 91
The rights of foreign states are not as extensive. They are listed in
Article 58(1) of Part V. They include the rights of navigation, overflight,
and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and "other internation-
ally lawful uses of the seas related to these, such as those associated with
the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. ' 292
285. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
287. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 56, para. 1, 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1280. Article 56(1)(a) declares:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters
superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such
as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
Id.
288. Id. at art. 56, para. l(b)(ii), 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280.
289. Id. at art. 60, para. 1, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280-81. Article 60(1) provides:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive
right to construct and to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use
of:
(a) artificial islands;
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and
other economic purposes;
(c) installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the
rights of the coastal State in the zone.
Id.
290. Id. at art. 56, para. 1(c), 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280. Article 56(1)(c)
invokes, inter alia, Article 81, id. art. 81, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1286. Article 81
provides that "[t]he coastal State shall have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate
drilling on the continental shelf for all purposes." Id.
291. Id. at art. 58, para. 1, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280. For a more complete
listing of coastal state rights, see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 247, 261-68 (1977).
292. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 58, para. 1, 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1280.
[Vol. 16:1
CONTINENTAL SHELF
Since the listing of coastal and foreign state rights does not exhaust all the
possible permissible uses of the waters and bed of the EEZ, Article 59 of
Part V sets forth a rule of residual competence . 93 In essence, it provides
that where the Convention does not attribute rights to either the coastal
state or foreign states and a "conflict arises between the interests" of the
coastal state and a foreign state, the conflict should be "resolved on the
basis of equity, and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into
account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as
well as to the international community as a whole." 94 While the primary
thrust of this provision is the articulation of a standard for resolving
conflicts concerning the conduct of various activities not characterized in
Part V as rights, Article 59 also produces another result. Since its
enunciated standard applies to undertakings other than those described by
Article 56 as rights of the coastal state, or Article 58(1) as rights of all -
including foreign - states, it implicitly holds forth the possibility that
many other foreign state uses may, in certain cases, take on the characteris-
tics of a right and lawfully be exercised.
Putting aside the matter of assimilating certain types of military uses
to navigation, cables, or pipelines2 9 5 it would appear that foreign state
293. Id. at art. 59, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280.
294. Id.
295. The arguments made regarding the 1958 Convention and rejection of the notion
of assimilating military activities to navigation, cables and pipelines seem just as applicable
here. Article 58(1) states that the rights of navigation and the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines are rights "referred to in Article 87." Id. at art. 58, para. 1, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1280. This signifies that they are high seas freedoms which may be exercised in
the waters and on the beds of the EEZ. See Oxman, supra note 278, at 72-73. Since Article
87, see supra note 283, like Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, also refers to "inter
alia," it would appear that enumerated freedoms - wherever they are listed - should be
understood as having a narrow and common meaning. The official records of UNCLOS III,
tend to support this view. Specifically, during the course of the conference the delegate from
El Salvador, Mr. Pohl, introduced a proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.68, reprinted
in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 235 (1975), which would have made no
reference to "inter alia." He explained this omission was designed to advance an exhaustive
listing which would avert controversy related to the meaning of the term. 2 UNCLOS III,
Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 235-36, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/SR.31 (1975). In this
context he referred to the controversy which surrounded nuclear weapon tests during the
late 1950s and early 1960s. The Salvadoran proposal was not reflected in the informal single
negotiating text, infra note 299, nor is it reflected in the Convention itself. Had it been
adopted, one might be inclined to give the enumerated freedoms of navigation and the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines a broad reading. This appears unnecessary since
Article 87(1) of the Convention refers to "inter alia," a specific vehicle for supporting
freedoms other than those enumerated. The effect, of course, is to ascribe a narrow, common
meaning to all enumerated freedoms. For comments suggesting that Article 2 of the 1958
High Seas Convention should simply be transferred to whatever product UNCLOS III
settled upon, see 2 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 236,237, U.N. Doc. No. A/
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military use of the bed of another state's EEZ is authorized only in two
distinct instances. The first would involve a military use considered to be
within the reference of Article 58(1) to other uses "related to [navigation,
overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines,] such as those
associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
pipelines." The second would involve a military use which the term
"interests" in Article 59 is designed to protect.
Arguably one might contend that the words "related to," as contained
in Article 58(1), are flexible enough to include foreign state military uses
involving the conduct of maneuvers or the emplacement of weapons and
detection devices which might be similar, though not identical, in charac-
ter, configuration, or appearance to navigation, cables, or pipelines. 96
After all, the reference to activities "associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines" which follows "related to" is
prefaced by the words "such as those." These words signify that the listing
is illustrative and apparently susceptible to expansion.
It would seem difficult to dispute the contention that the prefatory
words "such as those" signifies that the list which follows them is merely
illustrative. But to conclude from this language that the list may be
Conf.62/C.2/SR.31 (1975) (comments of Mr. Donahue of New Zealand and Mr.
Mouchan of the Soviet Union). For a proposal which would have had a similar effect, see the
proposal of Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.54, reprinted
in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 229 (1975). That proposal, in relevant part,
states:
It is clear that in any comprehensive convention on the law of the sea articles
setting out the rights and duties of States on the high seas must be included. Such
rights and duties are at present codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas. It is likely that some provisions of that Convention will need some
modification in the light of the conclusions reached by this Conference. However, it
is the view of the sponsors that the principles and provisions contained in the
Convention on the High Seas are otherwise valid, must remain in force for areas
beyond the territorial sea, and should be incorporated in any new comprehensive
convention on the law of the sea adopted by this Conference.
Id. See also the proposal of the United States, U.N. Dec. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.79, reprinted
in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 239 (1975). The United States proposal
stated:
The regime of the high seas, as codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention of the High
Seas, shall apply as modified by the provisions of this chapter and the other
provisions of this Convention, including inter alia those with respect to the
economic zone, the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment,
scientific research and the international sea-bed area.
Id.
296. This seems to be the position taken in Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, 69
A.B.A. J. 156, 159 (1983) ("[The] category may cover a gamut of uses - for example,
recreational swimming, weather monitoring, and various naval operations.")
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expanded to cover all military uses involving the conduct of maneuvers or
the emplacement of weapons or detection devices which are simply
comparable in nature or appearance to navigation, overflight, cables and
pipelines does not accord meaning to the context in which the words are
used. The words are used in a reference reading "such as those associated
with the operation" of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines.
The impression which naturally arises from the use of the italicized words
is that for the use or object to be considered "related to" navigation,
overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, it must assist
or be essential to the exercise of one of those enumerated freedoms in the
same manner in which objects used to secure cables and pipelines to the
ocean floor, or onboard meterological forecasting equipment used to
improve the safety of ocean travel, are associated with the operation of
ships, aircraft and cables and pipelines.2 7 Examples might include the
periodic use of deep sea divers to check the functioning of existing cables
and pipelines, as well as the deployment of some seabed-based navigational
aids2 98 designed to assist vessels in avoiding underwater geological obstruc-
tions. Since something like recreational swimming, however, may only be
similar in character to an enumerated freedom - i.e., navigation - and
not linked to its effectuation, support for its exercise cannot be found in
Article 58(1).
Confirmation of the foregoing position seems to appear in the record
of the development of Article 58(1). Specifically, up to the time of the
drafting of the informal composite negotiating text (ICNT), following the
conclusion of the sixth session held in New York during the early summer
of 1977299 no reference to "such as those associated with the operation of
ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines" appeared. Indeed, the
297. Notice that this interpretation places emphasis on the words "associated with the
operation" rather than the words "such as those." For a similar interpretation, see Clingan,
Freedom of Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS III, Environment, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 116 (1983). He states that the phrase at issue was added to Article 58(1) "to make
clear that while coastal states were entitled to any unspecified residual rights in connection
with resource exploitation, other states could exercise any unspecified residual rights
associated with the basic freedoms specified." Id. (emphasis added).
298. These uses, which are "associated with the operation" of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines, though not as intimately as objects used to secure cables
and pipelines and onboard meterological equipment, are subject to the limitations discussed
infra in Section III(C)(2). In particular note that the limitations in Section III(C)(2)(b)(i),
dealing with "installations and structures," would prohibit navigational aids which "may
interfere" with coastal state rights in the EEZ.
299. See Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.10,
reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 13, art. 58, para. 1 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ICNT].
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predecessors of Article 58(1) simply contained an enumeration of naviga-
tion, overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines as rights
or freedoms available to all states and then followed this with reference to
the existence of other uses of the sea "related to navigation and communi-
cation."300 Thus, the possibility of reading this language to include foreign
state military uses or objects similar in character, configuration, or
appearance may have existed. With the addition of the explanatory
reference reflected in the Convention itself, the possibility seems to have
been foreclosed.301 The type of relatedness envisioned by the words
"related to" is determined by the reference to "such as those associated
with" the operation of ships, aircraft, cables and pipelines.
Beyond the problem of the type of relatedness required by Article
58(1), the language of that provision appears to raise another nettlesome
matter. Basically, it is one which exists because the words "related to" are
not prefaced by the word "directly." This absence presents the possibility
of it being contended that foreign state efforts to emplace devices designed
to detect, identify, locate, and track the coastal state's submarines are
permitted by 58(1). Such a contention might rest on the fact that, since the
military information the ASW devices develop assists emplacing state's
surface ships, SSBNs, and antisubmarine submarines and enhances the
likelihood of them accomplishing their operational objectives, such devices
300. See Article 47(1) of the Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/WP.8, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 137, and 14 Int'l
Legal Materials 689 (1975) [hereinafter cited as INST]. Article 47(1) of the INST states:
"All States, whether coastal or land-locked shall, subject to the relevant provisions of the
present Convention, enjoy in the exclusive economic zone the freedoms of navigation and
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea." Id. Article 46(1) of the Revised Single Negotiating Text notes:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked,
enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of the present Convention, the freedoms of
navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and
other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and
communication.
Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP.8/Rev.1, reprinted in 5
UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 160 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RSNT].
301. During the fifth session, in 1976, the Second Committee conducted much of the
work on the EEZ provisions in informal sessions for which no records exist. See Report of
the Chairman of the Second Committee, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.17, reprinted in 6
UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 135 (1977). It is known, however, that the
committee was examining Article 4 of the RSNT, Article 58(1)'s predecessor, with great
and intense interest. See id. at 137. At the sixth session the informal system of meetings
continued, see Oxman, supra note 278, at 67, and though no records exist, some have
suggested that the Second Committee consciously preferred the ICNT's version of the
provision on the EEZ - which includes the addition to 58(1) - to that contained in the
RSNT. Id.
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are related to navigation by virtue of their association with the operation of
ships."02
Though it would be difficult to defend the assertion that this view is
totally lacking in persuasiveness, it appears that foreign state uses or
objects contended to be associated with the operation of ships, aircraft, or
cables and pipelines are permissible only when directly related to naviga-
tion, overflight, or the laying of submarine cables and pipelines. This
assessment was voiced, without opposition, by both Mr. Schreiber, of Peru,
and Mr.Zegers, of Chile, during the Conference's reported consideration
of the EEZ occurring at the 1974 second session in Caracas.303 Even in the
absence of such supportive negotiating history, it is clear that acceptance of
any other view would lead to the suggestion that the deployment of
weapons is also authorized by 58(1). After all, weapons, as well as ASW
devices, enhance the likelihood of the emplacing state's military vessels
being able to accomplish their operational objectives. Therefore, their
deployment could be viewed as "related to" navigation. A more absurd
suggestion would be difficult to imagine. Surely no one understood uses of
this sort as being expressly authorized by the terms "related to." To
maintain that they did fails to ascribe significance to two critical facts. The
first is that Article 58(1) carefully avoids incorporation of language of any
of the proposals on the EEZ submitted during UNCLOS III which would
have explicitly authorized the conduct of uses or the emplacement of
objects, even though such uses or objects may have had no direct relation to
navigation, overflight, or the laying of cables and pipelines. Proposals of
this nature were submitted by Chile, Nicaragua, the Soviet bloc, and the
United States. The language they used mentioned navigation, overflight,
the laying of cables and pipelines, and then followed with references
varying from "and other legitimate uses" to "any other rights recognized
by the general principles of international law."3 04 The second critical fact is
302. See Treves, supra note 19, at 843.
303. See 2 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 300, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
C.2/SR.45 (1975) (Schreiber, in criticizing the L.82 proposal of the African nations, infra
note 304, stated that it did not mention the duty of ships in transit through the exclusive
economic zone to behave in a peaceful manner and to abstain from "any. . .activity not
directly related to transit." (emphasis added)); id. at 203, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/
SR.26 (1975) (Mr. Zegers noted that the rights foreign states may exercise are "directly
linked with the requirements of international communication.")
304. The Chilean proposal used the language "other legitimate uses of the sea." See
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.4 (1975), reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278,
at 82. Chile's proposal, in relevant part, stated:
Article 14
In the economic zone, ships and aircraft of all States, whether coastal or not,
shall enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight subject to the exercise by the
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that another provision of the Convention, Article 59, contains language
dealing with activities not expressly characterized as rights by Article
58(1). When these two facts are coupled, they suggest that the right of a
foreign state to undertake uses or emplace objects - including ASW
devices - only indirectly related to navigation, overflight, or the laying of
cables and pipelines (or, for that matter, completely unrelated because not
"associated with the operation" of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
coastal State of its rights within the area, as provided for in this convention.
Article 15
The coastal State shall exercise its rights and perform its duties in the
economic zone without undue interference with other legitimate uses of the sea,
including, subject to the provisions of this convention, the laying of cables and
pipelines.
Id. (emphasis added). The Nicaraguan proposal at paragraph 6 was similar:
In the national zone beyond the first 12 nautical miles referred to in the
preceding paragraph, the coastal State shall guarantee to natural or juridicial
persons of third States that fishing, freedom of navigation, overflight, the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other legitimate uses of the zones shall be
subject to no restriction other than those provided for in this Convention and in
treaties concluded subsequent thereto.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.1 7, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS 111, Off. Rec., supra note 278,
at 195 (emphasis added). The Soviet Bloc's proposal at Article 4 was as follows:
The rights of the coastal State in the economic zone shall be exercised without
prejudice to the rights of all other States, whether having access to the sea or land-
locked, as recognized in the provisions of this Convention and in international law,
including the right to freedom of navigation, freedom of overflight, and freedom to
lay submarine cables and pipelines.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.38, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS 111, Off. Rec., supra note 278,
at 214 (1975) (emphasis added). The United States' proposal at Article 7 used the following
approach:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the rights of freedom of navigation and
overflight, and other rights recognized by the general principles of international
law, except as otherwise specifically provided in this Convention. The provisions of
this article do not apply to activities for which the authorization of the coastal State
is required pursuant to this Convention.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.47, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278,
at 222 (1975) (emphasis added). From the very beginning, each negotiating text reflected
an approach close to that contained in the proposals of Nigeria and a group of other African
nations. Compare Articles 47(1) of the ISNT, supra note 300, 46(1) of the RSNT, id.,
58(1) of the ICNT, supra note 299, 58(1) of the ICNT/Rev.1, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
WP.10/Rev.1 (1979), reprinted in 18 Int'l Legal Materials 687,716 (1979), and 58(1) of
the Draft Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.l0/Rev.3, reprinted in 19 Int'l Legal
Materials 1129, 1163 (1982) with U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.21/Rev.l, art. 2(1),
reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 199(1975) ("All states shall have
the following rights in the exclusive economic zone of a coastal State: (a) Freedom of
navigation and overflight, and (b) Freedom of laying of submarine cables and pipelines.");
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.82, art. 5(1), reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra
note 278, at 240 (1975) ("In the exclusive economic zone all States shall enjoy the fredom of
navigation, overflight and laying of submarine cables and pipelines.").
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pipelines) is supported, if at all, by Article 59's reference to "interests" and
not by the somewhat ambiguous language of Article 58.05
On examining Article 59, one confronts the question of whether
foreign state military uses involving the conduct of maneuvers or the
emplacement of weapons and detection devices fall within the term
"interests" and thereby qualify for potential authorization under the text
provided therein.306 It is difficult to know with absolute certainty what that
term means. The negotiating background of Article 59's incorporation in
the Convention, however, suggests that in all probability "interests"
includes many of the same uses authorized under the 1958 regime, to the
extent that the uses are not economic or research oriented in nature.
The records of the Conference disclose that proposals on the EEZ
basically fell into two groups: those which characterized the EEZ as an
international zone within which the adjacent coastal state would possess
specific rights concerning resource matters; and those which characterized
it as an expanded zone of national jurisdiction. The former approach,
preferred by some of the major maritime powers, evidenced itself in
language enumerating the freedoms appearing in Article 58(1), followed
by general language effective to secure for all states -- including foreign
ones - those rights not explicitly granted to the coastal state. 01 The latter
approach, on the other hand, simply set forth navigation, overflight, and
laying of submarine cables and pipelines as the only rights foreign states
were entitled to exercise.308 In the estimation of those advancing this
language, the EEZ should be a zone subject to extensive coastal state
control and nothing would make that point better than a limitation on the
number of rights foreign states were entitled to exercise. The language
ultimately adopted reflects an approach somewhere between these two
extremes.3 09 By refusing to adopt the restrictive approach, however, it is
clear that the delegates envisioned foreign states being able to undertake
uses beyond those few spelled out in Article 58(1). Exactly what uses were
envisioned is perhaps best suggested by recollection of the freedoms
honored in the 1958 regime.
Nonetheless, this suggestion does not imply that the foreign state uses
305. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 58, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1280.
306. Id. at art. 59, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280.307. See supra note 304 (proposals of Nicaragua, the Soviet Bloc, and the United
States).
308. See supra note 304 (proposals of Nigeria and other African nations).
309. See Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 774-81 (1975) (discussion in
context of informal single negotiating text).
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authorized under the earlier regime are now authorized by the rule of
residual competence. The refusal of the delegates at UNCLOS III to adopt
the approach associated with the view of the EEZ as an international zone
signifies that the type of foreign state undertakings coming within the term
"interests" as used in Article 59 do not retain the legal character they
possessed under the 1958 regime. Under the 1958 regime, many foreign
state uses other than navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines were recognized freedoms and could, in principle, be
conducted as a matter of right. Under the 1982 Convention, however,
which contains language that has appeared unchanged in every draft of
Article 59 beginning with the informal single negotiating text (ISNT)
developed at the third session in Geneva during the spring of 1975,10
foreign states desirous of conducting such undertakings on the bed of the
EEZ are simply said to have "interests" in doing so. Whether these
"interests" may be given effect as rights in every case in which their
exercise does not actually interfere with other "interests" of the coastal
state is a matter which will be examined below in the section on foreign
state military use. In all cases of that nature the activities take on their
former legal character.
(b) Continental Shelf Beyond the EEZ
With respect to that portion of the continental shelf lying beyond the
outer perimeter of the EEZ, Part VI vests the coastal state with the same
"sovereign rights" over resource-related activities granted to it by the 1958
Shelf Convention.311 In addition, it grants the coastal state exclusive rights
over drilling for all purposes,3"2 and the exclusive right to authorize,
regulate and construct artificial islands and other objects.313 Though not
mentioned in Part VI, another provision of the Convention grants the
coastal state the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct marine scientific
310. See ISNT, A/Conf.62/WP.8/Part II, supra note 300, at art. 47, para. 3,
reprinted in 4 UNCLOS 111, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 159; RSNT, supra note 300, at
art. 47, reprinted in 5 UNCLOS III, supra note 278, at 161; ICNT, supra note 299, at art.
59, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 13; ICNT Rev. 1, U.N. Doc.
No. A/Conf. 62/WP.O/Rev.1 (1979), reprinted in 18 Int'l Legal Materials at 716; Draft
Treaty, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/ WP. 1O/Rev.3, at art. 58, para. 1, reprinted in 19 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1164.
311. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 77, para. 1, 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1285 (stating "coastal State exercises over the continental shelf
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources")
312. Id. at art. 81, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1286. For the text of Article 81, see
supra note 290.




It is Article 87 of Part VII, however, rather than Articles 58(1) and 59
of Part V or any of the provisions of Part VI, which sets forth the rights
foreign states - and, for that matter, the coastal state - may exercise. To
be sure, Part VI does contain language purporting to grant rights or
referring to rights granted by Article 87. But, as alluded to earlier, the
language is unnecessarily repetitious and somewhat confusing.3 15
The specific rights provided in Article 87 parallel, with some addi-
tions, those stated in Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention. 16 The
listing, therefore, includes navigation and the laying of submarine cables
and pipelines.317 Beyond this, Article 87 continues the tradition of Article 2
of the 1958 High Seas Convention by prefacing the enumeration of
freedoms with the words "inter alia."' 18 It would seem, therefore, that
military uses are permissible, at least in principle. Support for that position
exists in the negotiating history of UNCLOS III.319
Quite obviously, it is one thing to say that Article 87's reference to
314. Id. at art. 246, para. 1, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1317.
315. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
316. See supra text accompanying note 67.
317. Beyond this, the enumerated rights include overflight, the construction of
artificial islands and other installations, fishing, and scientific research.
318. See supra notes 315-16.
319. During the course of the Conference's deliberations, El Salvador submitted a
proposal which listed the freedoms of the seas without making reference to "inter alia." See
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.68, art. 2, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note
278, at 235 (1975). The proposal, in relevant part, stated:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the
conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It
comprises for both coastal and non-coastal States:
(i) Freedom of navigation;
(ii) Freedom of fishing;
(iii) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(iv) Freedom of overflight;
(v) Freedom of scientific research.
The Salvadoran representative, Mr. Pohl, explained that this approach was motivated by
concern that open ended language of a similar nature in the 1958 High Seas Convention
provided legal justification for military undertakings in the form of nuclear weapons tests.
See supra note 295 (Pohl's explanation). For comments indicating that Article 87 may
reflect Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, see 2 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra
note 278, at 236, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/SR.31 (1975) (comments of Mr.
O'Donoghue, of New Zealand, and Mr. Mouchan, of the U.S.S.R., respectively). See also
Oxman, supra note 278, at 73. Oxman suggests "peaceful purposes" does not prohibit
military activities. Id. For this possibility to even arise, however, military activities must be
authorized. The only possible authorization is found in the reference to "inter alia." The
refusal of the Conference to adopt that proposal certainly suggests, albeit inconclusively,
that "inter alia" includes military uses.
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"inter alia" suggests the inclusion of military uses, and something entirely
different to say that these uses may be pursued on that portion of the shelf
located beyond the economic zone. By the terms of Article 86, however, it is
clear that the authorization of Article 87 applies to "all parts of the sea"
situated seaward of the economic zone."' Two specific reasons suggest that
this area includes not just the waters beyond the economic zone but the bed
and subsoil as well. First, as with Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas
Convention, some of the freedoms set forth in Article 87 can only be
exercised in areas other than the waters of the high seas. 3 2' This would
certainly appear to be the case with respect to the freedoms of overflight
and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines. Second, the reported
discussions about the continental shelf, which occurred at the 1974
Caracas session, indicate that the delegates intended to extend the
principle of freedom of the seas to the bed and subsoil beneath the waters of
the high seas. Interventions stressing this theme were advanced both by
those who opposed as well as those who favored the continental shelf
doctrine. 22
It is not inconsistent to conclude from this that Article 87 authorizes
foreign state military use of that portion of another state's continental shelf
which extends beyond the EEZ, while simultaneously recognizing the
coastal state's "sovereign rights" in resource-related activities. These
principles have been in force since as early as the 1958 Shelf Convention,
and there appears to be at least one incontrovertible piece of evidence
indicating that the drafters of the 1982 Convention intended that the
earlier adopted regime remain intact. Specifically, when 37 members of the
Group of 77 advanced a proposal explicitly prohibiting the construction,
maintenance, deployment, or operation of any military installation or
320. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text for similar reasons under the 1958
Convention. In this context, note that Article 112 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea, supra note 15, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1290, provides that the right to lay
submarine cables and pipelines applies to the bed of the high seas.
322. See 2 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 152, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/
C.2/SR.18 (1975). Mr. Upadhyaya of Nepal made a comment to the effect that "the
principle of [freedom of] the high seas. . . prohibited individual States from claiming any
part [of the high seas], including the seabed and its subsoil." Id. (emphasis added). The
comment was made in the context of opposition to the notion of the continental shelf, and
indicates the principle's applicability to the seabed and subsoil. A proposal submitted by the
United States, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.47 (1975), reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off.
Rec., supra note 278, at 222,225, provided in Article 26 that rights of navigation, overflight,
"and other rights recognized by the general principles of international law" set forth in
Article 7 apply to the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf. While this particular
proposal was not adopted, it signifies acceptance of the notion that the high seas freedoms
apply to the seabed and subsoil.
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device "on or over the continental shelf of another state," ' the Conference
hesitated and ultimately refused to embrace the notion. 24 Thus, it seems
rather clear that the regime of the continental shelf stands in stark contrast
with that of the economic zone. Under the former, the reference to "inter
alia" signifies that many uses beyond those specifically enumerated in
Article 87 are perceived as freedoms. Under the latter provision, uses
beyond those listed in 58(1) are simply characterized as "interests."
Moreover, it is the rule of freedom which applies to the continental shelf
and the rule of residual competence stated in Article 59 which applies to
the EEZ. 25 In principle, foreign states are authorized as a matter of right
to undertake military uses on that portion of another state's continental
shelf extending beyond the economic zone, even though the coastal state is
vested with "sovereign rights" for resource-related purposes. Foreign
states must satisfy the test established by Article 59 for similar efforts on
the bed of the EEZ to possess the same character as a legal right.
(c) Matter of Foreign State Scientific Research
The earlier discussion of scientific research disclosed that under
Article 5(8) of the 1958 Shelf Convention "any research concerning the
continental shelf" was subject to advance coastal state approval. 32 6 It was
noted that this provision included military scientific research projects
regarding the seabed and subsoil of the shelf but did not cover similar
research when focused outside the shelf, or other military undertakings not
classified as research. In view of the negotiating history of Article 5(8)327
and the fact that its drafters were apparently concerned only with activities
directed at the continental shelf, it was concluded that the existence of an
obligation to obtain consent before conducting scientific research on
another state's continental shelf did not suggest of itself that foreign state
military use was unlawful.
Under the 1982 Convention, the consent requirement remains intact.
Article 246(1) of Part XIII grants the coastal state the right "to regulate,
authorize and conduct marine scientific research" in its exclusive economic
323. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.42/Rev.l (1975), reprinted in 3 UNCLOS
III, Off. Rec., supra note 278 at 220.
324. See also Oxman, supra note 278, at 73 (implicitly suggesting that military
activities may be conducted on the bed of the EEZ and shelf, even in the face of the
"peaceful purposes" provision).
325. See Treves, supra note 19, at 832, 842 (noting that the basic rule on the shelf is
that of freedom).
326. 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14, at art. 5, para. 8, 15 U.S.T. at
474, 499 U.N.T.S. at 316.
327. See supra notes 126-40.
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zone and on its continental shelf. 328 Article 246(2) declares that this right
specifically requires that foreign states interested in conducting such
research "in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf"
obtain the consent of the coastal state before acting.3 29 The balance of
Article 246 improves on the 1958 research provisions and reflects a hard-
fought compromise between coastal states lacking substantial scientific
communities and states fortunate enough to possess them.3 0 In that
context, paragraph 3 of Article 246 directs the coastal state to grant
consent "in normal circumstances" and obligates the coastal state to
formulate and promulgate rules and procedures to ensure prompt consider-
ation of all requests to conduct scientific research.331
The latter notion is given added force by the Convention's provision on
implied consent.33 2 Paragraph 5 of Article 246 notes that the coastal state
"may however in [its] discretion" withhold consent if a project falls within
any of the four enumerated categories, two of which relate to the resources
of the EEZ and the continental shelf, the third to the construction and
operation of artificial structures, and the fourth to supplying the coastal
328. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 246, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1317.
329. Id.
330. See Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
Seventh Session (1978) 73 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 29-30 (1979) (coastal states without large
scientific communities basically wanted a consent regime that would leave the coastal state
with broad discretion, while coastal states with scientific communities favored absolute
freedom of scientific research). Article 246 reflects a compromise between the two extreme
views. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, art. 246, 21 Int'l Legal Materials
at 1317.
331. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 246, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1317.
332. Id. at art. 252, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1318. Article 252 of the Convention
provides:
States or competent international organizations may proceed with a marine
scientific research project six months after the date upon which the information
required pursuant to article 248 was provided to the coastal State unless within four
months of the receipt of the communication containing such information the
coastal State has informed the State or organization conducting the research that:
(a) it has withheld its consent under the provisions of article 246; or
(b) the information given by the State or competent international organization
regarding the nature or objectives of the project does not conform to the
manifestly evident facts; or
(c) it requires supplementary information relevant to conditions and the
information provided for under articles 248 and 249; or
(d) outstanding obligations exist with respect to a previous marine scientific
research project carried out by that State or organization, with regard to
conditions established in article 249.
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state with inaccurate information about the activity being conducted. s33
Paragraph 6 of Article 246 concludes the major substantive directives by
imposing a limitation on the coastal state's discretion to withhold consent
whenever the foreign state research is to be conducted on that portion of the
continental shelf extending beyond the outer perimeter of the economic
zone.
3 3 4
The 1982 Convention's retention of the consent regime, and its
extension beyond research "concerning" the continental shelf to research
"in" the EEZ and "on" the continental shelf, suggests a recurrence of the
same question posed under the 1958 Shelf Convention. Specifically, how
can one possibly maintain that foreign state use of another state's EEZ or
continental shelf for military purposes is permitted by the 1982 Convention
when simple, peaceful research cannot even be conducted without advance
coastal state approval. The logic of this proposition seems especially
compelling. Nevertheless, it fails to withstand scrutiny.
The most apparent deficiency in the proposition that the requirement
of consent for scientific research implicitly refutes the notion that, in
principle, foreign states may use another state's economic zone or conti-
nental shelf for military purposes, is the fact that the 1982 Convention
expressly recognizes the existence of such a freedom in other provisions. In
the context of the EEZ, one need only recall Articles 58(1) and 59, both of
which were mentioned earlier. Article 58(1) refers to the freedom of
"navigation" which, in light of Article 58(2)'s incorporative reference
invoking Article 95,335 includes navigation by military vessels, presumably
either on the water surface or in the navigable water column. 336 Article 59
333. Id. at art. 246, para. 5, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1317.
334. Id. at art. 246, para. 6, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1317. Article 246(6) states:
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, coastal States may not
exercise their discretion to withhold consent under subparagraph (a) of that
paragraph in respect of marine scientific research projects to be undertaken in
accordance with the provisions of this Part on the continental shelf, beyond 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured, outside those specific areas which coastal States may at any time
publicly designate as areas in which exploitation or detailed exploratory operations
focused on those areas are occurring or will occur within a reasonable period of
time. Coastal States shall give reasonable notice of the designation of such areas, as
well as any modifications thereto, but shall not be obliged to give details of the
operations therein.
Id.
335. Id. at art. 95, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1288.
336. For a discussion on the freedom of navigation as including transit in submerged
status, see Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 98 (1980). For a discussion on submerged navigation
in the water column of the EEZ, see Clingan, Freedom of Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS
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continues in the same vein. As already noted, it contains a list of
considerations designed to be used to determine whether uses other than
those identified or specified in the Convention as rights or freedoms can be
transformed from mere "interests" and thus given effect as rights."3 " A
ready example would include military use of that portion of the seabed and
subsoil of the continental shelf now considered to be within the exclusive
economic zone of a coastal state. Leaving the economic zone aside, it
should be recalled that Article 86 applies the high seas freedoms of Article
87 to everything seaward of the EEZ, including that portion of the
continental shelf extending beyond the zone's 200-nautical mile outer
perimeter. One of the freedoms contemplated by the reference in Article 87
to "inter alia" is that of military use. The obvious conclusion is that if the
requirement of consent for marine scientific research "in" the exclusive
economic zone or "on" the continental shelf is to be seen as implicitly
refuting the notion of the freedom of foreign state military use, Articles
58(1), 59, and 87 seem not to be in keeping with that implication. It cannot
be maintained by advocates of the implied refutation argument that these
Articles are simply express exceptions to an otherwise valid proposition.
Given the breadth of ocean uses within the language of Articles 59 and 87,
the basic proposition would seem to be swallowed by the so-called
exceptions.
The negotiating history of Article 246 is very different from the
history of Article 5(8) of the 1958 Shelf Convention which was reviewed
earlier. Specifically, supporters of the consent requirement in the 1982
Convention made no statements indicating, as did supporters in 1958, that
the requirement of consent for research was not intended to impair the
right of foreign state military use. Instead, the record is replete with
statements indicating that supporters recognized that research might have
an unacceptable effect on national security as well as on resources.3 38 The
HI Environment, 46 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 118 (1983).
337. See supra Section III(C)(1)(a) of this Article.
338. For remarks made at the second session in Caracas, see 2 UNCLOS III, Off.
Rec., supra note 278, at 336, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.3/SR.7 (1974) (remarks of Mr.
Rasolondraibe, of Madagascar); id. (remarks of Mr. Vandergert, of Sri Lanka); id. at 340
(remarks of Mr. Sanders, of Guyana); id. at 343, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.3/SR.8
(remarks of Mr. Rodriguez, of Venezuela); id. at 344 (remarks of Mr. Lo Yu-ju, of China);
id. at 347, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.3/SR.9 (remarks of Mr. Momtaz, of Iran); id. at 351
(remarks of Mr. Needler, of Canada); id. at 352 (remarks of Mr. Kakodkar, of India); id. at
378, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.3/SR. 16 (remarks of Mr. Zuleta Torres, of Colombia); id.
(remarks of Mr. Jain, of India). For remarks made at the third session in Geneva, see 4
UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 97, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.3/SR.21 (1975)
(remarks of Mr. Hussain, of Pakistan); id. (remarks of Mr. Lo Yu-ju, of China). For
remarks made at the fifth session in New York, see 6 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note
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reference in Article 246(3) to granting consent "in normal circumstances"
is designed to address that concern 3 9 by apparently permitting a coastal
state worried about marine scientific research of a military nature to
consider the circumstances not normal and, accordingly, deny consent.3 4
To argue from all of this, though, that the travaux demonstrate the
accuracy of the proposition that the requirement of consent for research
implies the impermissibility, as a matter of law, of clandestine foreign state
military use incapable of being designated research, seems tenuous at best.
To begin with, statements made by those supporting the requirement
of consent generally went no further than to suggest concern with research
jeopardizing or impacting national security.3 4I But, in addition, the
278, at 96, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.3/SR.30 (1976) (remarks of Mr. Rao, of India); id.
(remarks of Mr. Lo Yu-ju, of China); id. at 101, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.3/SR.31
(remarks of Mr. Ateya, of Kuwait). For remarks made at the resumed eighth session in
New York, see 12 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.65/
C.3/SR.41 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Malik, of Pakistan). For remarks made at the ninth
session in New York, see 13 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 21, U.N. Do. A/
Conf.62/SR. 126 (1980) (remarks of Mr. Pirzada, of Pakistan); id. at 43, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/SR. 128 (remarks of Mr. Tubman, of Liberia). For remarks made at the resumed
ninth session in Geneva, see 14 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 103, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 62/C.3/SR.46 (1980) (remarks of Mr. Hussain, of Pakistan).
339. At the fifth session in New York during 1976, proposals were advanced by both
Bahrain, 6 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 97, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.3/
SR.30 (1975), and the Libyan Arab Republic, id. at 98, to amend the RSNT to permit a
coastal state to exercise its discretion, under what is now Article 246(5), and withhold
consent for any scientific research project which would affect the coastal state's security.
Although the RSNT adopted neither of these proposals, its successor, the ICNT, did
include in Article 247(3), the predecessor of Article 246(3), the "in normal circumstances"
language. ICNT, supra note 299, at art. 246, para. 3, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III, Off.
Rec., supra note 278, at 42. Since the rejection of the Bahrain and Libyan proposals
signaled that coastal states could not invariably withhold consent simply because research
may be of a military nature, this language was included to give coastal states the right to
withhold consent for such research in some situations. If the circumstances were "normal,"
however, the coastal state could not appropriately withhold consent. See Oxman, supra note
278, at 75-77; Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of The Sea: The
Eighth Session, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 25-26 (1980).
340. See Clingan, Freedom of Navigation in a Post-UNCLOS III Environment, 46 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 180-81 (1983) (comment to this effect by Jose Luis Vallarta,
Chairman of the informal consultation group on "Protection and Preservation of the
Marine Environment" within the Third Committee at UNCLOS III).
341. See, e.g., 2 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 378, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/C.3/SR.16 (1974) (Mr. Zuleta Torres, of Colombia, stated that: "[t]he coastal
State should, however, in order to defend its own resources and for reasons of security,
regulate research .. " (emphasis added)). See also 13 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra
note 278, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/SR.128 (1980) (Mr. Tubman, of Liberia,
commented that "[h]is delegation believed that everything possible should be done to
promote rather than impede legitimate, genuine scientific research. That, however, could
not be done in a manner inimical to the security interests of coastal States.") (emphasis
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delegates involved in actually negotiating Article 246 apparently realized
that they were not dealing with military activities other than those in the
nature of research. 312 In view of these two factors, it would seem strange to
infer that the delegates intended to cover by implication that which they
consciously intended to leave uncovered by clear expression. This, of
course, is not to say that the negotiating history of Article 246 is clear in
authorizing foreign state military use in the face of the requirement of
consent for scientific research. Article 246's negotiating history will never
be as clear on this point as that of the 1958 Shelf Convention. There seems
little doubt, however, that it does not support the idea of implied
refutation.343
2. Limitations on Foreign State Military Use
The 1982 Convention sets forth limitations on foreign state military
use of the economic zone or continental shelf of another state which fall into
two distinct categories: those of specific applicability covering either the
bed of the EEZ or that of the continental shelf; and those of general
applicability covering the seabed areas of both zones of national jurisdic-
tion. The fundamental limitation of specific applicability which affects
foreign state military use of the bed of another state's economic zone is
reflected in the very test for determining whether such use may, in
principle, be carried out as a matter of right. In this respect, the limitation
differs considerably from that specifically limiting military uses of that
portion of the shelf extending beyond the EEZ, as well as from the
limitations of general applicability which affect military use of either area
of the seabed. Some of the limitations falling into the latter category derive
from exclusive rights granted to the coastal state, but it is clear that these
are unrelated to the provisions serving as the authorizing source of foreign
state use.
(a) Limitations of Specific Applicability
(i) Articles 56(2), 58(3), and 59 and the Economic Zone
Articles 56(2), 58(3), and 59 of Part V of the Convention contain the
basic limitations affecting foreign state military use of the economic zone.
In relevant part, the first of these provisions declares that the coastal state,
added).
342. See Oxman, supra note 278, at 75.
343. There are also other reasons for rejecting the notion of implied refutation. See
infra notes 352 & 360.
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in exercising its rights, "shall have due regard to the rights and duties of
other states and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of the
Convention." 4 This is counter balanced by the second provision, 58(3),
which provides that foreign states, when exercising their rights, "shall have
due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal state in accordance with
the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law not
incompatible with this Part. '' 8I Given that the balancing approach
reflected in the "due regard" standards set forth in these provisions applies
to situations where the exercise of "rights" or the performance of "duties"
by the coastal state or a foreign state affects "rights" or "duties" of the
other, neither provision would seem to have much impact on efforts by
foreign states to conduct military maneuvers or emplace weapons or
detection devices on the bed of another state's economic zone. As we have
already observed, s46 in most instances military uses of this nature do not
come within Article 58(1 )'s reference to navigation, cables, or pipelines, or
related uses of the sea, and thus are not characterized by the Convention as
"rights."
As a result of the inapplicability of Articles 56(2) and 58(3), the
fundamental limitation affecting the bed of the economic zone would
appear to be contained in Article 59.347 The language of that provision
seems to intimate that the "interests" it recognizes will be treated as
possessing a legal character equivalent to or at least resembling that
possessed by the freedoms set forth in Article 58(1) whenever such
treatment is warranted by equity, the surrounding circumstances, and an
assessment of the importance of the relevant interests involved. 48 Curi-
ously enough, these criteria apply in cases where "a conflict arises between
the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States. 3 49 Thus,
the question which one is naturally inclined to ask is whether the criteria
have any applicability to situations which do not involve an actual conflict
between a use of the coastal state and a use of a foreign state. The effect of a
negative answer would be to restrict the provision so that the criteria would
neither proscribe foreign state military uses in the absence of a conflict, nor
authorize foreign state military uses conflicting with coastal state activi-
ties. Whether the foreign state's use is designed to restore the military
344. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 56, para. 2, 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1280.
345. Id. at art. 58, para. 3, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280.
346. See supra Section III(C)(l)(a) of this Article.






equilibrium by meeting legitimate security concerns, or is designed to
produce a military advantage for the foreign state which threatens to alter
the balance of power and thereby imperil international peace, Article 59
would not apply.
The foremost reason for rejecting this reading is found in the language
of the provision itself. Observe that the excerpt quoted above refers to a
"conflict [arising] between the interests" of a coastal state and a foreign
state. It has already been suggested that the negotiating history of Article
59's rule of residual competence indicates that the term "interests" at least
includes recognition of all those types of uses which were considered high
seas freedoms under the 1958 regime and are not reserved by the provisions
of Part V of the 1982 Convention to the coastal state or foreign states.
Additionally, when the term is read in conjunction with the reference to a
"conflict [arising]" it signifies a conflict not only between actual uses of the
type just alluded to but also between "interests" as understood in their
purest sense. The effect is twofold. The criteria of Article 59 determine
which of two uses prevail when use of a coastal state and that of a foreign
state happen to conflict. Additionally, the criteria also determine whether
efforts directed at giving effect to some uses may even be initiated if the
effect would be to create a conflict with the interests - as distinguished
from the uses - of another state. Supporting the latter as a component of
the approach taken by Article 59 is that provision's reliance on the term
"interests" rather than the term "uses." Had the language selected
referred to a "conflict [arising] between the uses of the coastal State and
any other State or States," the preceding interpretation would have been
precluded. That kind of alternative language could not have been avoided
by the delegates at UNCLOS III because of legitimate fear that "uses"
may have led to confusion over the precise types of uses they were trying to
recognize in Article 59. "Uses" and "interests" are equally distinct from
"rights" and, given the background relating to Article 59's adoption, would
have imparted the same meaning. Therefore, it seems clear that when
"interests" is read in conjunction with the reference to a "conflict
[arising]" it means to cover conflicts of interests in addition to conflicts of
uses.
This notion of a two-pronged approach is already somewhat familiar.
As discussed in the context of the balancing test used under the 1958 shelf
regime, everything from the initiation of foreign state military use to actual
military conduct in the face of conflict with coastal state military or
resource-related activity is open to scrutiny. Article 59's reference to
equity, the surrounding circumstances, and an assessment of the impor-
tance of the relevant interests involved to the parties as well as to the
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international community as a whole recalls, in a more general sense, the
same factors used in the balancing test of the 1958 regime. Since the end
product of the application of Article 59's balancing test will be identical to
that under the 1958 shelf regime, one wonders what is gained by taking the
kind of narrow view of Article 59 which was described and rejected above.
If the criteria set forth in Article 59 are triggered only by an actual conflict
of uses, one would seem obliged to fall back on the customarily used
balancing test in order to deal with situations where a foreign state military
use does not conflict with coastal state military or resource-related activity.
In doing so, it seems clear that the only foreign state military uses which
may lawfully be conducted are those which are designed to restore the
military equilibrium, meet legitimate security concerns, and serve to
buttress international stability. It does not matter whether such uses be
undertaken in a fashion which carefully avoids or inescapably creates
conflict with coastal state military or resource-related activities.350 In
either instance the same degree of disapproval results since logic dictates
that peace and stability must be preferred over economic and material
well-being.
Similarly, the very initiation of foreign state efforts designed to give
effect to military uses which would place the coastal state in a position of
military inferiority seem to be prohibited. Military maneuvers, the
emplacement of weapons, and the deployment of detection devices inte-
grated with a larger military network which is able to neutralize the coastal
state's naval vessels cannot be pursued if designed to obtain a military
advantage for the foreign state. The ability of a foreign state to fully
implement these military uses if they do not conflict with activities of the
coastal state stands for little. Any other conclusion would lead to
predictable coastal state responsive action, which is likely to exacerbate an
already tense situation and, further, lead to a disruption of the balance of
power which could have rather untoward effects on the world community.
The mere fact that the balancing test of Article 59 is phrased in terms of
equity, the surrounding circumstances, and the relative importance of the
various interests involved to the parties as well as to the international
community as a whole does not alter the conclusion. As with the
customarily used balancing test, the test provided for in Article 59 seeks to
promote security and international stability by establishing a codified legal
standard that mirrors the values on which states normally act.
At least one commentator has suggested that even though Article 59's
balancing test will apply to a conflict of interests as well as a conflict of uses,
350. See supra Section III(B)(2)(b) of this Article.
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foreign state efforts to emplace military objects other than weapons on the
bed of another state's economic zone cannot, therefore, conflict with the
coastal state's security interests.3 51 The result, this commentator con-
cludes, is that emplacement efforts of that sort are permitted and need not
be preceded by negotiations resulting in the military use being expressly
authorized.
An apparent inconsistency exists between admitting the possibility
that Article 59 may prohibit the emplacement of weapons and arguing that
for other military objects Article 59 applies during the course of negotia-
tions or settlement efforts occurring after emplacement and may result in
an agreement or decision concerning their removal. If the emplacement of
weapons would create such a conflict with the interests of a coastal state
that the activity would be prohibited by the criteria contained in Article 59,
it would seem that any foreign state military undertaking creating a
conflict of comparable dimensions would be similarly prohibited. To
maintain that this is not the case and insist that a foreign state can pursue
such efforts until there is an agreement or decision of removal or
termination subjects the coastal state to threats which Article 59 would not
otherwise permit. Adherence to this position seems based on an assumption
that military uses not involving the emplacement of weapons cannot
conflict with the coastal state's basic security interests. The most appropri-
ate approach would be to recognize that there are many kinds of foreign
state military uses which possess the potential for creating conflicts with
the coastal state's security interests. If equity, the surrounding circum-
stances, and an assessment of the relative value of the interests concerned
suggest that they cannot be initiated, it matters little whether the military
uses involve the emplacement of weapons. In this category any detection
devices which, because of their integration with a larger military network,
are able to neutralize the coastal state's naval vessels, thereby threatening
to create international instability. 52
351. See Treves, supra note 19, at 845.
352. In addition to providing a standard for resolving conflicts with coastal state uses
or interests caused by foreign state military undertakings, Article 59 supports the rejection
of the notion that consent for scientific research implies that foreign states do not have, even
in principle, the right to use the bed of another state's EEZ for military purposes. See supra
notes 349-51 and accompanying text. This, of course, was said to derive from the fact that,
since the term "interests" as used in Article 59 includes all military uses recognized as
permissible under the 1958 regime, the 1982 Convention contains an express grant
(assuming the balancing test of Article 59 is passed) which is inconsistent with the asserted
implication. Id. At this juncture, it should be observed that Article 59 seems to support the
rejection of that same notion in a somewhat different fashion. Specifically, by articulating a
balancing test applicable to situations where a conflict arises between the interests of the
coastal state (claimed to exist by an implication from the requirement of consent for simple,
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(ii) Articles 78(2), 87(2), and the Continental Shelf
Just as Article 59 enunciates a principle applicable to uses of the bed
of the economic zone, Article 78(2) of Part VI and 87(2) of Part VII
enunciate principles applicable to uses of that portion of the continental
shelf extending beyond the EEZ's outer perimeter. " ' Recall that Article
5(1) of the 1958 Shelf Convention requires coastal states, when exercising
sovereign rights of exploration and exploitation, to refrain from causing
"unjustifiable interference" with navigation by foreign states. 5  Article
78(2) of the 1982 Convention also contains a restraint on "unjustifiable
interference" with navigation, but extends the restraint to include "other
rights and freedoms . . . provided for in [the] Convention" as well.355
Whereas Article 87(1)'s reference to "inter alia" signifies, as has already
been noted, that one of the "other rights and freedoms" is that of military
use, Article 78(2) thus clearly affects the exercise of that right. Any
adequate understanding of the limitations on foreign state military use in
relation to coastal state resource-related activity cannot be developed
without taking that provision into consideration.
There are two particular matters of interest with respect to Article
78(2) which require comment. First, like Article 5(1) of the Shelf
Convention, Article 78(2) is specifically designed to prohibit the coastal
state from exercising its resource-'elated rights in a manner which
interferes unjustifiably with some right or rights of foreign states.'"
Though neither provision is directed explicitly at foreign states, it would
seem to be a mistake to conclude that no limitation emerges on the exercise
of foreign state rights. By approving coastal state activities up to the point
at which they interfere unjustifiably, Articles 5(1) and 78(2) place an
peaceful research) and the foreign state (claimed to exist because "interests" includes
military uses recognized under the 1958 regime), Article 59 suggests that one cannot
automatically conclude that consent for scientific research implies that, as a matter of law,
foreign state military use is impermissible. This conclusion can only be arrived at after
considering the criteria so clearly spelled out. Interestingly, if there are some cases where a
coastal state's assertion of a conflict with an interest in security fails to result in the foreign
state military use being impermissible, surely an assertion of impermissibility based on a
mere implication should be viewed as much less compelling.
353. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 78, para. 2, 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1285 ("[t]he exercise of the rights of the coastal State over the
continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interference with
navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided for in this
Convention").
354. See supra Section III(B)(2)(a).
355. See supra note 353.
356. Id.
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indirect limitation on foreign state rights.3B5 More particularly, to the
extent that foreign state rights may lawfully be interfered with by coastal
state resource-related activity, those rights must necessarily be considered
limited.
Secondly, under the 1958 regime the "unjustifiable interference"
standard clearly unravels into a balancing test. Since each of the officially
reported proposals on Article 78(2) reiterate that standard35 and, since no
expression to the contrary appears in the official records of UNCLOS III, it
would seem quite fair to carry the balancing test over to the 1982
Convention. Given this, the extension to "other rights and freedoms...
provided for in [the] Convention" would seem to eliminate the doubt which
surrounds the 1958 Shelf Convention regarding whether "unjustifiable
interference" states a hierarchical approach to resolving conflicts among
foreign state military use and coastal state resource-related activity.3 59 The
ndtion of the coastal state's resource-related rights invariably prevailing
over, or - if you so prefer - being left inferior to a foreign state military
use is categorically rejected. To this extent, Article 78(2) is a significant
improvement on the earlier regime. 6
357. There is no language of direct limitation in Article 78(2). 1982 Convention on
Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 78, para. 2, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1285.
358. See U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.8/Rev.1, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec.,
supra note 278, at 118, provision 73 (1975). One earlier proposal stated:
Formula A
The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural
resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing
or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any interference
with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried out with the
intention of open publication.
Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones around them, may be
established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes
essential to international navigation.
Formula B
The exercise of the coastal State' rights over the continental shelf shall not
result in any unjustifiable interference with the freedom of navigation in the
superjacent waters and of overflight in the superjacent air space, nor shall it impede
the use of recognized lanes essential to international navigation.
Formula C
The coastal State shall exercise its rights and perform its duties without
unjustifiable interference with navigation or other uses of the sea, and ensure
compliance with applicable international standards established by the appropriate
international organizations for this purpose.
Id.
359. See supra Section III(B)(2)(b).
360. A point closely related to that made supra, at note 352, is that Article 78(2)
rejects the notion that consent for scientific research implies that foreign states do not have,
even in principle, the right to use another state's continental shelf for military purposes.
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When a foreign state military use conflicts with coastal military
activity, the appropriate standard is found in Article 87(2). 361 Like the
second paragraph of Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, Article
87(2) sets forth a standard to resolve conflicts between a high seas freedom
exercised by one state and that exercised by another state. The only
difference from the standard contained in the earlier convention is that
under 87(2) states are obligated to exercise their freedoms with "due
regard," rather than with "reasonable regard," for the freedoms of other
states. 62 The phrase "due regard" made its first appearance in the
Convention itself; all earlier draft texts used the phrase "due considera-
tion." Whether the change from "reasonable regard" was meant to have
some effect on the elements configuring the 1958 standard is uncertain.3 63
Earlier, it was observed that the articulation in Article 59 of a balancing test applicable to
military uses suggests that one cannot automatically conclude that consent for research
implies the impermissibility of such uses. See supra note 352. Similarly, Article 78(2)
suggests an identical result by requiring the coastal state to avoid exercising its rights over
the shelf in a manner causing "unjustifiable interference" with "other rights and freedoms
of other states." 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 78, para. 2, 21
Int'l Legal Materials at 1285. This is supported by the history of Article 78(2), which
indicates it was essentially formulated to deal with the affect that coastal state rights over
scientific research beyond the outer perimeter of the economic zone might be perceived as
having on the freedoms proposed in Article 87. See Report of the Chairman of the Second
Committee, 11 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 101, 102, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/L.38 (1979). The report notes a proposal by the Chairman of Negotiating Group 6
of the Second Committee containing the identical language reflected in Article 78(2) of the
Convention. Id. Of this proposal Mr. Goerner, of the German Democratic Republic, stated
in Plenary that "[t]he suggestions put forward. . . represented an improvement on the...
negotiating test." Id. at 35, para. 108, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/SR.166 (1979). With regard
to Article 78(2) he noted that "the [ICNT] provisions on the legal regime of the continental
shelf also need to be improved with a view to ensuring that the freedoms of the high seas
would be preserved intact." Id. (emphasis added). While it has been suggested that the
primary concern was with preserving the freedoms of the waters of the high seas, see
Oxman, supra note 330, at 22; and Oxman, supra note 339, at 26, the language of Article
78(2) is broad enough to apply to all high seas freedoms, including those which can be
exercised in the airspace above or on the bed below the waters of the high seas.
361. Article 87(2) states: "These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due
regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and
also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the
Areas." 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at 1287, art. 87, para. 2.
362. Compare Article 87(2), id., with 1958 High Seas Convention, art. 2, supra notes
237-38.
363. Discussion on the standard reflected in Article 87(2) is contained in the records of
the Caracas session. Only the Soviet delegate, Mr. Mouchan, commented on resolving
conflicting uses at that session. See 2 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 237, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/SR.31 (1975). He noted that "due account" should be taken of other
states' rights. Id. No explanation exists as to the nature of the "due account" test. Since
deep seabed mining was an issue of tremendous concern at UNCLOS III, and many who
have argued its lawfulness have relied on, among other things, the "reasonable regard"
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Nevertheless, it would seem peculiar to maintain that change has recon-
figured the elements of the earlier balancing test so that the coastal state
has a stronger claim against all foreign state military uses on the shelf
beyond 200-nautical miles from its shore-line than it has against such uses
on the bed of the economic zone located within 200-nautical miles.
Although foreign state conduct of maneuvers, emplacement of weapons,
and deployment of sensitive detection devices are not generally preferred
over coastal state military activity with which they conflict, these activities
may still prove lawful in the few instances where they are designed to
restore military equilibrium, meet legitimate security concerns, and serve
to promote international peace and stability." 4
Nonetheless, neither Article 78(2) nor Article 87(2) have gone far
enough. By their terms their respective balancing tests are applicable only
to situations involving interference between the actual exercise of rights of
the coastal state and rights of the foreign state. It would appear, therefore,
that neither provision expressly calls for application of a balancing test
unless an actual conflict of uses exists. In short, the very terms of Articles
78(2) and 87(2) do not prohibit the initiation of foreign state military uses
which are prohibited because of an unacceptable conflict of interests.
Rather, they are limited to situations in which foreign state military uses
have been pursued and eventually conflict with some coastal state resource-
related or military activity. Once again, the unstated, customarily-used
balancing approach must be applied to determine whether a foreign state is
prohibited from initiating a certain type of military use.
(b) Limitations of General Applicability
(i) Article 60(1)(c): "Structures" v. "Devices"
Under Articles 59, 78(2), and customary principles of law, the
economic zone and that portion of the shelf located beyond the EEZ's outer
perimeter are subject to the balancing test. In most conceivable instances
the effect is that foreign state military uses must give way to conflicting
resource-related or military activities of the coastal state. Indeed, the only
situation in which foreign state military use may be initiated and then
carried on in the face of conflict with coastal state activity is if the use is
language of the second paragraph of Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, it is at
least possible that the change reflects an attempt to remove that argument, and does not
otherwise alter the elements of the time-honored balancing test reflected in the concept of
reasonableness.




designed to restore the military equilibrium.36 Article 60(1)(c), 66 how-
ever, contains a limitation of general applicability which further restricts
activity of such an exceptional character. It does so by providing the coastal
state with the "exclusive right" to construct or authorize the construction,
operation, and use of "installations and structures which may interfere
with the exercise of the rights of the coastal state."36 7 The description of the
coastal state's right as "exclusive" suggests that foreign state emplacement
is permissible only if consented to by the coastal state. Without consent, it
would seem to matter little whether the foreign state's objects are designed
to accomplish military objectives and are of exceptional character which
would make their emplacement otherwise permissible. If the objects may,
or do, interfere with economic or resource-related activities of the coastal
state their emplacement would seem to be prohibited.
Clearly, the coastal state is not vested with a similar exclusive right
over military objects which do not interfere with economic or resource-
related activities. This fact is explicit from the very terms of Article
60(1)(c) and also from the refusal of delegates at the resumed ninth session
of the Conference to favor a proposal of Brazil and Uruguay giving the
coastal state an exclusive right over all installations and structures.68
Although it would seem that military objects which may, or do,
interfere with coastal state economic or resource-related activities are
prohibited, one might suggest that this is not necessarily so. Stated
succinctly, this argument would proceed by observing that Article
60(1)(c) speaks of an exclusive right to construct, authorize and regulate
the construction, operation, and use of "installations and structures." In
juxtaposition, however, the 1958 Shelf Convention entitles the coastal
state to construct and maintain or operate "installations and other
devices."' 69 The difference in language, therefore, might be said to
365. See supra Section III(C)(I).
366. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 60, para. 1(c), 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1280-81. This applies to the economic zone alone. Article 80, however,
applies the same standard to the shelf. Id. at art. 80, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1286.
367. If installations and structures which "may interfere" are prohibited, those which
do interfere are clearly prohibited.
368. See Reply to Zedalis, supra note 149, at 935 n.1. Brazil's representative, Mr.
Calero Rodrigues, noted that the "sea beyond the [territorial sea] should not be used in a
manner detrimental to the security of the coastal state." See 14 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec.,
supra note 278, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/SR. 136 (1982). At the session held during the
summer of 1980, Mr. Lupinacci, of Uruguay maintained that this could best be
accomplished by simplifying Article 60(1)(c) so that it" [would] not admit of any exception
or limitation with regard to types of installations or structures." Id. at 80, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/SR.140 (1982).
369. 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 14, at art. 5, para. 2, 15 U.S.T. at
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evidence the fact that military objects which are designed to restore parity,
meet legitimate security concerns, and serve to buttress international
stability may lawfully be emplaced on the bed of the EEZ or continental
shelf, even though they interfere with the coastal state's economic and
resource-related rights, so long as the objects may be considered
"devices."3 70
It seems clear that if the term "devices" had been deleted from the
Convention with nothing inserted in lieu thereof, one might be able to make
a rather persuasive argument that many objects previously covered now lay
outside the coastal state's exclusive domain of construction, operation, and
use. That is to say that if the Convention had vested the coastal state with
exclusive rights over "installations" alone, one could more easily argue that
the Convention did not extend the coastal state's authority to "devices."
But use of the term "structures" in lieu of "devices" places one in the
difficult position of reaching a similar result only by demonstrating that
"structures" has a narrower meaning covering a much smaller number of
objects than does the term "devices. ' 371 A successful demonstration of this
could remove from the coastal state's exclusive domain antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) devices (e.g., weapons and detection devices) which do, or
may, interfere with economic and resource-related activities. Several
problems, however, would be encountered in any such undertaking.
At the outset, nothing in the negotiating background relating to the
adoption of the reference to "installations and structures" supports the
notion that "structures" was intended to have a narrow, circumscribed
meaning. Five officially reported proposals dealing with coastal state
authority over artificial islands and various other objects were submitted
during the Conference's deliberations. Four of the proposals referred to
"artificial islands and installations, ' ' 71 and the fifth to "installations and
473-74, 499 U.N.T.S. at 314. Article 71 of the ILC's 1956 draft convention used only the
term "installations." The word "devices" apparently made its way into the Shelf
Convention when a proposal submitted by Mr. Mouton of the Netherlands was adopted.
U.N. Doc A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.22, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I, Off. Rec., supra note 60, at
132 (1958). No discussion concerning the term accompanied its adoption.
370. Treves, supra note 19, at 841, argues that the difference results in some objects
not considered "installations" or "structures" being left untouched by the grant of exclusive
rights to the coastal state.
371. Id.
372. These were the proposals of Nigeria, the United States, Gambia, Canada and
others. Article 16 of the proposal submitted by Canada, et al, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/L.4,
reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 81, 83 (1975), stated: "The
emplacement and use of artificial islands and other installations on the surface of the sea, in
the waters and on the sea-bed and subsoil of the economic zone shall be subject to the
authorization and regulation of the coastal State." Article 3(4) of the Nigerian proposal,
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other facilities. ' 3 73 As best as can be determined, "structures" made its
original appearance in the April 16, 1975 unofficially reported proposal of
the Evensen Group of the Second Committee.37 4 No explanation for its
adoption by that Group or for its subsequent incorporation in the informal
single negotiating text37 5 has yet been recounted by those with special
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding its selection.
Considerably more important, however, is the fact that reading
"structures" as not including "devices" would lead to some rather perverse
results in other contexts. Specifically, it would relieve the coastal state from
the requirement of establishing a permanent means for giving warning of
devices used in connection with resource-related activities and emplaced
on the bed of the economic zone or the continental shelf. 37 6 It would also
relieve the coastal state from having to remove similar devices no longer
useful.3  And, further, it would relieve the coastal state from the
obligation to refrain from interfering with international navigation by
avoiding the emplacement of devices in recognized sea lanes. 8" In short, by
simply using objects too small to be considered "structures," the coastal
state could escape obligations which have been integral parts of interna-
tional law of the sea.37 9
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.21/Rev.l, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra
note 278, at 199 (1975), stated: "A coastal State shall not erect or establish artificial islands
and other installations, including safety zones around them, in such a manner as to interfere
with the use by all States or recognized sea lands and traffic separation schemes essential to
international navigation." Article 3(1) of the United States' proposal, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.62/C.2/L.47, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 222 (1975),
used the following language:
The coastal State shall have the exclusive right to authorize and regulate, in
the economic zone, the construction, operation and use of artificial islands and
installations for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of natural resources, or
for other economic purposes, and of any installation which may interfere with the
exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the economic zone.
The proposal submitted by Gambia, et al., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.82, id. at 240,241
(1975), stated in Article 4(b): "A coastal State shall have the exclusive right to make and
enforce regulations relating to, inter alia the following: . . . (b) The construction,
emplacement, operation and use of artificial islands and other installations ....
373. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.38, art. 7, para. 1, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III,
Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 214, 215 (1975) (submitted by Bulgaria and others).
374. See Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Documents of the
Geneva Session 273 (ed. Platzoder 1975) (arts. l(l)(c), 4(l)(b)).
375. See ISNT, supra note 300, at 722, art. 48, para. 1(c).
376. See 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 56, para. 3, 21 Int'l
Legal Materials at 1281.
377. Id.
378. Id., art. 56, para. 7.
379. See text accompanying notes 173-234 (establishing that navigation, among
others, is an extremely valued right). The basic thrust of Article 5 of the 1958 Continental
1984]
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
But perhaps the single most disturbing problem with giving "struc-
tures" a narrow reading is that it runs contrary to the Convention's basic
thrust of increasing coastal state authority over the economic zone and
shelf beyond.3 80 The 1958 Shelf Convention vests the coastal state with
"sovereign rights" to explore the shelf and exploit its natural resources. As
alluded to earlier, Parts V and VI of the 1982 Convention reaffirm these
rights and provide, further, for many additional sovereign and exclusive
rights. Therefore, to maintain that use of the term of "structures" rather
than "devices" signifies a diminution in the coastal state's 1958 rights
seems somewhat incongruous. A better interpretation might be that while
"devices" refers to objects with operational characteristics or functional
attributes, "structures" should be more broadly interpreted to include all
objects affected, shaped, or constructed by the intervention of man. This
interpretation is not only consistent with the thrust of the Convention, but
avoids the perversions consequent to giving "structures" a narrow reading
in other contexts. Irrespective of the object's size, adequate measures must
be taken to insure that the object does not imperil the safety of interna-
tional navigation. Furthermore, a broad interpretation avoids the difficulty
of determining how large an object must actually be before it falls within
the ambit of the term "structures." Similar difficulties may also arise in
determining whether an object has been affected, shaped, or constructed
by the intervention of man, but they seem easier to resolve.
(ii) Article 81 and Drilling
Article 81 contains a second limitation on foreign state military use of
the continental shelf which augments the general limitation of Article
60(1) (c). Article 81, applying to the bed of the economic zone as well as the
Shelf Convention is to establish a standard permitting the right of navigation and the
coastal state's sovereign rights to be accommodated. 1958 Continental Shelf Convention,
supra note 14, at art. 5, 15 U.S.T. at 473-74,499 U.N.T.S. at 314-16. Interestingly enough,
Article 5(1) prohibits "unjustifiable interference." Id., art. 5, para. 1. The reference in
Article 5(6) to prohibiting the emplacement of installations and devices which may cause
"interference" to recognized sealanes is explained by the ILC's commentary 7 on the 1956
draft of Article 5's predecessor as being an advance application of the "unjustifiable"
interference standard. Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) at 46, 47, art. 71, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 299, 300, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1956/Add. 1 (1957). If one argues that objects too small to be considered "structures" are
not subject to Article 60(3)-(7) of the 1982 Convention, one must be prepared to accept the
notion that "unjustifiable interference" with navigation is permitted when caused by
certain kinds of objects.
380. See Zedalis, supra note 368, at 931.
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shelf beyond,381 grants the coastal state the "exclusive right to authorize
and regulate drilling. . . for all purposes." 82 While this right is a natural
outgrowth of the coastal state's economic and resource-related interests,
the reference to "for all purposes" signifies that it extends to drilling which
affects those interests indirectly, if at all. Therefore, this provision
establishes a further restriction on all permissible foreign state military
uses. The "exclusivity" of the coastal state's right to authorize and regulate
suggests that drilling associated with military uses is permissible only if
consented to by the coastal state. The absence of consent has the same
prohibitory effect on this activity as the absence of consent has under
Article 60(1)(c) on the emplacement of installations and structures which
may interfere with coastal state economic and resource-related activities.
(iii) Reservation for Peaceful Purposes
The third, and final, general limitation affecting foreign state military
undertakings is that reserving the seabed to use for "peaceful purposes."
This reservation, developed during the late 1960s in the General Assem-
bly's Seabed Committee, is found in Article 88 of the 1982 Convention.383
Article 88 reserves only the high seas to use for "peaceful purposes. 384
Article 58(2) of Part V, however, invokes the provision and specifically
applies it to the economic zone. 385 Though no similar reservation or
invocation appears in Part VI, the fact that that portion of the continental
shelf beyond the outer perimeter of the EEZ is subject to the regime of the
high seas 8 ' leads to the conclusion that "peaceful purposes" has applica-
381. See supra notes 287 & 312. This exclusive coastal state right has appeared in
each of the previously issued drafts of UNCLOS III. See ISNT, supra note 300, arts. 67,
45, para. 1 (e); RSNT, supra note 300, arts. 69,44, para. 1 (e), reprinted in 5 UNCLOS III,
Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 164, 160; ICNT, supra note 299, art. 56, para. 1(c), 81,
reprinted in 8 UNCLOS 111, Off. Rec., supra note 278, at 13, 16; Draft Treaty, supra note
310. From the negotiating history, it appears that two of the nations submitting proposals on
the EEZ and continental shelf included language like that found in the Convention. See
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.47, arts. 4 and 26, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec.,
supra note 278, at 222 (1975) (U.S. proposal, applying to both the EEZ and the Shelf);
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/C.2/L.82, art. 4(a), reprinted in 3 UNCLOS III, Off. Rec., supra
note 278, at 240 (1975) (proposal of the African nations, applying to the EEZ alone).
382. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 81, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1286.
383. Id. at art. 88, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1287.
384. Id. ("The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.").
385. Id. at art. 58, para. 2, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1280.
386. See supra note 283 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that any other
position would lead to the anomaly of having the "peaceful purposes" provision apply to the
bed of the economic zone and the high seas - reaffirmed by Article 141 - but not to that
portion of the continental shelf located between the two. For a similar view, see Treves,
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bility to that area as well.
The meaning of "peaceful purposes" in international conventions has
long been a matter subject to difference of opinion. s 7 Some commentators
have suggested that the language is designed to assure that the area to
which it applies is used for activities of a nonmilitary nature.3 88 Just as
ardently, others have maintained that it is directed at nothing more than
proscribing activities of an aggressive nature.389 Both positions were
reiterated during the fourth session of UNCLOS III held in New York in
the spring of 1976. Specifically, the representative from Ecuador, Mr.
Valencia Rodriguez, noted that the term peaceful purposes used in other
agreements meant "complete demilitarization and the exclusion. . . of all
military activities." 3 0 Mr. Learson, of the United States, disagreed,
stating that the terms "did not, of course, preclude military activities
generally," if consistent with the U.N. Charter. 91
supra note 19, at 817.
387. "Peaceful purposes" appears in Article 4 of the Treaty on Principles Governing
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610
U.N.T.S. 205, and Article III(1) of the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/L. 113/Add.4 (1979), openedfor
signature Dec. 18, 1979, U.N. Doc. A/Res./34/68 (1979). On the meaning of "peaceful
purposes" in the context of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, see Finch, Outer Space for
"Peaceful Purposes", 54 A.B.A. J. 365 (1968); Gal, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space -
After the Space Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH COLLOQUIM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 129 (1967); Gorove, Some Thoughts on Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH COLLOQUIM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
79 (1971); Markoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provision in the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3 (1976); Meyer, Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful" in
Light of the Space Treaty, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE 27 (1968); Stein, LegalRestraints in Modern Arms Control Agreements,
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 255, 260-64 (1972); Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967,8 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 454 (1978); Comment, The Treaty on
Outer Space: An Evaluation of the Arms Control Provisions, 7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
259 (1968). On the "peaceful purposes" provision appearing in the proposed Moon Treaty
of 1979, see Zedalis, Will Article III of the Moon Treaty Improve Existing Law?: A
Textual Analysis, 5 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 53 (1980). See generally Sullivan,
Antarctica in a Two-Power World, 36 FOREIGN AFF. 154 (1957); Daniel, Conflict of
Sovereignties in the Antarctic, 3 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 241 (1949); Hayton, The "American"
Antarctic, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 583 (1956); Simsarian, Inspection Experience Under the
Antarctic Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 502
(1966).
388. See, e.g., Markoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provisions in the
1967 Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 4 J. SPACE L. 3 (1976).
389. See, e.g., Finch, Outer Space for "Peaceful Purposes", 54 A.B.A. J. 365 (1968).





Whatever merits or demerits attach to these arguments in other
contexts, it seems that "peaceful purposes" applied to the economic zone
and the shelf beyond can only be read as prohibiting uses of an aggressive
nature. With particular reference to the EEZ, it is clear that Article
58(1)'s clause "referred to in Article 87" signifies that the enumerated
high seas freedoms retain their qualitative identity when exercised on the
waters or on the bed of the economic zone.392 Since the freedom to navigate
the high seas has long been available to military vessels and is implicitly
confirmed by the Convention itself,393 its listing in Article 58(1) as one of
the Article 87 freedoms applicable to the EEZ suggests that the "peaceful
purposes" provision must be read as including military uses.39 Regarding
that portion of the shelf extending beyond the outer perimeter of the EEZ,
a similar conclusion about military uses in that area can be drawn since
that area is directly under the regime of Article 87.9
(c) Remedial Action
Foreign state military use of the bed of another state's economic zone
or continental shelf involves security considerations. Consequently, it is
possible that unilateral coastal state measures directed at the elimination
of the use may, in some instances, be permissible. The most obvious case in
this category involves the conduct of military maneuvers or the emplace-
ment of military objects producing the kind of violations of the U.N.
Charter justifying invocation of the inherent right of self-defense affirmed
by Article 51.396 If the military uses do not prove violative of the Charter,
392. Oxman, supra note 278, at 72.
393. Article 95 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea states: "Warships on the
high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag
State." 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 95, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1288 (emphasis added).
394. Admittedly navigation is a freedom exercised on the water surface or in the water
column, but it would seem peculiar to argue that this warrants giving "peaceful purposes"
one meaning when applied to the waters of the EEZ and another when applied to the bed.
This is especially so in view of the fact that the rule of residual competence set forth in
Article 59 is, as we have seen, flexible enough to include foreign state military use of any
part of the economic zone. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
395. See generally comment by Norman A. Wulf, Deputy General Counsel, U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 46 L. & Contemp. Probs. 179 (1983), on non-
aggressive definition of "peaceful purposes" language in 1982 Convention on Law of the
Sea.
396. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
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they may nevertheless have been initiated, or are being continued, in
contravention of one or more of the limitations of specific or general
applicability discussed above."I When we addressed the matter of coastal
state remedial action in these circumstances in the context of the 1958
Shelf Convention, avoidance of military confrontation and maintenance of
international stability were described as preeminent concerns. Indeed, it
was suggested that, with the exception of the situation in which the coastal
state could remove military objects without encountering resistance from
the foreign state, resort to the peaceful settlement mechanisms provided in
Chapter VI of the Charter was an obligatory step in the resolution process.
This result was said to proceed from the fact that every other imaginable
situation involved a dispute "likely to endanger the maintenance of peace
and security," thereby constituting the kind of dispute Article 33 places
within the purview of Chapter VI.
Part XV of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea contains its
own provisions relating to the settlement of law of the sea disputes. By the
terms of its opening stanza, Article 279, Part XV applies to "any dispute
. . . concerning the interpretation or application" of the Convention. 98
The Convention considerably extends the peaceful settlement obligation
reflected in the Charter, because the Convention does not contain a
requirement that the dispute endanger the maintenance of international
peace and security. Therefore, the important question is no longer whether
removal or termination efforts will meet with resistance or will strengthen
or jeopardize international stability. The only relevant matter is whether a
dispute exists about the meaning or applicability of a specific provision of
the Convention. In this connection, it would appear that detection of
foreign state military activities or objects might produce one of the
following coastal state reactions: a representation that the Convention was
violated which the foreign state denies; a similar representation to which
the foreign state responds admitting violation but refusing to take action
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council
under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
397. See supra Section III(C)(2)(a), (b).
398. 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 279, 21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1322. Article 279 states:
States Parties shall settle any dispute between them concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article
2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek a
solution by the means indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter.
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which would result in the violation's discontinuation; or immediate coastal
state action, not preceded by a representation that the Convention was
violated, which is directed at termination of the activities or removal of the
devices. What can be said about each of these scenarios in light of the
language of Article 279?
A coastal state representation of violation communicated to and then
denied by a foreign state conducting activities or emplacing military
objects in apparent contravention of one of the specific or general
limitations mentioned in the 1982 Convention clearly gives rise to a dispute
subject to the peaceful settlement procedures of Part XV.3 99 The denial,
which might take the form of a rejection of either the coastal state's
interpretation of an admittedly applicable provision or its assertion that the
conduct of the foreign state is within a provision the meaning of which is not
in question, creates a dispute "concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion" of the Convention. Straightforward cases of this sort may not develop
very often. In all probability, such situations will arise only when the risks
associated with any other course of action incline the coastal state to
diplomatic niceties, or when the coastal state chances a representation
hoping that it will result in the foreign state ending activities or removing
objects viewed as undesirable yet tacitly recognized as not violative of any
of the Convention's limitations. 00
An entirely different case exists, however, if a representation meets
with an admission of violation by the foreign state which refuses to take the
necessary steps to stop the violation. The motivation underlying such a
foreign state response could be coastal state weakness or an assessment
that the expressed interest of the coastal state in obtaining a discontinua-
tion of violation is not strong enough to lead it to take measures essential to
secure the objective. The basic question regarding Part XV is whether the
foreign state is nevertheless obligated to submit to peaceful settlement
efforts designed to end the ongoing violation. It may contend that the
obligation does not exist because its admission prevents a dispute concern-
ing the meaning or applicability of a provision of the Convention from
arising. This is indisputably correct if Article 279's reference to "concern-
ing the interpretation or application of [the] Convention"' 0'° is read as
meaning a dispute about whether a relevant provision has a particular
399. See id., Art. 279.
400. Clearly, in the instance of a representation of a violation being advanced by a
coastal state unable to otherwise effect removal or termination, viewing a dispute within the
terms of Article 279 as in existence seems to comport with reality. See supra note 258.
There may be no other alternative left for the coastal state.
401. See supra note 398.
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interpretation or actually applies to the facts at hand. But, there is support
for reading the provision as referring to disputes which have arisen from a
particular provision's interpretation and subsequent application to extant
facts. If the latter approach captures the essence of Article 279, foreign
state admission of violation would not detract from the obligation to settle
the dispute through the mechanisms provided in Part XV.
Interestingly, the Convention's immediate draft predecessor used the
much broader reference "relating to" rather than "concerning," when
describing the kinds of disputes within the parameters of Part XV.4 0
Notwithstanding this, there would seem to be two items militating against
accepting the usual interpretative inference drawn from this change in
language. First, the change was not accompanied by a reported suggestion
that it was intended to have substantive effect. When considered in light of
the fact that each draft predecessor of Article 279 - beginning with the
ISNT - contained "relating to" and, further, that that reference was
changed wherever it occurred in Part XV, the absence of any explanatory
suggestion seems quite significant. Second, peaceful settlement cannot be
avoided. Violations of specific or general limitations of the Convention
which are willingly admitted by the foreign state because of coastal state
inability to take responsive action will, in most instances, trigger the
resolution mechanisms of Chapter VI of the Charter. 03 In view of the
particularity of Part XV and its specific application to disputes involving
the law of the sea, 404 it would seem peculiar to apply the procedures of
Chapter VI to the states concerned. Indeed, the parties themselves may
resist this notion because the Convention provides them with procedures of
somewhat greater latitude.40 5 The better approach, however, would be to
have initial resort made to those provisions of the Convention designed to
deal with such matters, leaving the Charter to operate when the procedures
of Part XV of the 1982 Convention prove unproductive.
What if in the third alternative above the coastal decides to forego
communicating a representation of violation to the foreign state, choosing
402. See Draft Treaty, supra note 310, at art. 279, 19 Int'l Legal Materials at 1239.
Article 279 states: "The States Parties shall settle any dispute between them relating to the
interpretation or application of the Convention in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 2,
and shall seek a solution through the peaceful means indicated in paragraph 1 of Article 33,
of the Charter of the United Nations." Id.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 258 & 265.
404. Adede, Law of the Sea - The Integration of the System of Settlement of
Disputes Under the Draft Convention as a Whole, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 84 (1978).
405. Article 286 of the Convention obligates the states concerned to submit to
settlement by a court or tribunal. The controlling provision of the Charter, however, would
appear to be Article 37(1) and it obligates referral to the United Nations Security Council.
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to immediately pursue efforts directed at the elimination of an apparently
violative military undertaking? Is it conceivable that the coastal state may
prevail if it argues that since it has made no representation of violation no
dispute exists, and without a dispute, Part XV does not apply?
More than likely, a situation of this sort will only occur when a foreign
state military use has resulted in the emplacement of military objects
which, for reasons of secrecy or weakness, are left undefended by foreign
state forces. In whatever context it arises, the determinative issue will be
the existence or nonexistence of a "dispute." A representation followed
either by a denial or an admission coupled with a refusal to end a violation
produces a dispute. If no representation is made, perhaps a coastal state's
assertion that no dispute exists may be accurate. To conclude from this,
however, that the coastal state may thus take action directed at the
termination of ongoing military activities or the removal of military objects
seems incorrect. After all, although a dispute may not result from an
exchange of representations, once the coastal state commences efforts to
eliminate a use the foreign state has a strong interest in seeing continued, a
dispute would then seem to arise.
As envisioned by Part XV of the Convention, resolution of each of the
three preceding situations would initially be sought through the mecha-
nisms set forth in Article 33(1) of the U.N. Charter. 06 It is clear that the
Convention does not obligate the states concerned to abide by the results of
conciliation efforts .'0 7 No expression to this effect appears in the Conven-
tion with regard to negotiation, enquiry, mediation, and arbitration but the
same can probably be said with equal confidence. Passing beyond these
more general forms of dispute settlement, Articles 286-296 describe
compulsory procedures with binding decisions which come into play
whenever the more general procedures prove unproductive. 418 In essence, it
is anticipated that parties to the Convention will designate in writing one or
more of several listed bodies which will be looked to for resolution
assistance, when a dispute within the purview of Part XV arises. Article
290409 vests the designated bodies with the authority to prescribe provi-
sional measures appropriate under the circumstances, and this procedure
406. See 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art. 279,21 Int'l Legal
Materials at 1322 (quoted supra at note 398).
407. In this connection, see 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, supra note 15, at art.
284, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1322, which cross-references Annex V, id. at 1344-45.
Article 7(2) of Annex V provides: "The report of the [conciliation] commission, including
its conclusions or recommendations, shall not be binding upon the parties." Id.
408. Id. at arts. 286-96, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1322-24.
409. Id. at art. 290, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1323.
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is supplemented by Article 296410 which obligates states' parties to comply
with final decisions.
Unfortunately, resort to the procedures of Part XV may not result in a
resolution of the dispute. The dispute may be excluded4 " or excepted41
from the compulsory procedures which entail binding decisions. If the
compulsory procedures cannot be avoided, the entire gamut of procedures
may be utilized but the state which finds itself on the losing end may flatly
refuse to comply with an adverse judgment. In either of these situations,
reference to the Security Council under Article 37(1) of the Charter may
then be appropriate. 13 The determinative matter under Article 37(1) of
the Charter, of course, will concern whether the dispute is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Attention
must then be shifted from the existence or nonexistence of a representation
of violation, to the likelihood of military confrontation and the prospects of
preserving international stability.
The discussion of remedial action under the 1958 Shelf Convention
revealed five basic fact patterns in which the likelihood of military
confrontation and prospects for preserving international stability were
addressed. This delineation was made to ascertain the appropriateness of
utilization of the dispute settlement procedures set forth in Chapter VI.
Those same fact patterns recur here. Furthermore, conclusions associated
with each of those patterns under the 1958 Convention seem completely
transferable to the determination whether a dispute involving a foreign
state military undertaking unable to survive the rigors of the various
balancing tests of the 1982 Convention is "likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security." If, however, the dispute
involves an undertaking which satisfies the balancing tests by virtue of
being designed to restore the military balance but proves violative of the
1982 regime because it involves drilling or the use of installations and
structures which interfere with the coastal state's economic and resource-
related activities, the conclusions would not seem to be completely
transferable. In the exceptional cases where coastal state efforts to remove
military objects emplaced in violation of Article 60 or Article 81, or
terminate ongoing military activities violative of either provision, meet
with foreign state resistance, it is clear that the Security Council may
410. Id. at art. 296, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1324.
411. See id. at art. 297, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1324.
412. See id. at art. 298, 21 Int'l Legal Materials at 1325.
413. Article 37(1) of the U.N. Charter states: "Should the parties to a dispute of the
nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they
shall refer it to the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 37, para. 1.
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exercise its authority under Article 37(2) and recommend procedures or
methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. The possibility of resistance
would make the dispute one which is "likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security."
A situation involving a coastal state which lacks the ability to
undertake removal or termination efforts directed at a military use
contravening Article 60 or Article 81 presents an interesting comparison
between the 1958 and the 1982 regimes. As described in the discussion of
that earlier regime, if the foreign state military use, notwithstanding the
inability of the coastal state to take remedial action, created a threat
sufficient to prevent it from passing the balancing test, the peaceful
settlement obligation of Chapter VI applied. 41 4 It has already been
mentioned that the same result will obtain whenever any of the balancing
tests of the 1982 Convention cannot be met. If the problem, however,
involves nothing other than a simple violation of the prohibition on drilling
or the prohibition on installations and structures, Chapter VI would seem
applicable. In order to satisfy the requisites of one of the relevant balancing
tests, the foreign state military effort must be designed to restore military
parity, meet legitimate security concerns, and bolster international peace
and stability. That the military use nevertheless violates one of the
Convention's limitations of specific applicability does not transform the
dispute into one which is "likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security."4 15 This may be accomplished by coastal state
action directed at termination or removal, but when the coastal state lacks
the wherewithal to initiate such action cannot be accomplished by the mere
violation of either Article 60 or Article 81.
An entirely different result occurs when the foreign state lacks the
ability to resist removal of military objects but asserts that, since the
Convention's balancing tests have been satisfied, the objects have been
lawfully emplaced. To convince the Security Council of the accuracy of
this assertion, the foreign state must have acted to restore military
equilibrium and in a manner which strengthens international stability.
Under the 1958 regime it was concluded in such cases that the foreign state
may trigger the coastal state's obligation under Chapter VI. 16 That same
conclusion should apply under the 1982 Convention even if emplacement
of the foreign state's objects have violated the limitations on drilling or
installations and structures. Coastal state efforts to remove such objects
414. See supra text accompanying notes 262-65.
415. This is so because the violation strengthens security.
416. See supra notes 266-67.
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would threaten the maintenance of international peace and security by
posing a risk of resurrecting a military asymmetry. In fashioning its
recommended procedures or methods of adjustment or terms of settlement,
the Security Council should reflect on this factor and on the violative
nature of the foreign state military use.4 7
417. In most instances, use of the mechanisms established by Chapter VI will produce
a resolution of any of the types of disputes noted above. Reference to Security Council
enforcement under Articles 41 and 42 of Chapter VII may be required, however, if
resolution does not result and a continuation of any of the disputes and accompanying
activity are determined to constitute a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression." Only in the exceptional instance of the intransigent state being a permanent
member of the Security Council would reference to Chapter VII perhaps not end the
matter. Even in cases of that sort, however, it would seem that the difficult question of
whether recourse to unilateral armed force may then be had would not require an answer
where the coastal state lacks the ability to effect the removal of foreign state military objects
or where the foreign state maintains, and subsequently demonstrates, the lawfulness of its
military undertakings. In the former situation the reason is obvious, and in the latter it
proceeds from the fact that, since the lawfulness of the undertakings will be linked to
general military inferiority of the foreign state vis-a-vis the coastal state, resistance
requiring the use of force by the coastal state is very improbable. Unless the coastal state
considers the foreign state objects or activities so threatening, or the foreign state considers
them so essential to its own security as to warrant risking international confrontation, it is
unlikely the question of whether recourse to unilateral armed force may be had will ever
have to be addressed. The answer to that question, should it have to be addressed, appears
somewhat unsettled.
Under customary international law, states were entitled to use force against other
states if justified as a reprisal. The elements of justification are stated in the Naulilaa
Incident Arbitration, 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 1012 (Portuguese-German Arbitral
Tribunal, 1928), as being: (1) a previous or ongoing violation of international law by one
state affecting another; (2) an unsuccessful effort to redress the matter by peaceful means;
and (3) a reprisal which is reasonably proportionate to the legal wrong suffered. Under
customary international law, the use of force as a legitimate reprisal was approved in
instances where dictated by necessity. Assuming that these elements were satisfied, it would
appear customary international law would authorize the use of force directed at the removal
of objects or the termination of activities. Customary international law, however, is not the
only consideration. Many have argued that Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter signify
that the customary law right has been eliminated and that the use of force is justified only
when undertaken in self-defense. See D. BowErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
154-55 (1958); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
265-68 (1963); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE
POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 217-18 (1963); M. McDOUGAL & F.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 142-43, 207-08 (1952); Fitzmau-
rice, The General Principles of International Law - Considered From the Standpoint of
the Rule of Law 92 [II] RECUEIL DES COURS 5, 171 (1957). Some have even stood by this
view after acknowledging that the absence of law-enforcing power in the United Nations
may allow violations of international law that do not justify the use of force in self-defense to
go unpunished. See Fitzmaurice, The Foundations of the Authority of International Law
and the Problem of Enforcement, 19 MOD. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1956). This view is rationalized
as compelled by the "overwhelming common interest in basic order, and the exorbitant




The kinds of military uses which a foreign state might be interested in
undertaking on another state's continental shelf are limited only by
available technology. The uses of most immediate concern, however, relate
to the emplacement of detection devices, weapons, and other military
objects employed in modern ASW. This results from the position of the
United States, one of the two superpowers, which must rely heavily on the
deterrence potential of its ballistic missile launching submarines while
pursuing efforts to enhance the survivability of its imperiled land-based
ICBM force.
In assessing the military acceptability of the essentially proscriptive
regime described in the preceding pages - a regime which prohibits
foreign state military use in all but the most extreme situations - one must
be sensitive to the degree of dependence of the superpowers upon their
respective SLBM forces, the missions and capabilities of their respective
submarine fleets, the extent to which geography has resulted in disparities,
and finally, the advantages or disadvantages, on a comparative basis, of
opting for an alternative legal regime. With respect to the first, recent
indications suggest that with the number of strategic warheads on both the
American and the Soviet side in the vicinity of 10,00018 basing preferences
differ quite markedly. The United States has deployed slightly more than
50 percent of its strategic warheads on SLBMs, with less than 30 percent
on bombers and about 20 percent on ICBMs.' 19 The Soviet Union, on the
other hand, depends extensively on ICBMs, which carry a little over 70
percent of all its strategic warheads. Less than 20 percent of its warheads
are based on SLBMs and less than 10 percent on bombers.4 20 The
significantly large percentage of Soviet warheads based on ICBMs has
contributed to the vulnerability of the United States ICBM force." 1
FELICIANO, supra, at 208. Based on various interpretations of the language of Article 2(4),
others have arrived at a different position. See C. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 203 (1948). Cf J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 44, 94-98
(1958); D. BOWETT, supra, at 155 (noting "doubts as to the continued legality of forms of
self-help"). One way to reconcile the conflicting approaches is to view what is permitted in
the name of self-defense in a flexible manner. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra,
at 1-260, 679-89. Another approach would be to maintain the importance of construing
Article 2(4) in a manner which comports with the conduct states are generally expected to
engage in.







Additionally, the large Soviet percentage reveals an obvious difference in
degree of dependence of the two nations on SLBMs to deter strategic
conflict or nuclear gamesmanship.
The missions and capabilities of the ballistic missile launching and
attack submarines comprising the undersea fleets of the United States and
the Soviet Union are in some areas similar and in other areas as different as
the countries' dependence on SLBMs. The most conspicuous similarity
relates to ballistic missile launching submarines. On both sides, they
operate to perform the mission of strategic deterrence by maintaining a
nuclear reserve able to strike urban-industrial centers and other "soft"
targets in retaliation for attacks on ICBMs silos.'2 2 Slightly less conspicu-
ous, the attack submarines of both nations - whether nuclear powered
SSNs or diesel powered conventional submarines - seek to destroy the
opponent's ballistic missile launching submarines before they can reach a
target acquisition destination and seek to insulate their own ballistic
missile launching submarines against similar efforts of the opponent.
There is a clear difference, however, in the tactical mission of sea control.
Soviet attack submarines are poised to deny United States naval forces free
use of the oceans by cutting sea lines of communication."2" United States
attack submarines, on the other hand, are ready to be called upon to assert
sea control by hunting and killing Soviet attack submarines before they can
successfully cut off communication. While the United States does main-
tain a formidable denial capability, 42' the difference in mission objectives
can be accounted for by the comparative locations of the United States and
the Soviet Union in relation to the Eurasian land-mass. During a period of
confrontation, the Soviets can use inland routes to transport and supply
their armed forces. The United States, on the other hand, will be forced to
use sea routes to perform the same tasks.
Looking at the capabilities of the respective submarine fleets the
following facts appear. The United States currently operates 95 attack
submarines, most of which are SSNs, 23 and 3 3 ballistic missile launching
submarines, of which 31 are Poseidon SSBNs and 2 are Ohio-class Trident
422. See HOUSE COMM. ON INT'L RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., EVALUATION OF
FISCAL YEAR 1979 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS: TOWARDS MORE INFORMED
CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING 64 (Comm.
Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as ACIS 1979]. Note, however, that a counter-silo capable
SLBM force may be developed by the late 1980's or early 1990's. Id.
423. See Weinland, The State and Future of the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic, in
NEW STRATEGIC FACTORS, supra note 19, at 55, 66.
424. See Turner, The Naval Balance: Not Just A Numbers Game, 55 FOREIGN AFF.
339, 342-44 (1977).
425. Allen & Polmar, supra note 2.
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SSBNs.26 The 2 Trident SSBNs carry a total of 48 Trident I (C-4) nuclear
missiles427 armed with eight warheads apiece.42 8 Each missile has a range
of about 4,000 nautical miles.42 9 All 31 Poseidon SSBNs carry 16 missiles
apiece.4 0 Of the 31, 12 have been retro-fitted to carry a total of 192 Trident
I (C-4) nuclear missiles" 1 which pushes the total number of warheads on
Trident missiles to 1,920.48 The remaining 19 Poseidons are armed with a
total of 304 Poseidon (C-3) nuclear missiles433 carrying 10 warheads
each,4 3 4 thus placing the total number of SLBM warheads at 4,960.43 5 The
Poseidon C-3s have a range limitation of about 2,500 nautical miles." ,
The Soviet Union operates 280 attack submarines,4 37 a large number
of which are diesel powered,4 38 and 62 modern ballistic missile launching
submarines. 4, 9 Of the 62, there are 23 Yankee-class SSBNs;440 each is able
to carry 16 SS-N-6 missiles.4 41 As best as can be determined, only 17 of the
Y-class SSBNs carry the dual warhead SS-N-6; the balance have the
426. Stockholm Int'l Peace Research Inst., Yearbook of World Armaments and
Disarmament: 1983, 48 table 3.1 53 (1983) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI 1983]; Allen &
Polmar, supra note 2, at 12 (fixing the total United States SSBN fleet at 34).
427. SIPRI 1983, supra note 426, at 53.
428. Id. at 48, table 3.1.
429. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., Fiscal Year 1980 Arms Control Impact Statements 46
(Joint Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as ACIS 1980].
430. SIPRI 1983, supra note 426, at 53.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 48, table 3.1.
433. Id. at 53.
434. Id. at 48, table 3.1.
435. Id.
436. See Lindsey, The Future of Anti-Submarine Warfare and Its Impact on Naval
Activities in the North Atlantic, in NEW STRATEGIC FACTORS, supra note 19, at 139, 150.
437. Allen & Polmar, supra note 2, at 12.
.438. In 1977 it was reported that 178 of the Soviet's 250 attack submarines were diesel
powered, the remainder being SSNs. See Karber & Lellenberg, The State and Future of
U.S. Naval Forces in the North Atlantic, in NEW STRATEGIC FACTORS, supra note 19, at
30, 31 figure 1.
439. SIPRI 1983, supra note 426, at 57. In 1982 it was reported that an additional
nine older version ballistic missile submarines were being operated. See STOCKHOLM INT'L
PEACE RESEARCH INST., YEARBOOK OF WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: 1982,
276-77, app. 7A (1982) [hereinafter cited as SIPRI 1982].
440. SIPRI 1982, supra note 439, at 276, app. 7A.
441. Id. The words "able to carry" were deliberately used. Given that the 23 Y-class
SSBNs are reported to have 16 SS-N-6 tubes apiece, they might carry a total of 368
missiles. Since SIPRI 1982 also reported that one Hotel III class SSBN had 6 SS-N-6
tubes, the total of SS-N-6 missiles in the Soviet arsenal should be 374. That was the figure
reported by SIPRI 1982 for SS-N-6 and SS-N-6 MRV, id., but SIPRI 1983, supra note
426, at 49, table 3.2, reports 358. This suggests one Y-class SSBN may not be armed.
Undoubtedly it is kept in port.
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single warhead version.44 2 Coupling these figures with the booster capabil-
ity of the SS-N-6, the Y-class SSBNs should be able to deliver 646
warheads443 to targets between 1,300-1,600 nautical miles in distance.4 '
Rounding out the total number of modern nuclear powered ballistic missile
launching submarines operated by the Soviet Union are 1 Yankee II (Y-II)
class,44 5 18 Delta I (D-I) class, 4 6 4 Delta II (D-II) class, "44 and 16 Delta
III (D-III) class SSBNs.4" The Y-II class SSBN carries 12 SS-N-17
missiles,44 9 each armed with a single warhead45 0 and having a range of
2,500 nautical miles.451 The D-I and D-II class SSBNs both carry the
single warhead SS-N-8,'452 which has a 4,300 nautical mile range;45 each
D-I can be armed with 12 missiles4 4 and each D-II with 16 .45 Pushing the
total possible number of warheads deliverable by modern Soviet SSBNs to
2,730 are the 16 D-Ill class submarines able to carry 16456 SS-N-18
missiles457 apiece; each missile is armed with 7 warheads 4 8 and has a range
limitation of 4,050 nautical miles.4 9 . Once the newest Soviet SSBN - the
Typhoon - becomes fully operational, 60 the total possible number of
warheads deliverable should be increased by 200. The Typhoon is able to
carry 20 SS-NX-20 SLBMs461 with 10 warheads apiece462 to targets
442. SIPRI 1982 reported that 23 Y-class and one Hotel III class SSBNs carry SS-N-
6 missiles. SIPRI 1982, supra note 439, at 276, app. 7A. It also reported that there were 102
SS-N-6s and 272 SS-N-6 MRVs. Id. at 277, app. 7A. Since the Hotel III class SSBN and
six Y-class SSBNs together could carry the 102 SS-N-6s, the other 17 Y-class SSBNs must
carry the multiple warhead SS-N-6.
443. This figure is based on 102 single warheads SS-N-6s and 272 dual warhead SS-
N-6s as reported SIPRI 1982. See supra note 442. But see SIPRI 1983, supra note 426, at
49, table 3.2 (reporting a total of 614).
444. SIPRI 1982, supra note 439, at 277, app. 7A.





450. SIPRI 1983, supra note 426, at 48, table 3.2.
451. See T. Dupuy, G. HAYES & J. ANDREWS, THE ALMANAC OF WORLD NAVAL
POWER 335 (4th ed. 1980).






458. SIPRI 1983, supra note 426, at 49, table 3.2.
459. SIPRI 1982, supra note 439, at 277, app. 7A.
460. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER 7 (1983) (reporting that one
Typhoon was being placed on duty).
461. SIPRI 1983, supra note 426, at 57.
462. Id. at 49, table 3.2.
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approximately 4,200 nautical miles4" 3 from launch location.4 14
In 1977 it was estimated that approximately 70 percent of the Soviet
Union's SSBN force was stationed with the Northern Fleet in Murmansk/
Polyarnyy on the Kola Peninsula above Scandinavia.' 65 Recent informa-
tion from the Department of Defense, however, notes that about 14 Delta-
and 10 Yankee-class SSBNs are stationed with the Pacific Fleet at both
Vladivostok, north of Korea, and the Siberian Port of Petropavlovsk, on the
Pacific side of the Kamchatka Peninsula. 4"6 Relying upon the figures
above, 24 Delta- and 14 Yankee-class SSBNs"71 - with 1 Typhoon-class
coming on-line - are left for location with the Northern Fleet. Obviously,
this means there has been a slight reduction in the percentage of the Soviet
SSBN force stationed with the Northern Fleet. By contrast, the United
States' SSBN force is predominantly an Atlantic fleet. Specifically, the 31
Poseidons are stationed at Charleston, South Carolina and 1 Trident is
stationed at Kings Bay, Georgia. 4'68 The second Trident is located at
Bangor, Washington.4 ' From all indications, most of the Trident force will
ultimately be based on the Pacific side of the continental United States. 4
Geographical disparities have been utilized by the United States to
the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. As the darkened blocks on Appendix
No.1 indicate, long-range acoustic devices (and perhaps other military
objects as well) have been deployed in the passages between Bear Island
and the northern coast of Norway; between Greenland, Iceland, and the
southwestern shore of Spain; between Newfoundland, the Azores, and the
southwestern shore of Spain; around Gibraltar; along the Aleutian Island
chain and the Kurile Basin to the northern shore of Japan; and between
Japan and South Korea.471 The result has been that no Soviet submarine
entering the Atlantic from Murmansk/Polyarnyy is able to escape
detection. 72 Presumably, the same can be said about those submarines
463. Id. at 57 (8300 kilometers).
464. The total number of warheads has been reported at 2,813. SIPRI 1983, supra
note 426, at 49. The 2,730 figure is an estimate based on SIPRI 1982 figures, designed to
reflect what the Soviets could deliver given the number of SSBNs, the number of missile
tubes on 'each SSBN, and current multiple reentry vehicle capability.
465. Hoist, The Strategic Importance of the North Atlantic: Some Questions for the
Future, in NEw STRATEGIC FACTORS, supra note 19, at 169.
466. See U.S. Dep't of Defense, supra note 460, at 22.
467. Id. (fixing total number of Yankee Class SSBNs with Northern Fleet at 15).
468. See id.
469. Id.
470. See ACIS 1980, supra note 429, at 44-45.




stationed in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk which leave home port for a
patrol location in the Pacific.4 " The absence of comparable passage zones
along the coasts of the United States has meant that Soviet ASW efforts
have been confined to specific point oriented activities, leaving United
States ballistic missile launching nuclear submarines with unimpeded
open-access to the protective security of the deep ocean. 74
The cone-shaped figures on Appendix No. 1 indicate the portions of
the United States which Soviet SS-N-8s, SS-N- 1 8s, and SS-NX-20s could
hit if launched from, respectively, the D-I and II, D-III, and Typhoon-class
SSBNs sitting in the safety of home port at Murmansk/Polyarnyy or
Petropavlovsk. These figures reflect a range of 4,200 nautical miles.
Missiles with such a range would be unable to reach the United States if
launched from the safety of Vladivostok. Clearly, the shorter range SS-N-
6s and SS-N- 17s would be unable to reach the United States from any of
the Soviet SSBN bases.
Appendix No. 2, a polar projection map which pictures the world from
an imaginary vantage point situated high above the North Pole, reflects the
same features as Appendix No. 1. The darkened blocks indicate the
location of the United States' ASW network and the cone-shaped figures
indicate the portions of the United States which the longest range Soviet
SLBMs could hit if launched from Murmansk/Polyarnyy or Pe-
tropavlovsk. Unlike Appendix No. 1, however, Appendix No. 2 eliminates
the distortion in both the distance and in the course which missiles
launched from such locations would travel in order to reach targets in the
United States. Therefore, it presents a significantly more accurate view.
Missiles launched from Petropavlovsk could reach targets only in the
northwestern one-quarter of the continental United States. Those from
Murmansk/Polyarnyy could cover only the northernmost one-quarter of
the contiguous forty-eight states. Even if a complementary launch from
both locations were to be undertaken, two-thirds of the United States
would fall beyond range, including the southwest, midwest, and southeast.
Operating on the same premise, Appendix No. 3 indicates those
portions of the Soviet Union which come within range of the 4,000 nautical
mile Trident I (C-4) missiles stationed aboard the Ohio-class Trident
submarine in Bangor, Washington. The C-4 missiles stationed aboard the
other Ohio-class Trident submarine located in Kings Bay, Georgia, as well
as those aboard 12 of the 31 Poseidon SSBNs in Charleston, South
473. See id. at 104, 114 (submarines from Petropavlovsk have open access to deep sea,
but submarines must still transit areas monitored by United States Navy).
474. Id. at 104.
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Carolina, cannot reach the Soviet Union from the safety of home port. The
Poseidon C-3 missiles aboard the other 19 Poseidon SSBNs would be
unable to reach anything more than the northeasternmost tip of Siberia,
even if moved to the United States' forward-most base in the Pacific
Northwest. Clearly, the longest range missiles would subject only the
northeastern one-third of the Soviet Union to attack. The heavily popu-
lated and more industrialized south and southwestern portions of the
country would escape the direct effects of an SLBM exchange.
For United States submarine launched ballistic missiles to obtain full
coverage of Soviet land territory, the SSBNs carrying them must leave
home port, cross the continental shelf, and sail to the high seas beyond.
Soviet SSBNs that are capable of launching missiles against United States
targets must do the same. Appendix No. 2 illustrates by asterisks some
possible launch locations for the longest range SLBMs operational in the
Soviet Union. Possible launch locations for the longest range United States
SLBMs are illustrated on Appendix No. 3 in a similar fashion. Bearing in
mind the general location of these launching sites, is it possible that there
may be some merit to an argument that a regime permitting foreign state
military use of another state's continental shelf would be just as acceptable
as the proscriptive regime discussed at great length above? If each super-
power is entitled to use the other's shelf for the establishment of an ASW
network capable of detecting and, if necessary, destroying the other's
SSBNs before they are able to reach appropriate target acquisition
destinations, does not the opportunity to one state simply counterbalance
the opportunity to the other?This line of reasoning overlooks one terribly important and determi-
native fact. In order for United States SSBNs to reach full coverage launch
locations, they currently need not transit any Soviet ASW network. Soviet
SSBNs, however, cannot reach the regularly used patrol locations -
reflected on Appendix No. 2 by the crisscross figures in the Atlantic and
Pacific475 - and bring all the United States within range of their SLBMs
without passing through the extensive ASW network operated by the
United States and its Allies. Therefore, if one were to take the position that
the most acceptable international legal regime is one which permits each of
the superpowers to use the other's shelf for military purposes, the Soviets
would be benefitted and the United States disadvantaged. If the Soviets
availed themselves of their international legal right by establishing an
ASW network on the continental shelf extending off each of the three
coasts of the United States, they would enhance their strategic position by
475. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET MILITARY POWER 84-85 (1982).
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adding the United States' SLBMs to the list of jeopardized weapons, which
already includes the United States' land-based ICBM force. The conse-
quences for world order might well prove untoward. It is irrelevant that the
United States would have an equally legitimate claim to move its existing
ASW network further landward. Soviet SSBNs are already subject to the
threat posed by the United States' ASW network since they cannot reach
full coverage launch locations without passing the barrier established by
that network.
One cannot ignore the fact that approximately 55 percent of the
United States' SSBNs, as opposed to about 15 percent of the Soviet
Union's SSBNs, are on patrol at any one time.476 This presents much more
than just a perceptible increase in the coverage United States SLBMs have
of Soviet territory. Theoretically, ballistic missiles aboard SSBNs on
patrol could be coupled with those held in the safety of home port and, if
launched from appropriate locations, used to provide full coverage of all
Soviet targets. This should not enhance, however, the acceptability of a
permissive regime. As alluded to earlier, SLBMs are designed for use
against urban-industrial centers and are thus second-strike weapons.4 77 Of
necessity, then, they are held in reserve and therefore become subject to
destruction by SSNs during the intervening period between reciprocal
land-based ICBM strikes and the kind of counterforce damage assessment
that would warrant a directive which would result in the SLBMs being
launched. Any regime permitting the Soviets to establish an ASW
network, even though the network is capable only of detecting United
States submarines crossing the continental shelf while steaming from
home port to the deep ocean, would increase the chances of Soviet SSNs
immediately picking up and trailing those carrying SLBMs. This change
would place United States SSBNs in greater jeopardy than they now face
and might well further erode the strategic balance.
476. ACIS 1979, supra note 422, at 104.
477. See Ball, The Counterforce Potential of American SLBM Systems, 1 J. PEACE
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